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Abstract
This thesis covers three empirical analyses on the economics of criminal justice, completed
using a new micro-dataset that links up the administrative criminal, employment and
beneﬁts records of oﬀenders in England and Wales.
The ﬁrst analysis considers the eﬀectiveness of post-custody supervision in reducing
recidivism and improving labour market outcomes. It employs a regression discontinuity
design and to exploit an age cut-oﬀ point in the compulsory provision of post-custody
supervision, and ﬁnds that there are no eﬀects on recidivism, employment or beneﬁts
outcomes, contrary to the belief that lead to a recent policy change.
The second analysis considers the labour market eﬀect, or scarring, of criminal con-
victions. It employs a distributed lag model with ﬁxed eﬀects to estimate the potential
damage to earnings and employment likelihood of a criminal conviction. It ﬁnds evidence
that contrary to the popular belief (and simple OLS results), once individual ﬁxed ef-
fects are controlled for, a criminal conviction even in the event where the punishment is
i mprisonment is only associated with moderate damages.
The third analysis considers the eﬀect of prison sentences on later outcomes. After
the England riots in 2011, judges in riot areas were statistically handing out more prison
sentences to oﬀenders who had nothing to do with riots than judges in non-riot areas.
This creates a valid instrument for testing the eﬀect of imprisonment (at least on non-
rioters). It shows that once self-selection is controlled for, prison sentences can in fact
induce reduction in recidivism, likely through speciﬁc deterrence, but the eﬀect dies out
after 6 months and gives way to criminogenic factors. There are no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects on employment, at least not within one year, though somewhat surprisingly the
estimates tend to be positive rather than negative.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is concerned with the economics of criminal justice.
The seminal paper by Becker (1968) in which the ﬁrst economic model of crime was
proposed kickstarted economists' contribution to this important public policy area that
was traditionally studied by physchologists and criminologists. Yet, to this date there
remains considerable evidence and knowledge gaps, particularly around the empirical
implication of the complicated interaction and feedback loop between crime and other
outcomes, and in general the eﬀectiveness of criminal justice punishment in reducing re-
cidivism. This is somewhat reﬂected in the variance observed between diﬀerent countries'
justice policies - for example the United States have adopted a much more punitive appro-
ach and system than in Europe, with Scandinavia on the opposite side of the spectrum.
The literature on the determinants of crime is vast, as will be touched on in chapter
2, and in the face of inter-country diﬀerences on so many relevant levels, it is hard to
simply infer what diﬀerences in criminal justice system can make to those complicated
interactions. The problem is further complicated by the fact that experiments in this
policy area would be considered unethical or putting public safety at risk (say assignment
to custody is by a random lottery so some petty crime oﬀenders would be over punished
or serious oﬀenders would be on the loose). Observational data are the only source to
generate evidence. Early empirical research was based on aggregated cohort data, which
is ﬁne to a point but there are obvious limits. For most part the lack of good quality
micro-data has been a stumbling block to progress in the empirical literature. But this
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is starting to change. For example, Norway is particularly good at making use of its
existing administrative micro-datasets and linking them up to allow hollistic analyses of
many policy areas including crime and criminal justice. This is evident in its emerging
status as the hotbed for social policy empirical analyses.
In this thesis I take advantage of a new data-sharing initiative between the justice and
labour departments in the UK government, in which a new micro-dataset encompassing
crime, beneﬁts and labour market outcomes of oﬀenders in the UK is created for the ﬁrst
time, to shed light on three topics that are part of the current policy debate but without
empirical consensus. Each topic is discussed in a chapter, following an overview of the
literature on the economics of crime and criminal justice in chapter 2, and a description
of the aforementioned new dataset in chapter 3.
My ﬁrst empirical contribution, discussed in chapter 4, is to the debate on the eﬀective-
ness of post-custody supervision in inﬂuencing outcomes. I use Regression Discontinuity
Design to exploit a previous policy feature in the England and Wales criminal justice
system in identifying the treatment eﬀect of a 3-month post-custody supervision period
on later outcomes. According to the law before 2015, within the group of adult oﬀenders
sentenced to less than 12 months in custody, the allocation to post-custody supervision
is completely determined by age: only those under 21 at the time of conviction are on
licence upon release. Using the new micro-dataset I ﬁnd that the 3-month supervision pe-
riod, during which oﬀenders have to comply with conditions and undertake programmes
aimed at reducing their recidivism, has no impact on 1-, 2- and 3-year recidivism, beneﬁt
claim and employment outcomes. Results from Duration Analysis applied in a Regression
Discontinuity spirit further reveal that not even very short term impact can be detected,
such as speciﬁc deterrence or incapacitation eﬀect during the 3 months on licence. The
robustness checks all return satisfactory results and point towards a very strong RD de-
sign, endowing my estimates with very high validity. In 2015, the law was changed such
that all adult oﬀenders sentenced to custody, regardless of sentence length and age, shall
be supervised on a mandatory basis for a minimum of 12 months. The implication of my
results for the current policy debate is that an expansion of the provision of post-custody
supervision in its previous form to simply more oﬀenders may not be a cost-eﬀective
measure in preventing recidivism and facilitating oﬀenders' social re-integration.
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My second empirical contribution, discussed in chapter 5, is on the eﬀect of crimi-
nal convictions on labour market outcomes. The popular belief, as evident from a quick
internet search, appears to be that a criminal record would cause long term and potenti-
ally irreversible damage to employability and hence earnings. This is consistent with the
observation one can get from studying the cross-sectional diﬀerences between groups of
oﬀenders and non-oﬀenders. However, cross-sectional diﬀerences do not infer causality,
but merely correlation. Utilising the panel structure within said dataset, I estimate the
relationship between criminal record and labour market outcomes by using a distributed
lag model with ﬁxed eﬀects. I ﬁnd mild negative eﬀects of convictions on employment
likelihood that persist for at least 10 quarters, and some evidence that the damage on
earnings dies out after 10 quarters. This is in line with a hypothesis of statistical discrimi-
nation combined with employer learning. I estimate the eﬀect by punishment type, and
ﬁnd consistent with the existing literature that a prison spell has the largest and most
persistent negative eﬀect, while less severe punishments like ﬁnes and police cautions have
smaller eﬀects. There is little evidence that crime types matter. I test another hypothesis
whereby employment experience to date becomes a more useful signal of true producti-
vity in the presence of a criminal record and ﬁnd mixed support. I carry out the analysis
separately for two periods, before and after the recent great economic crisis which I deﬁne
as started in 2008.1I ﬁnd that the results are somewhat diﬀerent and inconsistent. The
diﬀerence can be explained by a compositional change in the productivity of oﬀenders,
and anecdotal evidence suggests this could be the case. The policy implication is that
the labour market eﬀect of a criminal conviction may not be as severe as many, including
policymakers, fear. More important drivers for the poor labour market outcomes of pe-
ople with criminal records may lie with other channels that require policy interventions
of diﬀerent type at a diﬀerent stage in oﬀenders lives, such as education.
My third empirical contribution, discussed in chapter 6, is on the eﬀect of custody on
recidivism and employment outcome. This is a popular area of research with numerous
recent contributions, largely due to availability of new datasets around the world that
1The technical start date of the crisis is debatable as ﬁrst sign of stress in the ﬁnancial system surfaced
in August 2007 when the French bank PNB Paribus shut down two of its investment funds. Nonetheless,
it was not until 2008 that oﬃcial UK statistics conﬁrmed the beginning of a sustained decreased in GDP.
Also, the crisis only fully sank in (and was characterised) when American investment bank Lehman
Brothers failed in September 2008 and British banks RBS, HBOS and Lloyds TSB were rescued by the
UK Government.
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follow oﬀenders' journey through the criminal justice system and link across multiple
outcomes. By far the most common strategy in circumventing the self-selection into
custody issue has been to exploit the randomness in allocating court cases to judges who
inherently exhibit diﬀerent level of harshness as a source of exogenous variation. While
this is a popular strategy, it is not problem-free. Court cases are often complex and
what is observed as innate harshness to the econometrician may in fact capture features
that are observed outside hard data and endogeneity may result. In this thesis, I take
a diﬀerent approach to the literature and exploit the England riots of 2011 as a natural
experiment for exogenous variation in punishment disposal. The riots broke out on a scale
that was unseen in the UK for several decades and it is well documented that the criminal
justice response was very swift and judges were particularly harsh towards rioters during
sentencing to send a message - for example a teenager was sentenced to 10 months in
custody for stealing two left-footed trainers in Wolverhampton, England. I demonstrate
that this extra harshness spilled over to non-rioters who committed similar oﬀences, but
only in the riot-aﬀected areas. Eﬀectively, non-rioting oﬀenders who happened to be
trialled in the riot areas after the riots faced an exogenous 10% hike in their odds of being
sentenced to custody. Using the riot as an instrument, I ﬁnd that incarceration induces
very short-lived speciﬁc deterrence eﬀect but it fades away after 6 months and gives way
to criminogenic factors. There is no signiﬁcant eﬀect on employment at least within one
year. The analysis also shows that prior employment record explains quite a lot of the
variation in post-custody outcomes, again suggesting ﬁxed eﬀects at the point of prison
entry are important.





In this chapter I provide a review of both the theoretical and empirical literature on the
economics of crime and criminal justice, with the aim of understanding the current state
of knowledge and the existing gaps that may be plugged with the new micro-dataset in
the UK, which I describe in more detail in the next chapter.
Economists have long contributed to answering the important policy question of cri-
minal justice, but there is not always consensus, both in the theoretical and empirical
literature. While economic modelling of criminal behaviour and responses to criminal jus-
tice have in general progressed from a simple static perspective to a more sophisticated
dynamic perspective, the extra analytical demand that comes with the latter, combined
with a lack of individual datasets on behaviour, means that empirical testing of a struc-
tural dynamic model of crime has so far proven to be diﬃcult. Even for simpler kinds of
testing of particular structural or reduced-form parameters, there are numerous empirical
challenges such as heterogeneity, eﬀect of unobservable traits, selection, and simultaneity
to name a few.
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2.2 Modelling punishment and crime
Criminal behaviour has long been studied by psychologists, criminologists and social
researchers. Economists only joined the ﬁeld rather recently, after Becker's seminal paper
in 1968 on a simple rational model of crime. Since then, more sophisticated models
have been developed and the literature has grown quickly. In this section, I describe
and discuss the three main classes of model used in the literature to explain criminal
behaviour: static, dynamic and behavioural. Apart from a few exceptions, I use the
same notation for common variables across models. I also identify the implications of
punishment on crime in these models, which is an useful exercise for the next section,
where I review the empirical literature, link the empirical ﬁndings to the models and
contemplate whether any reduced form or structural parameters related to the eﬀect of
punishment on crime have been identiﬁed to this date.
2.2.1 Static model: Becker (1968)
The ﬁrst model of crime was developed by Becker (1968). In this simple model, an
individual is rational and choose to commit crime if the expected utility from it is greater
the expected utility from not committing crime. More formally, let Wc,i be the monetary
plus psychological income for agent i from committing the crime he is faced with, Ww,i
be his income from work (outside option), pi be the probability of conviction (in a simple
model this is assumed to be exogenous and constant across i), Fi be the punishment and
Ui be the utility function, then an individual choose to commit an oﬀence if:
piUi(Wc,i − Fi) + (1− pi)Ui(Wc,i) > Ui(Ww,i). (2.1)
Let Oi be the oﬀence function for person i (one can think of it either as total number
of oﬀences committed by i or the propensity of committing an oﬀence). Then it is clear
that Oi is a function of pi, Wc,i, Fi and Ww,i:
Oi = O(pi, Wc,i, Fi, Ww,i). (2.2)
From equation (1), assuming utility is increasing in Wi and decreasing in Fi, we can
6













This very simple model powerfully predicts that the number of oﬀence increases in
returns to crime, and decreases in probability of conviction, severity of punishment and
returns to legitimate work (outside option). Note that these predictions do not rely on
the sign of the second derivative of the utility function, ie preference to risk. Whether
an individual is risk-averse or risk-loving does not aﬀect the direction of the eﬀects, but
the relative magnitude. A risk-loving person has convex utility and so would react more
to a unit change in pi, the risk factor, than to a unit change in Fi, the negative return
to crime if caught. If it is assumed that criminals are risk-lovers, then this would imply
policies that raise the probabilities of conviction are more eﬀective than those that increase
punishment in combating crime. To some extent, the argument that criminals are risk
preferrers is supported by the empirical literature, which I will discuss in section 3. These
predictions form the basis of a lot of the empirical work, and also the rationale behind
traditional crime-control policies such as increasing the presence of police, building new
prisons and handing down tougher sentences. Becker's model is simple to understand, but
has several important limitations to its usefulness for drawing policy implications. Firstly,
it assumes that participations in legal and illegal activities are mutually exclusive, which is
not supported by data. Second, it has no dynamic structure. Third, the oﬀence function
should be endogenous in its determinants. For example, probability of arrest is likely to
change as a person commits a crime repeatedly, or the legitimate income that one gets
is likely to be partly driven by the number of oﬀence he commits. Subsequent models
represent attempts to rectify some of these issues.
2.2.2 Static model: Ehrlich (1973)
The other prominent static model of crime is that of Ehrlich (1973), which is an extension
to the simple rational choice model of Becker. Instead of modelling the choice of commit-
ting crime or staying legitimate as a one-oﬀ expected utility comparison across uncertain
states, this model allows for simultaneous earning of both legal and illegal (crime) income
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through a time-allocation set up that is also based on expected utility maximization. This
model improves from the Becker model by capturing quite rightly the notion that many
crimes are in fact carried out by individuals who also have legitimate earnings.
The essence of the formal set-up is as follows (from now I suppress i subscript for
ease of notation). An individual can allocate his time within a period to leisure, legal
work and crime participation, denoted by tl, tw and tc. Income from legal work Ww is
now a monotonic function in tw, and income from crime Wc is a monotonic function in
tc. Income from legal work is certain, while that from illegal work depends upon the
realization of for example the two states of world: state a, where the individual is caught
and convicted with probability p at the end of the period, or state b, where the individual
gets away with crime with probability 1 − p. If caught, the individual suﬀers a loss Fi,
which is a function of tc. Finally, utility within the period is a function of leisure, and of
total earnings Xa or Xb depending on the realized state. We can write
Xa = Ww(tw) +Wc(tc)− F (tc) (2.3)
and
Xb = Ww(tw) +Wc(tc). (2.4)
The individual then makes a decision on time allocation between leisure, legal and illegal
work by maximizing expected utility,
EU(X, tl) = pU(Xa, tl) + (1− p)U(Xb, tl), (2.5)
with respect to tc, tw and tl, subject to various time, resource and nonnegativity con-
straints. By taking Kuhn-Tucker ﬁrst order conditions, it is easy to see that an interior
solution for allocation between tw and tc must satisfy the following equality:
− (wc − ww)
(wc − f − ww) =
pU ′(Xa)
(1− p)U ′(Xb) (2.6)
where the small letters w and f are the ﬁrst derivatives of W and F with respect to their
arguments. From equation (6), we can identify the factors determining allocation of time
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to legal and illegal activities as risk attitude, marginal expected return to crime and work,
and marginal penalty. Note that the extreme allocation is that of total specialization in
either crime or work, and this could happen, taking specialization in crime as an example,
as a result of constant marginal wage and marginal penalty combined with preference for
risky returns. This model can also be generalized easily to accommodate more than two
uncertain states of the world, for example incorporating unemployment probabilities in
legitimate work.
In terms of comparative statics, the implications of this model are similar to the simple
Becker model. An increase in either p or f would, holding other variables constant, reduce
at the margin incentives to take part in crime. The relative magnitude of the two, again
as in the Becker model, depends on the risk attitude, with risk preferrer reacting more
to p. Similarly, a ceteris paribus increase in the legal-illegal income diﬀerential would at
the margin reduce incentives to allocate time to illegal activities. Ehrlich's more general
model of choice has also given new insights that are consistent with stylized facts, such
as the extent of participation in crime is important in determining response to p or f .
Suppose an individual specializes in crime, ie the solution to his utility maximization
results in a corner solution, then his allocation is unlikely to be aﬀected by small changes
to p, f , or the income diﬀerential. This gives an important policy implication - that
'hardcore' criminals may require diﬀerent policy treatment to deter.
There are other static models in the literature such as Grogger (1998), but as they give
similar insights to the above models, particularly in terms of the eﬀect of punishment, I
will move on now. While static models are certainly useful starting points for thinking
about criminal behaviour and corresponding crime-deterring policy, the simpliﬁcations
that individuals only consider one-period utility when making choices, and policy tools
such as p and f only aﬀect decisions and payoﬀs within the period during which the
criminal opportunity arises, are inherently unrealistic. Also, in these models deterrence
is the only eﬀect that punishment has on oﬀenders. In reality, the eﬀect of punishment is
more than that and could last well beyond the sentence length. For example, a criminal
record can alter one's future legitimate opportunity and foster the propensity to reoﬀend
in the future. Also, time spent in prison may present a chance for the criminal to learn
tricks from other inmates, thus improving his expected future illegal returns. These
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together may oﬀset any dynamic deterrence of punishment, if the individual values the
resulting increased expected illegal returns more than the legitimate income (subdued by
having a criminal record) loss in the future.
Thinking in a dynamic framework would open up new policy insights, such as human
capital investment (education) early in life may reduce incentives for crime participation
later. Clearly, static models, no matter how sophisticated, are not enough to capture the
incentives mechanism fully, and not so amenable to counterfactual policy experiment. To
this end, various eﬀorts have been made in the literature to put a dynamic structure on
criminal behaviour. Below I describe three such dynamic models.
2.2.3 Dynamic model: Imai and Krishna (2004)
The ﬁrst model I discuss is that of Imai and Krishna (2004). It is one of the early papers
that takes a dynamic structural approach in modelling crime, employment and deterrence.
Their approach allows current crime participation choices to be aﬀected by both past
arrests and future consequences (wage and employment opportunities) of today's actions.
Its spirit is close to a dynamic extension of Becker's seminal model.
The choice set of a person is simple: to commit a crime or not. If he gets caught,
his high school graduation, employment, wages can all be aﬀected, which in turn aﬀect
his choice. To do this, past criminal record is allowed to aﬀect the probability of gradu-
ation, employment and wage distribution draws. The model also allows for unobserved
heterogeneity.
From now on, I use t to denote point in time, rather than time resource. The state
space of the model St at any time contains the following variables: time t age, criminal
record, high school attendance, high school graduation, unemployment and wage. Crimi-
nal records depreciate at rate δCR. Each period, either 1 or 0 is added to the depreciated
criminal record carried over from the previous period, depending on if the individual com-
mits a crime and gets caught or not. The probability of unemployment takes standard
logit form and is aﬀected by age, high school graduation, criminal record in previous pe-
riod and unemployment status in previous period. High school attendance is exogenous,
but the probability of high school graduation takes standard logit form and is endogenous
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in criminal record at graduation age. The starting wage follows lognormal distribution,
with the mean of the distribution aﬀected by criminal record. The growth of wage is also
assumed to follow lognormal distribution, with the mean aﬀected by age and criminal
record.
The utility of not committing a crime Un(St) is interpreted also as the utility of not
getting caught. It depends on age (ﬂexibly, with change of intercept and slope at key
ages such as 17 and 18), unemployment status, wages, high school graduation status and
criminal record. The utility of committing a crime Uc(St) is taken to be the direct gain
and depends on age, unemployment status and criminal record.
The value of not committing a crime is
Vn,t(St) = Un(St) + βE[Vt+1(St+1) St, not arrested in t] + n,t (2.7)
and the value of committing a crime is
Vc,t(St) = Uc(St) + pβE[Vt+1(St+1) St , arrested in t]+
(1− p){Un(St) + βE[Vt+1(St+1) St , not arrested in t] + c.t (2.8)
where the 's are i.i.d extreme valued distributed utility shocks, β is discount rate and
p is the probability of getting caught. The value of committing contains Un(St) because
it is assumed that if he does not get caught after committing a crime, then he enjoys
the beneﬁts from crime as well as the beneﬁts of an otherwise normal life. An individual
enters the period knowing the state space vector St. After the realization of 's occur, he
makes the decision to commit a crime or not. The value function is hence:
Vt(St) = MaxVn,t(St), Vc,t(St). (2.9)
The above is an outline of the essence of the model. As mentioned, it is a dynamic
treatment of Becker's model, and considers eﬀects of punishment outside pure deterrence
in the traditional sense, ie a one-oﬀ disutility. That it allows dynamic and endogenous
relationships between crime, employment and graduation makes it a valuable contribution
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to the literature. The main implication for eﬀect of punishment is that, as the future state
space, ie status of graduation, employment and wage, is negatively aﬀected by today's
punishment (arrest), a dynamic deterrence mechanism is created through these channels.
However, there are several drawbacks to it. First, it does not capture the eﬀect of im-
prisonment appropriately. It does not allow multiple period or severity of punishment,
which is important for thinking about the incapacitation and speciﬁc deterrent eﬀect in
a dynamic model. Also, the time t disutility of punishment is modelled as giving up
Un(St) within the period, but in general should be more than that because, for example,
of the unpleasant experience in prison and potential ramiﬁcations on future state space.
In pursuit of simplicity, the model has forgone an important policy instrument in f . For
these reasons, the model is perhaps not realistic and does not allow simulation of any
policy that increases the severity or length of sentence. Second, it is a complicated model
driven by a lot of parametric assumptions that are diﬃcult to fully justify. Although the
authors brought the model to data and generated some Maximum Likelihood estimates,
the results may change if diﬀerent assumptions are used. The complexity of the model
also makes it unfriendly for testing using other data. Third, it does not have the more
realistic time allocation feature as in Ehrlich (1973). Fourth, it assumes a long time
horizon in the oﬀender's evaluation of the value function, which may be too strong an
assumption for this group of individuals.
2.2.4 Dynamic model: Sickles and Williams (2008)
Instead of modelling crime as a binary yes-or-no decision, Sickles and Williams (2008)
present a dynamic treatment of the Ehrlich (1973) time allocation model, augmented with
a 'social' capital accumulation perspective.
Social capital Kt represents reputation and status in society. Such capital naturally
depreciates at rate δK , but individuals can also accumulate it through spending time ωt
on work, or reduce it through spending time Ct on committing a crime and consequently
getting caught. Recall that a denote the state in which the individual is arrested and b
the state where he is not, then
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Ka,t+1 = δKKt − αCtKt, (2.10)
and
Kb,t+1 = δKKt + γωt, (2.11)
where α transforms time spent in crime into stigma, and γ transforms time in labour
market into social capital (eg building up network and reputation). Notice in this model
that having a higher level of social capital aﬀects positively the cost of punishment. This
captures the notion quite appropriately that people with higher social status, such as a
public ﬁgure, often suﬀer more damage to his reputation and opportunities than a normal
member of the public for the same criminal justice punishment. The individual's within-
period utility depends on current level of time spent on leisure lt, composite consumption
good Zt and Kt,
Ut = U(lt, Zt, Kt). (2.12)
Social capital also determines positively the legitimate earningsWω that the individual
receives, along with time allocated to employment. This is captured in the intertemporal
budget constraint:
At+1 = (1 + r)[At +Wω(ωt, Kt) +WC(Ct)− Zt], (2.13)
where r is the interest rate,WC is illegal income as before, and At can be interpreted as
physical capital. Another interesting innovation of the model is that probability of arrest
p is no longer exogenous to the individual, but he can aﬀect it through his intensity of
committing crimes. Governments can also inﬂuence this probability by spending more
resources Rt on law enforcement:
pt = p(Ct, Rt). (2.14)
Note that The eﬀect of Rt on pt is expected to be positive, but the eﬀect of Ct is less
clear. On one hand, being involved in more crimes during a single period would raise the
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chance of arrest. However, the individual may also improve his criminal skills by virtue
of practice makes perfect, and become better at avoiding punishment.
The individual's problem is then to maximize his expected discounted utility. The
Bellman's equation of his dynamic programming problem, as characterized by the value
function V (At, Kt) in period t, is:
V (At,Kt) = max
Zt,ωt,Ct
U(lt, Zt, Kt)+β {p(Ct, Rt)V (At+1, Ka,t+1) + [1− p(Ct, Rt)]V (At+1, Kb,t+1)} ,
(2.15)
subject to time constraint and equations (10),(11),(13). This model incorporates many
ideal elements of a model of crime, such as the endogenous probability of arrest. The in-
novation of social capital is also an interesting contribution to the literature. Compared
to Imai and Krishna (2004), the dynamic eﬀect of punishment on labour market out-
comes works via damage to social capital, rather than criminal record directly entering
employment equation. Within this model it is possible after punishment to accumulate
social capital quickly by investing time in work and catch up with the capital level of
non-criminals, whereas in the previous model the eﬀect of punishment on wage and em-
ployment is more persistent if the depreciation of criminal record is slow. Consequently,
the authors suggest that an eﬀective policy to prevent individuals from pursuing a life-
time of crime would be to foster the social capital of the disadvantaged. This is consistent
with the current policy momentum on rehabilitation during sanction, which can credibly
be modelled as boosting social capital. Despite the model having a lot of interesting
features, it has several weaknesses. Similar to Imai and Krishna (2004), it assume long
time horizon in individual's dynamic optimization, and it does not allow multi-period
punishment (notice however, while explicitly it lacks f , the αCt here serves similar mo-
delling purpose). Also, while the authors demonstrate an estimation algorithm for the
structural parameters that involves calibration of parameters, simulation techniques then
simulated method of moments, in general the model is not friendly for empirical work.
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2.2.5 Dynamic Model: McCrary (2010)
The ﬁnal model I study is that of McCrary (2010). The main improvement of his model
over others in the literature is that it allows for punishment lasting longer than one
period, which is a useful modelling assumption. The author argues that this is important
because typically some oﬀences are punished with long prison sentences, so the notion of
punishment being a single period utility loss is inappropriate. The model is also developed
so that it can easily be tested with commonly found longitudinal data on arrest. This gives
it an advantage over other dynamic models, which typically require richer and harder-to-
ﬁnd datasets. I now take a closer look at the model, before discussing its strengths and
weaknesses.
Suppose inﬁnitely-lived agents face the same problem in every period of committing a
crime or not. The beneﬁt of crime Wc in each period is drawn randomly, following some
distribution F (wc) with density f(wc). Notice the slight change of notation here -Wc is a
random variable and wc is the realization (instead of ﬁrst derivative). If an agent commits
a crime, the probability of getting punishment is p. The punishment is imprisonment for
J periods, where J is a random variable taking on values j = 1, 2, 3, etc., with probability
pij . After criminal beneﬁt wc is drawn at the beginning of the period and the agent makes
a decision, his utility in that period can then take on 3 values, depending on his decision
and the uncertain arrest outcome. If he commits a crime and gets away, then he receives
utility ﬂow ww + wc , ie outside option plus beneﬁt from crime. If he does not commit
a crime, then utility ﬂow is ww. If he commits a crime and gets caught, then the utility
ﬂow is ww - f for each of the j periods that he is incapacitated. It is assumed that
ww + wc > ww > ww − f . The agent's objective is to maximize the sum of current and
expected future utility ﬂows, discounted at constant rate β, by choosing to commit the
crime or not. Time homogeneity is assumed, so the agents will not obtain additional
information in the future that he does not have access to in current period.
If the agent stays away from crime, he receives payoﬀ ww + βE[V (Wc)], where V (Wc)
is the value of being free next period and presented with a future opportunity to commit a
crime with value Wc (this is uncertain in current period but follows the same distribution
over time, hence the expectation operator without time index). If he commits the crime
with value wc this period and gets away, the payoﬀ is ww + wc + βE[V (Wc)]. If he is
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caught and has to face imprisonment for j periods, then his payoﬀ is
(ww − f)(1 + β + β2 + ...+ βj−1) + βjE[V (Wc)]. (2.16)
Therefore, the value of being free and being presented a criminal opportunity worth
Wc = wc is
V (wc) = max{ww + βE[V (Wc)],
(1− p)(ww + wc + E[V (Wc)]) + p
∑
j
pij [(ww − f) (1− β
j)
(1− β) + β
jEV (Wc)]} (2.17)
In this model, the optimal strategy is to have a reservation value wc* and only commit
crime if the realization of Wc is above it. At wc*, the two arguments inside the maximum
operator is equalized, and it is possible to solve for wc* analytically to study comparative
statics. Note that an increase in wc* implies lower ex-ante probability of crime and so
fewer crime in the population. This is be seen from the resulting increase in F (w∗c ).
The model gives unambiguous prediction that crime can be reduced (wc* can be in-
creased) by increases in p, f and β. These are similar predictions to other models in the
literature, dynamic or static. Crime can also be reduced in the model by a shift in the
probability of sentence length draw towards longer sentences, ie an increase in E[J ], as
long as the agent cares about the future and does not have β = 0. This is an interesting
and important point often overlooked in the literature, as the author pointed out. Most
dynamic models invoke the assumption of long time horizon during the individual's max-
imization problem, but evidence has shown that this assumption may be inappropriate
because many crimes are committed when oﬀenders are experiencing diminished capacity
due to drug, alcohol or overwhelming emotional impulsion (McCrary, 2010). This has
policy implication for governments, speciﬁcally that longer sentences may not at all have
an deterrent eﬀect. The last interesting comparative statics, despite not so relevant to
the eﬀect of punishment, is that of the eﬀect of an outward shift in the distribution of
criminal beneﬁts, or in other words crime becoming more proﬁtable on average. The mo-
del prediction is ambiguous, which may be counter-intuitive and a departure from other
models. The reason is that while crime has become more proﬁtable and attractive in the
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current period, the opportunity cost of crime commission is also higher now that the agent
has to risk imprisonment and not being able to take advantage of more valuable crime
in the future. In the extreme case, the future opportunity can so good that agents never
want to commit crime today and risk imprisonment. The two eﬀects work in opposite
directions, hence the ambiguous prediction.
Assumptions around time homogeneity can be relaxed to allow for more general mo-
delling. Despite the model's advantages, there are several drawbacks. Unlike the previous
two dynamic models, labour market outcomes (outside option) and probability arrest are
exogenous here, which is an unrealistic assumption. Also, the binary choice set of crime
commission is also undesirable.
While I have presented three dynamic models which oﬀer diﬀerent but equally valuable
perspectives, there are also several other important contributions which I will not discuss
here, including Huang et al. (2004), Imrohoroglu et al. (2004), Burdett et al. (2004) and
Lochner (2004). It should be clear that to this date, dynamic modelling of punishment
and crime remains a very diﬃcult branch of work, with a lot of ongoing debates and
a lot more to be understood. In my view, it will be interesting for future models to
push on in two directions, despite the cost of higher complexity. First, it will be useful,
especially for policy simulation, to improve assumptions on available policy instruments.
It is too simplistic to assume governments only having p or f at disposal. There are
many dimensions of punishment not captured so far, for example a prison sentence is not
merely an increase in f to a community sentence, and many argue those dimensions do
interact with outcomes. Putting a formal structure around those dimensions and their
eﬀects on crime will enrich the modelling of punishment and perhaps give new insights
to both academics and policymakers. Second, crime is a phenomena closely related to
outcomes in labour market, accommodation, health, marriage, etc., and future models
can look at incorporating more of these dynamic relationships. This will allow better
understanding of the eﬀect of diﬀerent types of interventions on preventing recidivism.
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2.2.6 Behavioural model
Recently, there are developments in drawing lessons from behavioural economics to model
crime. The main argument to using a behavioural economic approach as opposed to the
'classical' approaches outlined above is that, while a expected utility/rational framework
is useful for gaining insights into how incentives may aﬀect behaviour, people may not
behave as predicted by expected utility theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Garoupa
(2003) provides a useful summary of the debate in relation to criminal behvaiour. The
criticism is three-fold. First, in the rational approach it is assumed that individuals have
preferences about each possible state of the world before taking an action (ie deciding
on the 'lottery' to pick). However, it has been argued that some individuals become cri-
minals because of isolation from anti-criminal patterns during upbringing and so instead
of having rational preferences over all states, rather they are constrained by the incom-
plete information set, shaped by the contact they have with criminal patterns, that they
have. Second, the assumption that criminals choose an action based on comparison of
marginal costs and beneﬁts and maximization of utility may not be appropriate. Ga-
roupa (2003) point out inaccuracies, or even contradictions, between predictions from an
expected utility model and observed actual behaviours. Explanations for such limited ra-
tionality include task complexity (too costly to compare costs, beneﬁts or calculate risks),
manipulation of beliefs (for example, overconﬁdence), ambiguity of risk of apprehension
(classical expected utility theory only takes into account risk, but not ambiguity), and
limited opportunism (that individuals care about costs and beneﬁts of others under some
circumstances). Third, it has been argued that individuals respond to perceived rather
than actual changes, and the discrepancy between the two leads to inability of the classi-
cal approach in accurately predicting response to changes in policy instruments. Reasons
for this include ignored moral costs on the part of criminals in the model, over-simplistic
modelling of enforcement decisions and the criminal market arguably being a diﬀerent
kind of market to those typically considered in economics.
A behavioural crime model (van Winden and Ash, 2012) would instead treat people
as having limited rationality, and their criminal behaviour motivated by both cognition
and emotions. I now discuss the most relevant cognitive and emotional biases. In most




The recognition of emotions as an important part of economic behaviour (Elster, 1998;
Loewenstein, 2000; van Winden 2007) is growing, but there is no formal behavioural
economic model to this date that incorporates them. For this reason, I do not discuss
emotional factors in great length, but only list the most relevant ones for criminal be-
haviour as identiﬁed in the literature: anger, altruistic punishment, shame, guilty, social
norms, empathy, sympathy and social ties. While the behavioural implications on crime
of the eﬀect of emotions are still very much a matter of debate both theoretically and
empirically, some 'classic' models have these features partly built-in. For example, Sickles
and Williams (2008) introduces social capital, which can be seen as a proxy for social ties.
Until further research, it is not clear whether simply extensions to the rational approach
will be enough to accurately capture the eﬀect of emotions and their interplay with other
determinants of criminal behaviour.
2.2.6.2 Cognitive factor: risk attitude
Behavioural economists argue that prospect theory, where outcomes are evaluated against
a reference point and probabilities are transformed into decision weights with more weig-
hts on small probabilities, should replace expected utility theory in criminal modelling.
Such a claim is supported by experimental evidence that shows non-linear risk attitudes
amongst subjects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). The policy implication under prospect
theory is that, since individuals are risk averse towards prospective gains but risk loving
towards losses, and punishments are losses, so governments should make the punishment
as predictable as possible. This is a diﬀerent way of modelling but consistent with ﬁn-
dings from simple rational model assuming preference for risk. The characteristics of the
prospect theory prediction can be incorporated into a classical expected utility approach
by reweighting the probabilities of the uncertain states accordingly.
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2.2.6.3 Cognitive factor: loss aversion
Experimental evidence further shows that losses and gains are perceived asymmetrically,
that losses loom larger (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). This means that within the
prospect theory framework, the marginal utility is steeper in the negative than the positive
domain as deﬁned by the reference point. The policy implication is that punishment
should impose a bigger deterrent eﬀect on the population than predicted by the classical
approach. Loss aversion can also be easily incorporated into a classical approach by
introducing non-linear marginal utilities.
2.2.6.4 Cognitive factor: time preferences
The classical dynamic approach typically assumes exponential discounting. That is, each
additional period is discounted by the same factor β. This would conveniently lead to
time consistency in prediction. For example, preferences over risking arrest or not remain
the same over time. However, critics point to experimental evidence that subjects de-
monstrate stronger preference for immediate gains over future gains (Ainsley and Haslam,
1992), and often criminals start to regret their actions at the point of sanction, showing
time inconsistency in their decision-making process (Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler 1998).
They argue for hyperbolic discounting to replace the classical exponential discounting.
This gives new insights such as swift justice may be important as a crime deterrent. In-
corporating hyperbolic discounting in a classical approach can be done, in its simplest
form, by having non-constant discount rate βt, which starts low for low t, but increases
over time.
Insights from behavioural economics can no doubt add to the traditional rational ap-
proach of modelling criminal behaviour. Experimental evidence has shown that people
do not necessarily behave as the classical rational approach predicts, and so policy simu-
lations may perform better by involving lessons from a behavioural approach to crime.
However, the main drawback to this approach is that it lacks a unifying theory on why
those deviations from expected utility theory exist, or how and if those cognitive and emo-
tional factors are interlinked. Policy recommendations based on a behavioural approach
to reduce crime, such as having large, prominent, and gaudy parking tickets (Jolls, 2005),
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may seem ad-hoc and diﬃcult to comprehend within a general structure or model of be-
haviour, as opposed to policy instruments such as changing the severity of punishment,
which has more solid theoretical groundings. In my view, at this stage research should
actively review if some of the classical assumptions do fail and by how much, and at
the same time exercise caution when adding elements of behavioural economics to the
modelling of crime.
2.3 Empirical evidence
There is a large body of empirical research dedicated to verifying the relationship bet-
ween crime and various variables and policy instruments. Some of the investigations are
motivated directly by the predictions of existing theoretical models, including those dis-
cussed in the above section. The parameters estimated in this kind of research typically
have some structural meaning to them in relation to the models used. Other studies are
more focussed on estimating reduced form parameters. They are close to studies in the
treatment eﬀect literature in spirit. In this section, I concentrate on summarizing the
empirical ﬁndings related to crime and punishment, the main relationship of concern to
this dissertation. Before that, for completeness I also brieﬂy describe the research on
crime and non-punishment variables.
2.3.1 Crime and non-punishment variables
One of the major predictions of the simple rational model of Becker (1968) and most
subsequent models is that criminal behaviour can be aﬀected by legal labour market
conditions, or more speciﬁcally, wages and unemployment (expected wages). A selection of
distinguished papers that have investigated this relationship (or its variants) include Witt
et al. (1998), Grogger (1998), Doyle et al. (1999), Gould et al. (2002) and Machin and
Meghir (2004). They generally ﬁnd evidence for unemployment or lower relative wages
in explaining the rise of criminal behaviour in particular groups of oﬀenders. However,
in a dynamic setting Imai and Krishna (2004) ﬁnd that lower unemployment can instead
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induce more crime, due to the lower expected cost of incarceration in terms of diﬃculty
in ﬁnding a job afterwards. This is an interesting proposition and is consistent with
theoretical prediction, but within the context of previous discussion on the limitations of
their model and results from other empirical studies using panel or time series data, one
should perhaps not place too much weight on their ﬁndings.
There are also studies that consider business cycles and poverty and inequality as
determinants of crime. Cook & Zarkin (1985) ﬁnd that a 1% point increase in unemploy-
ment from the long term trend is associated with a 2.3% point increase in robbery and
1.6% point increase in burglary, but not associated with homicide. Hsieh & Pugh (1993)
conclude after a meta-analysis that poverty and income inequality are moderately and
positively associated with violent crime. Kelly (2000) also ﬁnd that inequality has robust
impact on violent crime, and property crime only associated with poverty. The former is
attributed to strain and social disorganization theory, while the latter is consistent with
standard economic theory.
Lochner's (2004) human capital model of crime predicts that crime participation is
negatively correlated with human capital, which is accrued through education and expe-
rience (in other words, age). The crime-age relationship is well documented and long been
studied by sociologists/criminologists, see for example Hirschi & Gottfredson (1983). The
crime-education relationship has not been studied as much as crime-age, but recently the
empirical literature on that is growing. For example, Machin et al. (2011) ﬁnd, using
regression discontinuity design and exploiting an exogenous policy change in compulsory
schooling age, a negative eﬀect of education on crime.
Other variables that have been studied by economists, albeit more in a reduced form
manner and less motivated by proper models of criminal behaviour, include drug use
(Grogger & Willis 2000, Levitt 2004) and legalized abortion (Levitt 2004). These empi-
rical studies found evidence for the drug use increasing crime commission and abortion
reducing it.
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2.3.2 Crime and punishment variables
Hypotheses developed in the theoretical literature have generated a set of predicted eﬀects
that the criminal justice punishment can have on crime, at both micro and macro levels.
We have already seen some of them in section 2. First of all, there is the general deterrent
eﬀect. As probability of apprehension or sentence length goes up, expected ex-ante utility
from crime decreases for all individuals at the margin and so does crime participation. Si-
milarly, according to the speciﬁc deterrence hypothesis (eg Smith & Gartin 1989), contact
with the criminal justice system, for example a period of imprisonment, can reinforce an
oﬀender's perception of the likelihood of arrest or the severity of punishment, thus deter-
ring him from recidivism. Apart from deterrence, Ehrlich (1981) point out that criminal
justice punishment can also reduce crime through the incapacitation eﬀect, ie physically
prohibiting criminals to commit crime, but it may be oﬀset in the other direction by the
replacement eﬀect, whereby the criminal opportunities not taken up by the incarcerated
oﬀenders are simply taken up by new entrants to the criminal markets. Ehrlich (1981)
also suggests the existence of a rehabilitative eﬀect on criminal behaviour for programs
that criminals have to undertake during punishment. In contrast, Bayer et al. (2009)
argues instead that prison can act as a "school for criminals" where inmates learn from
each other and become better and more likely reoﬀenders in the future. From a capital
accumulation perspective, contacts with criminal justice system may depreciate human
capital (Ehrlich 1981) or social capital (Sickles and Williams 2008), thus reinforcing crimi-
nal behaviour in the future. As observed by Cameron (1988) and Frey (2009), the causal
relationship between punishment and crime is highly complicated. Unsurprisingly, it is
diﬃcult to disentangle and estimate the many eﬀects. Nonetheless, reasonable progress
has been made in the empirical literature.
General deterrent eﬀect, especially of more eﬀective crime detection in the form of
increased police numbers, has been studied relatively extensively and the evidence is in
general supportive. Using the number of ﬁre-ﬁghters to instrument police numbers, Levitt
(1997) ﬁnds a signiﬁcant and positive relationship between police deployment and crime
reduction. Applying quasi-experimental econometric technique to the terrorist attacks in
Bueno Aires in July 1994, and in London in July 2005, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004)
and Draca et al. (2011) respectively ﬁnd similarly strong evidence on the deterrent eﬀect
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of police. It is harder to identify the general deterrent eﬀect of longer sentence length
because it generally is observed together with the incapacitation eﬀect. Nonetheless,
Helland and Tabarrok (2007) manage to estimate it with a credible empirical strategy
utilizing the "three strike" legislation in California. Lee and McCracy (2009) also estimate
the deterrent eﬀect using a quasi-experimental design which separates out incapacitation,
and remark that the elasticity is signiﬁcant but very small. Drago et al. (2009) ﬁnd using
the a natural experiment in Italy that the elasticity of average recidivism with respect to
the expected punishment equal to 0.74 for a 7-month period. In general the evidence here
suggests that the response to an increase in crime detection is stronger than to an increase
in severity of punishment, conﬁrming Becker's (1968) early conjecture that criminals are
risk-lovers. The general deterrent eﬀect of capital punishment is unclear, as Nagin et
al. (2012) conclude after a comprehensive survey of existing research. They claim that
the literature has failed to validly identify the marginal eﬀect of death penalty over an
alternative lengthy prison sentence, and that there is no plausible models of murderers'
perceptions of and response to capital punishment.
There is mixed evidence on the eﬀect of incapacitation. On one hand, Levitt (1998)
and Kessler & Levitt (1999) ﬁnd that the size and direction are similar to that of deter-
rence. On the other, sociologists Blokland & Nieuwbeerta (2007) conclude after a review
of evidence in their ﬁeld that, although the estimated imprisonment elasticity of crime
rate range from 0% to 2.2% reduction, most of the studies do not adequately control for
the simultaneity between crime rate and imprisonment. Apart from this, I am also not
aware of research that explicitly distinguish between the incapacitation and displacement
eﬀects. If crime opportunities left behind by the incarcerated criminals are taken up by
new entrants, then not taking into account this displacement will under-estimate the true
eﬀect of incapacitation. The eﬀect may also be over-estimated if the displacement is in
time, that is if individuals simply delay crime commission into the future. Overall, while
existing studies all point towards a small but signiﬁcant positive impact of incapacitation
on crime reduction, there are in my views very few credible estimates. This is a gap in
the literature, and one which is probably quite hard to ﬁll for the reasons mentioned.
With regards to the rehabilitative eﬀect of criminal justice punishment, the evidence
is sparse at best, at least in the economics literature. Levitt & Miles (2007) remark that
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there are very few economic studies contributing to this area of research. Sociologists
have attempted to evaluate the eﬀect of various rehabilitative programs but their designs
tend to suﬀer from attrition and selection biases, rendering their estimates incredible.
On the eﬀect of punishment on human or social capital, we can refer to the relatively
large empirical literature on punishment and labour market outcomes. Waldfogel (1994)
ﬁnds a strong negative eﬀect of imprisonment on the likelihood of employment and wages.
Grogger (1995) using ﬁxed eﬀect models similarly ﬁnds a negative, albeit short-lived, eﬀect
of arrest on wages and employment. Kling (2006) ﬁnds that longer sentence lengths are
not correlated with more negative labour outcomes. To summarize, as Freeman (1999)
conclude in his wide-ranging review, the empirical research tends to ﬁnd a negative impact
of punishment on individuals' labour market outcomes. The evidence seems to suggest
that this 'scarring' eﬀect is at its greatest at the ﬁrst entry to the criminal justice system,
with much smaller marginal eﬀect for further contact. Given the prediction from an
economic model of crime that labour market outcome is negatively related to criminal
behaviour, the empirical ﬁndings here would suggest that punishment can be criminogenic
in this sense. A more in-depth discussion on this topic is given in chapter 5.
So far, the empirical studies reviewed in this section focus more on identifying pa-
rameters that have structural meanings in an economic model of crime. Within their
neighbourhood in the literature, there are also works on identifying reduced forms pa-
rameters instead. Structural parameters are invariant to the economic conditions, so
the studies reviewed so far are informative with respect to giving policy predictions or
simulations under alternative environment. On the other hand, research on estimating
reduced-form parameters, which I review below, oﬀers direct evidence on the eﬀectiveness
of policies in a programme evaluation sense. It does not require a ﬁrm theoretical model
to motivate empirical testing, and in concentrating on identifying the aggregate policy
eﬀect, it serves a diﬀerent but equally useful purpose to structural parameters estima-
tion. It also faces diﬀerent diﬃculties, ones that are akin to those in the treatment eﬀect
literature, ie selection on unobservables and heterogeneity.
Both sociologists and economist have contributed to this literature, but using diﬀe-
rent research designs. Sociologists Nagin et al. (2009) conclude after reviewing existing
evidence in sociology that the eﬀect of imprisonment on subsequent criminal behaviour
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appears to be null or criminogenic, rather than a preventative one. They remark that the
majority of sociological research in this area uses matching design in one form or another
as the identiﬁcation strategy. Weisburd et al. (1995), using propensity score matching,
ﬁnd no negative eﬀect of imprisonment on re-arrest rates over a period of 10 years for
white-collar crime oﬀenders. Nieuwbeerta et al. (2009) combine trajectory modelling
with propensity score matching, and ﬁnd that ﬁrst-time imprisonment is associated with
more criminal activities in the 3 years following release. Wermink et al. (2010) also use
propensity score matching to compare oﬀenders sentenced to custody and community
punishment, and conclude that oﬀenders on the latter are less likely to reoﬀend. One
should exercise caution, however, when interpreting results from matching designs, be-
cause unless selection is entirely based on observable variables the estimates are likely to
suﬀer from selection bias. For example, if criminals are sentenced to custody rather than
community punishment due to the perceived risk of reoﬀending associated with his per-
sonality traits and this information is not available in the dataset, then matching designs
will likely over-estimate the apparently criminogenic eﬀect of imprisonment. There are
other attempts by sociologists to use randomized experimental designs, such as Killias et
al. (2000) and Green & Winik (2010). Their results agree that the marginal impact of
imprisonment over less severe sanction, such as community punishment, is crime-inducing
on the individuals.
Economists' take on estimating the treatment eﬀects of interest tends to be more
creative, often by exploiting exogenous features of the system as sources of identiﬁcation.
Kuziemko (2012) applies Regression Discontinuity design to the cut-oﬀ parole rules in
Georgia, USA to estimate the eﬀect of additional time served in custody on recidivism.
She ﬁnds a large negative eﬀect of an extra month in prison on recidivism rate. In contrast,
Marie (2009) also applies Regression Discontinuity to the Home Detention Curfew scheme
in the UK justice system, where prisoners sentenced between 3 months to 4 years for
relatively minor crime types are released early, and ﬁnds that oﬀenders sentenced to 3
months in custody who are eligible for early release have lower re-oﬀending rates by up to
5% than those who are sentenced to just under 3 months and spend more actual time in
prison. While the estimates of eﬀect of additional time in custody from the two studies
seem to contradict each other, it is worth bearing in mind that the discontinuities in the
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two systems occur at diﬀerent locations along the sentence length spectrum, and so it is
entirely possible that along it the local eﬀects are very diﬀerent and have opposing signs.
In another economic study, Di Tella & Schargrodsky (2013) make use of the random
assignment of oﬀenders to judges in Argentine justice system, and estimate by OLS/IV
that the recidivism rates of oﬀenders sentenced to electronic monitoring is 9% lower than
those sentenced to custody. Nagin and Snodgrass (2013) also make use of randomization
of cases to judges in Pennsylvania to ﬁnd that incarceration has little eﬀect on reoﬀending
behaviour from 1 year up to 10 years after release. Mueller-Smith (2015) argues that the
popular approach of using judge randomisation as instrument suﬀers from the assumption
of monotonicity and exclusion, and shows that bias can result if they are violated. He
proposes an improved estimation procedure that takes into account of this and ﬁnds that
prisons are criminogenic instead of having no eﬀects. There does not seem to be any clear
consensus in the reduced-form literature, particularly in the economics literature, about
the eﬀect of sanction on future criminal behaviour, but this is not so surprising. While
structural parameters are invariant to the economic conditions, reduced form parameters
are not. For example, the eﬀects identiﬁed in each of the aforementioned studies are
likely to be diﬀerent types of treatment eﬀect, ie Regression Discontinuity designs identify
local treatment eﬀects, while matching typically identiﬁes average treatment eﬀect on the
treated. It is certainly useful in the future to develop a structural model of recidivism, for
instance, to understand better if and why local treatment eﬀects along the sentence length
spectrum may be diﬀerent, and connect these separate studies to form a full picture of
recidivism behaviour.
2.4 Concluding remarks
Looking across the literature it is clear that the amount of work carried out using micro-
datasets that span across crime and other outcomes is rather lacking. This is unsurpri-
singly due to the lack of suitable datasets as well as often the sensitivity and diﬃculty
involved with joining up individual-level data. Evidence for the UK is especially lacking.
The new micro-dataset that I have access to, which I describe in more detail in the
next chapter, goes a long way in providing the necessary material to answer many of the
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cross-cutting questions about crime, labour market and beneﬁts.
In this thesis I choose to focus on three topics that I have touched on above already
that are without clear consensus: the rehabilitative eﬀect of post-custody supervision
program, the labour market eﬀect of criminal conviction, and the eﬀect of custody on
recidivism and labour market outcomes. In the ﬁnal chapter I discuss further areas of
research not provided in this thesis that are possible with similar micro-datasets and




The empirical analyses in the rest of this thesis are all carried out using some combinations
of the following four micro-datasets in the UK: the Police National Computer (PNC), the
National Beneﬁts Database (NBD), P45 Employment database and P14 Earnings data-
base. When datasets with personal information are administered by diﬀerent government
departments, they are typiclly not shared nor linked to each other due to data sharing
legal restrictions. This was the case with the four datasets Ise in this thesis. The PNC
extract is held by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), NBD by the Department for Work and
Pensions (DWP), and P14 and P45 databases by Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
(HMRC). Fortunately a breakthrough arrived in 2011, when the MoJ reached agreement
with the DWP and HMRC to enter a data share of these four datasets. The intention is
that the arrangement would enable hollistic analyses of the interaction between criminal,
beneﬁt and employment outcomes to inform better policymaking in criminal justice and
reoﬀending reduction.
In this chapter I provide general descriptions for all of them. The technicalities of
applying the datasets to the diﬀerent research designs, such as time period and sample
will be discussed later in the relevant chapters.
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3.1 Police National Computer
The PNC is the administrative IT system managed by the Home Oﬃce of the UK Go-
vernment and is used by all police forces in England and Wales. The PNC covers all
oﬀences that are punishable by imprisonment plus many of the serious summary oﬀences
(ie recordable oﬀences) and contains oﬀender level information. It generally does not
cover less serious oﬀences that most likely attract ﬁnes as punishment, such as TV li-
cense evasion, careless driving, driving without insurance, reproducing British currency
notes, etc. Across all police cautions and disposals dealt with by courts including custody,
probation, ﬁnes, discharge, 55% are recorded on the PNC. Coverage across all sentence
types is very high except ﬁnes, where just less than a ﬁfth is recorded (Ministry of Justice
2014). Despite the PNC not covering non-recordable oﬀences which make up a signiﬁ-
cant part of overall crime and which explains the big diﬀerence between the PNC and
the British Crime Survey crime numbers, arguably leaving them out does not aﬀect my
analyses. This is because the punishment of interest in this thesis is typically custodial
sentence, and also the fact that non-recorded crimes do not show up in criminal checks
hence unlikely to aﬀect employment outcomes as much as recordable crimes. This point
will be further discussed in the relevant chapters. I use the extract of PNC that the Mini-
stry of Justice (MoJ) holds, and use in particular the variables on information about the
oﬀence, conviction, punishment and oﬀender characteristics (age, gender and ethnicity).
The timeframe of the extract that has been matched to external datasets is between 2000
and 2013.
3.2 National Beneﬁts Database
The extract of NBD that I have access to contains information on claims to all DWP
beneﬁts made by oﬀenders who can be matched to the PNC between 2000 - 2013. Note
that not all beneﬁts are recorded on the National Beneﬁts Database. For example, child,
housing and council beneﬁts are recorded outside the NBD since they are administered by
other government departments outside DWP. There are in total twelve types of beneﬁts
available in the data: Attendance Allowance, Bereavement Beneﬁt, Disability Living Al-
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lowance, Employment Suport Allowance, Incapacity Beneﬁt, Carers Allowance, Income
Support, Jobseekers Allowance, Pension Credit, Passported Incapacity Beneﬁt, Retire-
ment Pension, Sever Disablement Beneﬁt and Widows Beneﬁt. Out-of-work beneﬁts are
most relevant to this thesis in terms of proxying whether oﬀenders require state help, and
they are all included in the data. The main information from this data that I exploit in
the analysis is the start and end date of beneﬁt claims.
3.3 P45 Employment
The extract of P45 Employment that I have access to, contains employment date in-
formation for oﬀenders who can be matched to the PNC between 2000 - 2013. In the
British system, P45 is the reference code of a multi-part form oﬃcially titled `Details of
Employees Leaving Work', issued by the employer when an employee leaves. Part of it
is submitted to HMRC for individual's tax record purposes, and it is the employment
start and end date information on there that provide information about period of em-
ployment of oﬀenders. One note of caution on P45 employment is that it does not cover
all employment. For a start, self-employment and cash-in-hand jobs are not recorded in
the data. Also, for my period of analysis employers were only required to submit P45
forms for periods of employment that are above the Lower Earnings Limit (around ¿100
per week). Hence, P45 employment under-estimates total employment, and this may be
particularly problematic for oﬀenders, as one may view them as more likely to take up
self-employment, cash-in-hand or lower paid jobs. Despite this, trends and diﬀerences in
P45 employment between groups of oﬀenders should to a large degree reﬂect trends and
diﬀerences in true employment between the same groups, which are the outcomes I am
ultimately interested in. Also, there are no alternative adiministrative datasets anyway
that capture self-employment or cash-in-hand jobs. For these reasons I argue that P45
employment is a good proxy for oﬀenders' true employment.
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3.4 P14 Earnings
The P14 Earnings database covers income information derived from P14 forms that em-
ployers sent to HMRC. At the end of each tax year, employers normally complete a three-
part form for each of their employees, regardless of the length or mode of employment,
about their taxable income and deduction through income tax and National Insurance
contributions. The ﬁrst two parts are sent to tax oﬃces and form the P14, while the
third part is issued to the employee and commonly known as the P60 End of Year Cer-
tiﬁcate. Note that employers are not required to submit the P14 for all workers  only
those with earnings above the Lower Earnings Limit just like in the P45 Emplyoment
dataset. Despite this, in reality I still observe some entries with stated pay lower than the
threshold, showing some employers would report anyway. I am not able to determine the
coverage of the P14 dataset in the low pay region, but I assume that reporting there is
a random event. Note also that due to the nature of P14, income from self-employment
or cash-in-hand jobs is not included. I assume, like above, that trends and diﬀerences in
P14 earnings between groups of oﬀenders reﬂect those in true earnings. From the P14
database I observe and use variables on the start and end dates of employment spells and
the corresponding pay. Wages are normalized to 2008 level using the Oﬃce of National
Statistics GDP deﬂator.
From the discussion of the P45 and P14 databases so far, clearly it is possible to
derive employment spells for individuals from either data sources. The results from both
are, however, not always consistent. There are employment spells that appear in one
but not the other, though there is an overlap of over 90%. This is a common issue
with administrative datasets. Because of the inconsistency, I will only use either P45
or P14 within the same analysis when considering employment outcomes and never in
conjunction. There is not enough information to judge which administrative dataset is
better in terms of accuracy so the default choice within an analysis is simply driven by
whether earnings are considered as an outcome, in which case P14 will be used as seen
in the chapter 5. This is so because the structure of raw information held wthin the P14
dataset is more complicated to analyse - so unless required, I work with the P45 instead.
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3.5 Matching between datasets
The matching between PNC, NBD, P45 and P14 was done by MoJ and DWP using
a quality-assured methodology (see annex A of Ministry of Justice, 2014a). Over 80%
of the 5.2 million PNC records since 2000 were successfully matched and the MoJ had
conducted tests to ensure the representativeness of the match. The only diﬀerences in the
distribution of key variables between the matched and unmatched data are in ethnicity
(slightly lower proportion for ethnic minority) and disposal category (high number of
cautions in the unmatched data). Problems as such are not uncommon for matching
across multiple micro-datasets and for most part I am going to take the quality of the
data as granted and ﬁxed. Where relevant, issues stemming from the imperfect matching
and data imputation will be discussed in the next three empirical chapters.
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Chapter 4
The Eﬀect of Post-Custody
Supervision on Recidivism and
Other Outcomes
4.1 Introduction
A key aim of the criminal justice system is to reduce recidivism. That is, to prevent the
oﬀenders who have been brought to justice from oﬀending again. A quick glance of the
UK oﬃcial statistics suggest that on average 25% to 27% of oﬀenders would commit a re-
oﬀence within a year. Juvenile oﬀenders typically have a higher rate than adult oﬀenders,
about 38% and 24% respectively. The numbers are higher for oﬀenders released from
custodial sentence, which currently stand at 43% for adults and 69% for juveniles. And
they get worse if we focus on short prison sentences, ie ones that are less than a year.
According to the National Audit Oﬃce (2010), the annual economic and social cost of
reoﬀences committed by short term prisoners alone is estimated to be between ¿7 billion
to ¿10 billion. It is therefore no surprise that rehabilitation and recidivism reduction is
an important agenda for policymakers in the UK - one of the most important policy shifts
took place in 2014 when the government decided that all short term prisoners would be
subject to one year compulsory supervision after release.
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So is post-custody supervision all good for reducing recidivism? The literature does
not lend unanimous support. Theoretically, the impact of an extra period of supervision
is multifold and ambiguous on the whole. First, under the speciﬁc deterrence hypothesis
(Smith and Gartin 1989), oﬀenders on licence are expected to commit fewer crimes due
to their experience with the criminal justice system and knowing they are more likely
to detected and punished for reoﬀences that they commit. Second, oﬀenders on licence
are usually restricted in movement during the time they meet their supervisors or under-
take required activities. They may be further restricted if the supervision comes with a
curfew order. Such incapacitation (Ehrlich 1981) may reduce the amount of crime being
committed. Third, supervision often incorporates some degree of rehabilitation aimed at
enhancing oﬀenders' ability to re-integrate into society, such as improving their employ-
ability, substance abuse, mental health and accomodation. It should have a beneﬁcial
inﬂuence (Ehrlich 1981, also see the review of Levitt and Miles 2007). On the other hand
there may be negative scarring eﬀect of the extra supervision on labour market outcomes,
which are linked to recividism under any static or dynamic models of criminal behaviour
(Becker 1968, Ehrlich 1973, Imai and Krishna 2004, McCrary 2010, etc). Grogger (1995)
ﬁnds that arrest has a negative short term impact on employment rate. This may be true
also for an extra period of supervision. Finally, under the school of criminal hypothesis
of Bayer et al. (2009), there may be negative peer eﬀects operating among oﬀenders on
licence, leading to higher recidivism rate.
A selection of treatment eﬀect studies that have attempted to estimate the eﬀect
of time spent within the criminal justice system on oﬀenders' outcomes includes Marie
(2009), Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2009), Kuziemko (2013) and Huttunen et. al (2014).
Amongst them, there is no agreed direction of impact. This may be due to the coexisting
opposite eﬀects as mentioned above, but may also be due to time spent being slightly
diﬀerent objects and involving diﬀerent activities in the researches.
In this chapter, I use the new UK micro-dataset described in chapter 3, which encom-
passes criminal, labour market and beneﬁt histories of oﬀenders, to estimate the eﬀect of
a 3-month period of post-custody supervision on recidivism, beneﬁt claim and employ-
ment outcomes. I do so by applying Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to an age
cut-oﬀ rule in the English law that prior to 2015 determined completely the allocation
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to treatment. Speciﬁcally, among adult oﬀenders who are sentenced to a short custodial
sentence, those aged under 21 are supervised by the Probation Service for 3 months upon
release, while those aged 21 or above are not. I ﬁnd that, contrary to the policy belief that
underpinned the UK government's expansion of the provision of post-custody supervision
to all short term prisoners from 2015, post-custody supervision has no detectable eﬀect on
recidivism, beneﬁt claim and employment outcomes from the time of release up till 3 years
afterwards. While RDD treatment eﬀect estimates have an inherently local interpretation
restricted only to persons near the cut-oﬀ of age 21, we know from the well documented
age-crime proﬁle (Hirschi & Gottfredson 1983) that this is also the age where criminal
activities peak. There are important policy implications here as my results suggest that
more of the same services under the new policy landscape may not be a cost-eﬀective
measure in preventing recidivism and facilitating oﬀenders' social re-integration.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. I outline the policy situation and the
empirical research design in section 2. I then describe the data in section 3. I discuss and
interpret my results in section 4. Section 5 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Research Design
4.2.1 Policy situation
In England and Wales, adult prisoners are automatically released at around the halfway
point of their custodial sentence. Prior to the commencement of the Oﬀender Rehabi-
litation Act 2014, under the Criminal Justice Act 1991 and Power of Criminal Courts
(Sentencing) Act 2000, if the custodial sentence length is less than 12 months and the
oﬀender is at least 18 but under 21 at the time of conviction, upon prison release he/she
is to be supervised by the Probation Service (also known as being on licence) for a
ﬁxed term of three months. While on licence, the oﬀender has to comply with standard
conditions such as keeping in touch with probation oﬃcers, undertaking rehabilitation
programmes, doing supervised unpaid work, observing any curfew orders, and most im-
portantly, not committing any oﬀence. Recall to prison procedures are enforceable at
court if the oﬀender is proven to have commited crime during the supervision period. On
36
the other hand, if the custodial length is less than 12 months but the oﬀender is at least
21 at the time of conviction, he/she is released without further conditions1. This is the
discontuity that I exploit in this research. To complete the policy picture, all prisoners
sentenced to 12 months or longer, regardless of age, are supervised upon automatic release
until the end of their sentence.
Licence exists to serve several purposes. Firstly, the under 21 oﬀenders (and those
sentenced to 12 months or longer) are generally considered to be more prone to falling
back to crime. In monitoring their activities upon release, it is a public safety measure to
reduce the risk that their recidivism may pose to society. Secondly, the licence may act as
a short-term deterrent against recidivism, as committing a crime during the supervision
period would lead to a return to prison with possible time addition for the new oﬀence.
Finally, some activities that oﬀenders undertake while on licence are designed to facilitate
reintegration into society and/or rehabilitation of substance misuse. They aim to reduce
the long term recidivism of this group of high risk oﬀenders in the process.
From the stated policy purposes, one may expect post-custody supervision to have
a ceteris paribus positive impact on recidivism reduction in both short and long term,
as well as positive eﬀects on reintegration outcomes such as employment afterwards.
If I treat beneﬁt outcome as a measure of oﬀenders voluntarily seeking state help, since
ideally the policy should prepare them better for life after custody, I should see a negative
eﬀect on beneﬁt claim. However, the scarring or school of criminal hypothesis (Grogger
1995; Bayer, Hjalmarsson, and Pozen 2009) would instead predict a criminogenic eﬀect,
if being supervised reduces employability or if oﬀenders have negative peer eﬀects on
each other while being supervised in the same Probation oﬃce. It is under the belief
that the beneﬁcial eﬀects of licence would outweigh the harms that a new licence policy
applying to England and Wales would be introduced by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ)
in late 2014 under a new agenda termed Transforming Rehabilitation. Under the new
policy, all prisoners sentenced to less than 12 months in custody, regardless of age, would
receive 12 months of supervision. This obviously represents a huge increase in resource
1Technically, there is another subtle diﬀerence - under 21 adult oﬀenders are required by law to be
detained in Young Oﬀender Institutions (YOI), intended for oﬀenders aged 15 - 20, rather than adult
prisons. However, the regime of YOI for oﬀenders aged 18 - 20 is in practice much the same as that
of adult prisons. In some cases, under 21s are merely detained in designated YOI cells within an adult
prison block. After discussion with oﬃcials and practitioners, I decide that it is appropriate to assume
the eﬀect of this diﬀerence is negligible.
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requirement, as it means the treatment group will receive an additional 9 months of
supervision, and the control group an additional 12 months. In section 4, I present my
analysis and demonstrate to what extent the current policy of a 3-month supervision is
eﬀective, which shall shed some light on the likely impact under the new policy.
The rest of the research design discussion will only consider individuals who are re-
levant for the licence policy in question, ie adult (>18) prisoners sentenced to custody
for less than 12 months. I also restrict the analysis to male oﬀenders, as over 90% of
the prison releases are attributed to male and criminological research (Steﬀensmeier and
Allan 1996; Uggen and Kruttschnitt 1998; Painter and Farrington 2004) shows male and
female criminal behaviours are diﬀerent.
4.2.2 Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design
It is clear from the above policy description that a Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design
(SRD) can be set up to study the eﬀect of post-custody supervision on various outcomes.
Letting Li be a binary indicator of individual i being on licence or not (1 if positive, 0
otherwise), Yi(0) and Yi(1) be the pair of counterfactual outcomes for i under the two
treatment status, Yi be the observed outcome and Xi be the age at conviction (in years)
for i, I can formally express the situation as follows:
Yi = (1− Li) · Yi(0) + Li · Yi(1) (4.1)
Li = 1[Xi<21] (4.2)
The outcomes that I consider as Yi are 1-, 2- and 3-year binary rates of recidivism,
beneﬁt claim and employment. Further let Zi denote a vector of covariates of i, such
as demographic characteristics and criminal history. For an individual, the quadruple
(Yi, Li, Xi, Zi) are observed by the econometrician. While there are no hard adminis-
trative data to demonstrate the sharpness of the design as modelled in (2), such as record
of reception into Probation Service upon custodial release, I take conﬁdence from the UK
legal system that the reality is that of a perfect SRD case and there is no voluntary opt-in
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or opt-out.
The conditions required for identifying the treatment eﬀect in a SRD setting are well
understood and discussed in greater detail in Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001),
Lee (2008) and Imbens and Lemieux (2008). Formally, only one continuity assumption is
required for identiﬁcation, and in this policy context it reads:
Assumption 1. E [Y (0) |X = 21] and E [Y (1) |X = 21] are continuous.
It is straight forward to see under this assumption that
E [Y (0) |X = 21] = lim
X↓21
E [Y |X = 21] (4.3)
and,
E [Y (1) |X = 21] = lim
X↑21
E [Y |X = 21] . (4.4)
Let β denote the average treatment eﬀect at X = 21. Then, β can be identiﬁed as
β = lim
X↑21
E [Y |X = 21]− lim
X↓21
E [Y |X = 21] . (4.5)
Assumption 1 is the minimal condition with which SRD will work. Sometimes one
may wish to impose the stronger (but not necessary) assumption that the pair of expected
counterfactuals is continuous anywhere along X, rather than just at the threshold value,
to increase validity. I show in section 4 that assumption 1 is likely to be satisﬁed, and
given the feature of the UK criminal justice system, I believe the stronger version of the
continuity assumption is also likely to hold for X > 18.
Based on (5), there are diﬀerent viable econometric speciﬁcations to estimate β from
the data. The essence is captured in the following general model:
Yi = α+ Liβ +Kn(Di)
′γ + Li ·Kn(Di)′δ + ui,
for 21− d ≤ Xi ≤ 21 + d, (4.6)
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where Di is the absolute distance of i's age at conviction from the threshold of 21
years, Kn(Di) is a function denoting the sum of powers in Di up to power n, and d is
a length of time corresponding to the choice of bandwidth for sample selection on either
side of the age threshold.
One would typically also include the vector of other control variables Zi in the econo-
metric model, to reduce the potential bias induced by including observations not so close
to the threshold, as well as to improve the precision of treatment eﬀect estimates if Z is
correlated with Y (Imbens and Lemieux 2008). In a valid RD design, however, the inclu-
sion of Zi should not matter. This is because under assumption 1, if the counterfactual
outcomes are continuous at the threshold, it indirectly implies that other covariates should
also be continuous. Hence, the inclusion of Zi should not make a signiﬁcant diﬀerence to
the estimation of β. I show that this is true in my analysis in section 4.
The choice of n is typically positively related to the choice of d. In my analysis,
I choose n = 1 (ie nonparametric local linear regressions around the threshold) for d
equalling 3 and 6 months, and n = 2 (quadratic polynomial) and 3 (cubic polynomial)
for d equalling 1 year. I can take more conﬁdence in the results if they are not sensitive
to the choice of speciﬁcation. I do not include in the analysis observations that have an
absolute diﬀerence in age at conviction of more than 1 year away from the threshold (ie
at most I only include 20 - 22 years old). This is to ensure I do not consider observations
that are likely to be systemically diﬀerent from the ones near the discontinuity.
One factor that may undermine the validity of using SRD here to identify average
treatment eﬀect (conditional at X = 21) is the potential manipulation of allocation
to treatment, leading to dissimilar oﬀenders located across the age threshold. This can
happen if some oﬀenders give weight to the displeasure of an extra 3 months of supervision
when they consider the consequence of their actions, and subsequently decide to delay
oﬀending until after turning 21. However, this is unlikely to be part of their decision
mechanism given the existing evidence on young oﬀenders being myopic (Lee and McCrary
2005). Allocation may also be unnaturally manipulated by judges during sentencing if
they respond in a way that will result in just over 21-year-olds being more likely to be
sentenced to custody for 12 months or more and hence receive post-custody supervision
that a shorter sentence would otherwise not entail. I show strong evidence from my
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robustness checks in section 4 that there is no suggestion at all of manipulation across
the threshold by both oﬀenders and judges.
4.2.3 Duration Analysis in a Regression Discontinuity spirit
The structure of my data allows me to formulate the outcomes as duration variables,
such as time elapsed until the individual commits his ﬁrst reoﬀence. I can apply tools
from the Duration Analysis literature to gain important insights about the dynamics of
outcomes for diﬀerent groups, such as the degree of duration dependence, in addition to
the dynamic eﬀect of licence that I am primarily interested in. Wooldridge (2002) provides
a good textbook summary of the topic. The literature is slightly out of fashion but there
are numerous early papers on for example recidivism (Witte and Schmidt 1979; Schmidt
and Witte 1989; Chung, Schmidt, and Witte 1991) and unemployment (Lancaster 1979;
Lancaster and Nickell 1980). In this paper, I combine Duration Analysis with SRD to
mitigate the risk of unobserved heterogeneity to identifying the eﬀect of licence.
Let T be the duration (say, in days) of an oﬀender remaining in an initial state after
release from prison. The initial states that I consider in this analysis, and an oﬀender
typically ﬁnds himself in at ﬁrst, are being a non-reoﬀender, non-beneﬁt-claimant and
non-worker. The ﬁrst object of interest is the dropout function, F (t), which is the
cumulative distribution function of T and captures the probability of having dropped out
of the initial state by time t:
F (t) ≡ Pr(T ≤ t). (4.7)
This is the complement of the more popular survival function. I do not consider re-
entry into the initial states, so an individual who was employed for some time but sacked
afterwards at time s and remained unemployed in the future would still be modelled as
having dropped out of the initial state of unemployment by time s.
The second object of interest is the hazard rate, λ(t), which captures the instanta-





Pr(t ≤ T ≤ t+ h|T ≥ t)
h
(4.8)
Let f(t) be the ﬁrst derivative of F (t). It can easily be shown that
λ(t) =
f(t)
1− F (t) (4.9)
Rearranging the above, we can link F (t) and λ(t) directly by the following expression:








I hypothesise that being on licence has an eﬀect on the hazard rate, and so the
dropout function. I assume the speciﬁcation of piecewise exponential hazard function
(see Wooldridge (2002) for more detail), which is a very ﬂexible speciﬁcation within the
class of proportional hazard model that does not, for example, a priori assume any shape
about state dependence (∂λ(t)/∂t) as the popular Weibull hazard function does. This
speciﬁcation allows me to estimate the eﬀect of licence at as many diﬀerent points in time
after release as I like. I choose to use months as the unit of time in my analysis. Formally,
for number of months m = 1, . . . ,M since release, I specify the hazard function as:
λ(t;D,L, θ) = exp [Lβm +Kn(D)
′γ + L ·Kn(D)′δ]λm, am−1 ≤ t ≤ am (4.11)
or after taking natural logs,
lnλ(t;D,L, θ) = Lβm + Kn(D)
′γ + L · Kn(D)′δ + lnλm, am−1 ≤ t ≤ am (4.12)
where X,L,Kn, D are as previously deﬁned, λm is the constant baseline hazard rate
speciﬁc to m, and am is the number of days corresponding to m months. In this spe-
ciﬁcation, the baseline hazards are restricted to be constant for t within the same time
segment speciﬁc to m, but allowed to diﬀer between diﬀerent segments. For the choice of
M , I restrict it to be 36 in the analysis since 3 years after release is usually a long enough
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period to study interesting diﬀerences in behaviour.
The set of βm is the treatment eﬀect. It is assumed that licence has a constant scale
eﬀect of exp(βm) on λ(t). βm are m-speciﬁc and capture the potentially time-variant
eﬀect of supervision on reoﬀending, beneﬁt claim and employment hazards. For example,
one may hypothesise that under speciﬁc deterrence, the impact may be greater during
the ﬁrst 3 months when the oﬀenders are on licence. Alternatively, if the supervision is
eﬀective in making fundamental changes to how oﬀenders view costs and beneﬁts of their
actions in the future and hence creating a positive spiral, we may see the eﬀect of licence
to increase over time. This speciﬁcation can reveal any interesting dynamic eﬀects of
treatment that may be useful for future modelling work.
θ ≡ (βm, γ, δ, λm) is the vector of parameters to be estimated. This can be accomplis-
hed using Maximum Likelihood, given the piecewise exponential hazard function that I
specify. The log likelihood function for observation i can be written as:
mi−1∑
h=1
ln [αh(θ;Li, Di)] + di ln [1− αmi(θ;Li, Di)] (4.13)
where mi is the month since release by which i has left the initial state, di is a dummy
variable indicating if i's duration is uncensored (so equalling one only when i has not left
the initial state by the end of the measurement period of 36 months) and αm(θ;Li, Di)
is a function capturing the likelihood of survival during m and m− 1 months:
αm(θ;Li, Di) ≡ exp {− exp [Liβm +Kn(Di)′γ + Li ·Kn(Di)′δ]λm(ami − ami−1)}
(4.14)
General discussion of the derivation of the likelihood function under piecewise constant
exponential hazard speciﬁcation can be found in Wooldridge (2002). The log likelihood
for the entire sample is obtained by summing expression (14) across all i = 1, ..., I.
Similar to the situation where a simple OLS regression would suﬀer from bias in
treatment eﬀect estimation due to unobserved heterogeneity, a simple duration analysis
would suﬀer similar consequences. To overcome this, I propose implementing my MLE
procedure in a RD spirit. My proposal is to restrict the sample to a subset with age at
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conviction of about 21, and choose an appropriate Kn(Di) correspondingly. Consistent
with the choices I make in RD analysis, I choose to couple a 1-year bandwidth on either
side of the threshold with n = 2 or 3, and couple a 6-month and 3-month bandwidth
with n = 1. Thinking of each λ(t) as an outcome of interest in a RD framework, the
assumption required here for identiﬁcation is a familiar one of continuity:
Assumption 2. The counterfactuals of λ for any t are continuous at the age at conviction
threshold of 21.
Before presenting the results, I turn my attention ﬁrst to describing the data in the next
section, and discuss some data limitation issues and my proposed solutions.
4.3 Data
This paper draws on the new linked data created by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) in
partnership with Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and Her Majesty's Revenue
and Customs. My analysis dataset is made up of three component datasets: the Police
National Computer (PNC), National Beneﬁts Database (NBD) and P45 Employment.
General descriptions about them are provided in chapter 3. In this section I discuss the
sample for this analysis and speciﬁc data issues that are relevant. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, while the process of matching carried out by MoJ/DWP is demonstrata-
bly robust, some analytical issues are impossible to avoid when matching across multiple
agencies and departments, all with diﬀerent data systems and recording practices.
4.3.1 Sample
I include in the analysis sample oﬀenders in England and Wales who were released
from prison between 2002 and 2008. Whilst the earliest matched PNC data is available
from 2000, I have chosen to begin the analysis at 2002 because there are quality concerns
with the 2001 data (it is often omitted from oﬃcial reoﬀending analysis). The latter cutoﬀ
of 2008 is chosen because at the time of undertaking this analysis, 2008 is the latest cohort
for which I can observe the 3-year reoﬀending rate. Applying the sample selection criteria
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set up in sectoin 2.1, there are in total 263,146 prison releases of 157,100 unique oﬀenders
identiﬁed during the analytical timeframe. An oﬀender is recorded to have reoﬀended
within one year, two years and three years if he has committed at least one oﬀence during
this period that is subsequently proven through caution and court conviction. This PNC
sample is then linked to its counterpart NBD and P45 Employment records for analysis
of beneﬁt and employment outcomes.
4.3.2 Analytical Data Issues
The MoJ/DWP data matching process is highly rigorous (MoJ, 2014a) and has over-
come major practical matching issues in creating the database. However, there still remain
analytical issues stemming from imperfect matching between datasets and measurement
error that must be considered carefully when using the data for analysis.
PNC individuals missing on NBD/P45
There are two reasons why individuals appearing in PNC may not be found on NBD
and/or P45 Employment. The ﬁrst one is that they have never claimed beneﬁts and/or
never been employed within the time period that the extracts of NBD and P45 data cover,
both of which going back to before 2000 and lasting until early 2013. This is a natural
cause and the not-found reﬂects the behaviour that I am interested in. The second reason
is recording error, where basic identifying information about the same individuals (such
as name or date of birth) has been recorded diﬀerently on diﬀerent datasets, leading
to a match not being established. The two types of not-found are of diﬀerent nature
and in analysis would require diﬀerent handling. Unfortunately, the matching process
cannot distinguish between the two. If I simply code all unfound PNC/Reoﬀending
Cohort individuals as never claimed beneﬁt and never been employed, set up the outcome
variables accordingly and run the analysis on the entire sample, the estimated treatment
eﬀects are going to be biased. This is because for the fraction of beneﬁt claimants and
workers suﬀering from the recording error, I will be coding them wrongly as non-claimants
and non-workers. On the other hand, if I drop all unfound individuals and use only those
who can be found in the analysis, this can potentially lead to a non-representative sample if
the found and not-found groups display diﬀerent characteristics. The resulting treatment
eﬀects, while still can be internally valid if the RD assumption is upheld, are only speciﬁc
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to a strangely deﬁned subgroup of the population, restricting the already limited external
validity of the RD estimates.
One simple solution is to assume away the eﬀect of the diﬀerences in the found and
not-found group on outcomes (by far the major one is the proportion of UK nationals, 94%
vs 79% for NBD, 93% vs 86% for P45), and simply use the found sample without further
adjustment. A more sophisticated approach is to generate separate propensity scores of
being found in NBD and P45, and apply the scores as inverse weights to the observations
when analysing the Reoﬀending/NBD matched sample and the Reoﬀending/P45 matched
sample. The intuition here is to re-create within the found samples the representation
in the full Reoﬀending sample, by weighing up observations with characteristics more
associated with not being found and weighing down others. This can overcome the issue
of misrepresentation when using the found samples, but at the cost of less precision in
estimation. I later present results of both approaches. The use of weight appears not to
aﬀect the estimates, suggesting representativeness of the found samples is not much an
issue, at least for the subgroup of oﬀenders that I consider in the analysis.
Random Start/End Dates in P45
It appears to be a common problem in the P45 data that the start and/or end dates
are not properly ﬁlled out. To complete the dataset anyway, the DWP's approach is to
ﬂag the problematic employment spells and randomly assign dates within the tax years
(known to be accurate) that the records belong. MoJ and DWP further adjust these
random dates so that beneﬁt spells do not overlap with prison spells. Out of the 105,172
unique oﬀenders from my analysis sample who can be matched to P45, 60% of them have
had at least one randomised start dates during 1998 - 2013. Of those who had had at
least one randomised start date, the average times of randomisation is 2.6. Obviously,
inaccuracy in recording the start and end dates aﬀects the validity of the employment
outcome and history variables that I create for the analysis.
Upon closer inspection, there are three reasons to believe that the impact of this is
not detrimental to the analysis. Firstly, the randomisation is not completely wild and is
still accurate to the tax year. It may not make a diﬀerence at all to the RD employment
outcome variables of ever employed within 1, 2 and 3 years, and even if it does, the
diﬀerence that can be made is limited as time goes on. For example, if the randomised
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start date is within one year after custody but the true date is outside, I still know for
sure that the true date must be within two years after custody, as a consequence of the
tax year restriction. In such a case, the two-year outcome must be correct even if the
one-year one was wrong. Secondly, I am not interested in all the P45 records. I formulate
my outcome variables as whether the individual was ever employed in the 1, 2 and 3 years
after custody, and the history variable as whether he was ever employed in the 1 year
prior custody, so I need to only consider the P45 records immediately before and after a
prison spell. In my sample, of the 171,102 prison spells that can be associated with a P45
record before or after, just under 10% have a subsequent P45 spell with a randomised
start date, and less than 7% have a preceding P45 spell with a randomised end date. The
extent of the problem is limited as I focus on the relevant records for analysis. Thirdly, I
show in the results section that keeping or dropping the aﬀected records do not make a
diﬀerence to the estimates in both RD and duration analyses, suggesting the randomised
records do not bias results and the allocation to randomisation is random.
4.4 Results
Between 2002 and 2008 in England and Wales, in the data I can identify a total of
263,146 releases of 157,100 unique adult male oﬀenders sentenced to less than 12 months
in custody. Roughly 15% (39,003) of the releases were for oﬀenders of age at conviction
less than 21, the threshold at which the likelihood of receiving post-custody supervision
jumps sharply from one to zero. The descriptive statistics can be found in table 1. UK
nationals make up over 90% of the observations, and white 84%. For nearly 80% of the
releases, the oﬀenders can be found on the NBD. The found rate for P45 is lower at 64%.
4.4.1 Regression Discontinuity Analysis
Reoﬀending outcomes
Figure 1 shows simple plots of smoothed local linear polynomial ﬁt (over a 1 month
window) of 1-year, 2-year and 3-year reoﬀending rates against age at conviction, with a
break at the red line denoting the licence eligibility threshold of age 21. Any jump at the
threshold can loosely be interpreted as the local treatment eﬀect. Supervision appears
to have a negative eﬀect on the 1-year reoﬀending rate but positive eﬀects on the 2- and
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3-year rates. However, the jumps are all of minor magnitudes (less than 2% point in
absolute) and none appears to be statistically signiﬁcant. We can see that in general over
60% of these young oﬀenders reoﬀend within one year, and this ﬁgure rises to over 80%
by 3 years after release.
Table 2 shows more accurate regression results. It conﬁrms the simple ﬁndings from
inspecting the ﬁgure. The ﬁrst two columns report estimated treatment eﬀects on 1-
year, 2-year and 3-year reoﬀending outcomes from a speciﬁcation of equation (6), with a
linear functional form and a bandwidth of 3 months on either side of the age threshold,
with and without control variables. The next two columns report results from a similar
speciﬁcation but with a 6-month bandwidth. The last two pairs of columns report results
from a quadratic and a cubic speciﬁcation respectively over a 1-year bandwidth. The
estimates are all close to zero and not statistically signiﬁcant at even the 10% level. The
fact that they are similar with or without controls and regardless of the functional form
is a strong indication that the RD assumption is credible.
Beneﬁt outcomes
Figure 2 shows plots of 1-, 2- and 3-year beneﬁt claim rates against age at conviction.
In general, over 90% of the this group of prisoners have claimed beneﬁt and actively
sought ﬁnancial help from the state by 3 years after release, and licence appears to have
a weak negative impact. Table 3 presents the results of RD beneﬁt analysis using the
NBD matched sample, a subset of the sample from the reoﬀending analysis. Though I do
not report estimates from speciﬁcations without control covariates (available on request),
they are very similar to the speciﬁcations with controls. This is indicative that the RD
continuity assumption is upheld despite using a subsample. The ﬁrst two columns in
table 3 report the estimates from the same speciﬁcation, speciﬁcally the one with linear
functional form ﬁtted over a bandwidth of 3 months using the NBD matched sample,
but ﬁrst one is without propensity score weighting and the second one with. The next 3
pairs of columns are for estimates from speciﬁcations with 6 months bandwidth/linear,
1 year/quadratic and 1 year/cubic. The estimates from all speciﬁcations are largely the
same - they all suggest a weak negative eﬀect of licence on beneﬁt claim of about 1-3%
point, but none of them are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. There is only one set of signiﬁcant
estimates at the 10% level, coming from the speciﬁcation with a bandwidth of 1 year and
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cubic functional form in age.
I notice from the table that the application of propensity score inverse weighting
appears to have almost no eﬀect, suggesting the matched sample is representative of the
overall sample and does not require sample rebalancing.
Employment outcomes
Figure 3 shows plots of 1-, 2- and 3-year employment rates against age at conviction.
There is almost no visible discontinuity and treatment eﬀect at the threshold. Over 50%
of the oﬀenders in the data had been in P45 employmen for at least once by 3 years after
release. Table 4 presents the results of RD employment analysis using the P45 matched
sample, excluding the observations associated with a subsequent randomised P45 start
date. The table structure follows that under beneﬁt analysis. Again, I do not report
estimates from speciﬁcations without control variables, but they are available on request
and are highly similar to the speciﬁcations with controls. We notice as before that the
propensity score weighting does not make a signiﬁcant diﬀerence, and no estimates are
signiﬁcant at the 10% level, conﬁrming the ﬁndings from graphical inspection.
I present table 5 to demonstrate that the issue of random dates is not of signiﬁcance
to the analysis. The table shows estimates from the same speciﬁcations as in table 4, but
using the entire P45 sample without discarding the randomised P45 spells. We can see
the estimates are very similar to those in table 4, conﬁrming that the issue of randomised
dates is of minor importance.
4.4.2 Duration Analysis
I use tools from the Duration Analysis literature to dig deeper into the dynamics of
the eﬀect of supervision on outcomes, as well as the outcomes themselves.
Reoﬀending outcome
Each graph in ﬁgure 4 shows two plots of the hazard λ(t) of dropping into recidivism,
for the control group (green) and treatment group (red). The diﬀerence between them is
plotted as the dashed line, and can be interpreted as the time-variant eﬀect of supervision.
The hazard functions are generated by applying MLE procedure to the sample likelihood
function, which is the sum of equation (13) across i. Each graph in the panel corresponds
to a choice in the combinations of sample selection bandwidth around threshold and
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functional form of the sentence length variable during estimation. Figure 5 shows the
corresponding dropout functions. Table 6 presents MLE estimates of the treatment eﬀect,
βˆm. Each column again corresponds to a speciﬁcation with a particular combination of
bandwidth and functional form. They are all estimated without control covariates Z, as
RD analysis already demonstrates that the inclusion of Z does not matter. Also, the size
of this vector (about 30 variables) means that inclusion of it would considerably increase
the computational demand, for little value in return.
The ﬁrst thing we notice from the table and the graphs is that there are no signi-
ﬁcant patterns of eﬀects of supervision on the hazard rates (and therefore the dropout
functions) anywhere along the time horizon. This is perhaps surprising, as one may have
expected to see a diﬀerence in recidivism hazard not least at the very beginning due to
speciﬁc deterrence and incapacitation. Even though oﬀenders on licence are restricted in
movement and exposed to the certainty of recall to custody if they are caught commiting
a reoﬀence, they do not behave diﬀerently to oﬀenders who are not exposed to super-
vision. We also notice from the graph that the hazard functions demonstrate negative
duration dependence, ie the longer an oﬀender stays free of crime, the less likely he is
to fall back to crime. This is consistent with previous recidivism research using duration
analysis techniques, such as Chung et al. (1991).
Beneﬁt outcome
Figures 6 and 7 show plots of the beneﬁt hazard and dropout functions. The deﬁnition
of the initial state here is not having claimed beneﬁt once after prison release, and so the
interpretation of the beneﬁt hazard is, perhaps unnaturally, the probability of claiming
beneﬁt at time t, having not claimed beneﬁt since release, and similarly the dropout
function refers to the probability of having claimed beneﬁt at least once by time t.
The results are not sensitive to the choice of speciﬁcation. We can see that the hazard
for both groups take a very similar and striking shape. The hazard is particularly high
in the ﬁrst month after custody, then drops sharply after 30 days and remains ﬂat from
there onwards. This reveals an interesting behavioural response to being punished in
custody, that beneﬁt is mostly claimed right away, but if it was not then the likelihood
of claiming beneﬁt later is much lower. While this is not relevant for the discussion on
the marginal impact of supervision, it is a useful stylised fact for further behavioural
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modelling work on individual's interaction with the criminal justice system. Back to the
eﬀect of supervision, we see that it has no impact on the shape or scale of the hazard
function, although a small insigiﬁcant decrease about 1% does show up in the dropout
functions over time. This is consistent with the ﬁndings in beneﬁt RD analysis.
Employment outcome
Figures 8, 9 and table 8 show the corresponding graphs and treatment eﬀect estimates
for employment outcome. For both treatment and control groups, the employment hazard,
deﬁned as the probability of being employed at a particular time having not been employed
once since prison release, exhibits a trend of negative duration dependence. This is
consistent with a hypothesis of reduced employability the longer individuals stay out
of work. On the diﬀerence between the treatment and control groups, there are more
signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect estimates, but overall they are not economically signiﬁcant
and there are no particular emerging patterns. The close to null eﬀect could be due to
rehabilitative eﬀect and scarring eﬀect oﬀsetting each other, or that being on licence has
genuinely little eﬀect.
4.4.3 Robustness checks
The validity of results in RD and Duration Analysis is dependent on assumptions 1 and
2 being satisﬁed, but as they involve counterfactuals they are not directly testable. They
may be called into question if allocation to supervision can be unnaturally manipulated
by the oﬀenders or the judges. I present ﬁve robustness checks here to show that there is
no hint of any manipulation and my main analysis results are highly robust.
Covariates balance
The continuity assumption refers to the idea that if everyone was treated the same
away, there would not be a jump in the outcome across the threshold. This would require
the observables (at least those that would correlate with the outcome anyway) and unob-
servables to be continuous at the threshold. If the treatment and control groups near the
threshold are similar over a large set of observable characteristics bar the licence status,
it is strongly indicative that the unobservables are likely to be balanced and that the
continuity assumption is plausible. We have seen from the RD analysis results that the
treatment eﬀect estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of the set of control covariates.
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This is a good sign that the covariates are balanced. To conﬁrm this, I run regressions
based on equation (6), but replacing the outcome with control variables. The idea is to
detect whether there is a discontinuous jump in the variable across the threshold. We can
see from table 9 that across the 31 control variables encompassing nationality, ethnicity,
index oﬀence type, criminal histories, beneﬁt histories and employment histories, only
2 of them are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Speciﬁcally, it appears that the
just under 21 group has a higher proportion of violent oﬀenders by 3% point, and fewer
drink driving oﬀenders by 1.5% point. However, these are not economically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences. Also, as for a fact there is no diﬀerence in sentencing guidelines across the age
threshold for these oﬀences, I take the view that the diﬀerences are anomalies. Overall,
the comparability between treatment and control groups is very strong.
Density of forcing variable
The continuity assumption is more plausible if agents cannot manipulate allocation to
treatment. This is the intuition behind the McCrary (2008) test  density of the forcing
variable (age at conviction) should be continuous across the threshold if agents cannot
manipulate which side of the threshold to be on. In my case, if there is manipulation, I
expect it to be in the form that just under 21 oﬀenders would wait until they turn 21 to
commit the same crime in order to avoid the additional 3 months of supervision. Previous
research by Lee an McCrary (2005), which shows young oﬀenders are myopic and do not
respond to increased sentence length, suggests this is unlikely to be true, but if it is, I
should see a dip in density as as age approaches 21 from underneath, and a discontinuous
upward jump in density at 21. Visual inspection of ﬁgure 10, which shows a ﬁnely gridded
histogram of age at conviction for all male oﬀenders sentenced to less than 12 months
in custody and released between 2002 and 2008, suggests that there is no discontinuity
at 21. In fact, this ﬁgure is highly reminiscent of the well-documented age-crime proﬁle
from criminological studies such as Hirschi & Gottfredson (1983), with a peak of criminal
activities at around age 20.
Figure 11 shows the result of applying the McCrary continuous density test. The
estimated jump in density at the threshold is statistically signiﬁcant, but the test has
picked up a downward jump in density that contradicts the intuition outlined above. I
conjecture that this is due to the test not performing well at a cutoﬀ near the peak of
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density where there is a sharp change in gradient from positive to negative. As a counter
check, I apply the McCrary test to a placebo cutoﬀ at age 20 instead of 21 in ﬁgure 12,
and it again returns a signiﬁcant discontinuous downward jump. There is no reason to
suspect unnatural manipulation into crime around the age of 20. It adds weight to the
conjecture that McCrary test may not perform well near a sharp turning point. Based on
the results of visual inspection and the placebo test, I conclude there is nothing unnatural
in the density of the forcing variable at the allocation threshold, and there is no hint of
manipulation on the oﬀenders' part.
Continuity of the ratio of long vs. short custody
Judges may react to the licence age cut-oﬀ during sentencing in a way that invalidate
the continuity assumption. As mentioned under policy situation in section 2, all adult
oﬀenders sentenced to 12 months or more in custody are supervised upon release, regard-
less of age. It is hence a conceivable situation that when deciding on the sentence for
an oﬀender just over 21, the judge may be inclined to giving out a 12 months or more
custodial sentence over a under 12 months one so that the oﬀender would still receive
post-custody support, something that he would have had under a short custodial sen-
tence had he arrived at the court just before he turned 21. Such counter-balancing act
against the age cutoﬀ on the judges' behalf would undermine the continuity assumption,
as the 21 or above oﬀenders sentenced to less than 12 months in custody would belong
to a group that is deemed to have lower recidivism risks and lower needs for supervision.
In my design, this would underestimate any positive eﬀect of supervision on recidivism
reduction.
Figure 13 shows a smoothed line denoting the ratio of 12 - 14 months custody to 9 - 11
months custody sentence by age at conviction. It is clear that there is not a discontinuous
jump in the ratio at the age threshold, suggesting judges do not counter-balance the age
cutoﬀ by sentencing more 21 years old to 12 months or more in custody in order to provide
them with supervision.
Sensitivity to sentence length
On the same line of thought as the previous robustness check, if judges counter-balance
the age cutoﬀ by reserving the just under 12 months custodial sentences for oﬀenders 21
or above that have lower perceived needs for supervision, then my analysis results may
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be sensitive to the inclusion of prison spells with custodial length between 9-11 months.
From table 10, we can see that excluding those prison spells does not make an impact on
the estimates. This conﬁrms that the comparison between under and over 21-year-olds is
not sensitive to being near the 12 months sentence length threshold, over which all adults
oﬀenders would receive post-custody supervision.
Sensitivity to criminal history
The last check I present is an external validity robustness check, unlike the previous
ones. It is reasonable to hypothesize that oﬀenders with diﬀerent criminal histories may
react diﬀerently to supervision. For example, new oﬀenders may react most positively
to the speciﬁc deterrence element of the supervision. I show that in table 11 there is no
emerging pattern as I restrict the analysis to oﬀenders with 0, 1 and >1 previous convicti-
ons. If anything, supervision appears to have a weak but not statistically signiﬁcant (at
5% level) criminogenic eﬀect on oﬀenders with multiple previous convictions. I conclude
that my ﬁnding of null supervision eﬀect on recidivism, beneﬁt claim and employment in
not sensitive to types of oﬀenders (in terms of criminal histories) being considered and is
a general result applicable to the all types.
Overall, results of the robustness checks all point towards a very strong and highly
credible RD design.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I use Regression Discontinuity Design to exploit a previous policy
feature in the England and Wales criminal justice system in identifying the treatment
eﬀect of a 3-month post-custody supervision period on later outcomes. According to the
law before 2015, within the group of adult oﬀenders sentenced to less than 12 months
in custody, the allocation to post-custody supervision is completely determined by age:
only those under 21 at the time of conviction are on licence upon release. Using a new
micro-dataset produced under the joint eﬀort of MoJ and DWP covering information on
criminal, beneﬁt and employment histories, I ﬁnd that the 3-month supervision period,
during which oﬀenders have to observe licence conditions and undergo various programmes
aimed at reducing reoﬀending and enhancing re-integration into society, has no impact
on 1-, 2- and 3-year recidivism, beneﬁt claim and employment outcomes. Results from
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Duration Analysis applied in a RD spirit further reveal that not even very short term
impact can be detected, such as any speciﬁc deterrence or incapacitation eﬀect during
the 3 months on licence. The robustness checks all return satisfactory results and point
towards a very strong RD design, endowing my estimates with very high validity.
This paper adds evidence to the growing empirical literature on the eﬀect of criminal
justice punishment on outcomes. The null eﬀects estimated here are somewhat consistent
with the ambiguous theoretical prediction on the direction of impact, as well as the
mixed results from previous similar research on time spent within the criminal justice
system. The majority of existing research only provides treatment eﬀects on recidivism
and does not shed light on the mechanism behind the observed pattern. I am able to
incorporate into the analysis labour market and beneﬁt (not least as a proxy for oﬀenders'
self assessment of whether state ﬁnancial help is required) outcomes and provide a fuller
picture of the eﬀect of being on licence.
Inherent in any RD studies, the estimated treatment eﬀects are only valid for the
sample of individuals near the threshold. In my case, they are male oﬀenders sentenced
to under 1 year in custody and aged around 21 at the time of conviction. The results
cannot be generalized with conﬁdence to, for example, 18- and 30 years-olds, who are
located on very diﬀerent parts in the age-crime proﬁle. Despite this limitation, the results
should still be highly relevant and useful for policymaker. This is because, as a matter
of fact, on average oﬀenders of about 21 years old are near the peak of activities during
their criminal careers. For all the good intention of and the resource spent on the current
licence policy, it is perhaps surprising from a UK policymaker's point of view that it is
not an eﬀective means of reducing reoﬀending and facilitating social re-integration. This
is also an alarming result within the context of the new MoJ Transforming Rehabilitation
agenda, which came into eﬀect in late 2014. Under the new licence policy, all adult
oﬀenders sentenced to less than 12 months in custody will receive post-custody supervision
lasting 1 year. While it remains to be seen whether a 12-month supervision period under
the new policy is going to be more eﬀective than a 3-month period, found in this paper to
be ineﬀective at least for young oﬀenders, results here should provide an opportunity for
policymakers to consider and explore what the other more eﬀective and eﬃcient measures




Figure 4.1: Reoﬀending outcomes of the analysis sample
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Figure 4.2: Beneﬁt outcomes of the analysis sample
Figure 4.3: Employment outcomes of the analysis sample
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Figure 4.4: Reoﬀending hazard functions
Figure 4.5: Reoﬀending dropout functions
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Figure 4.6: Beneﬁt hazard functions
Figure 4.7: Beneﬁt dropout functions
60
Figure 4.8: Employment hazard functions
Figure 4.9: Employment dropout functions
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Figure 4.10: Distribution of age at conviction
Figure 4.11: McCrary density test for a cut-oﬀ at age = 21
Notes: The discontinuity estimate (log diﬀerence in height) is -0.087, with standard error
0.013.
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Figure 4.12: McCrary density test for a cut-oﬀ at age = 20
Notes: The discontinuity estimate (log diﬀerence in height) is -0.102, with standard error
0.013.
Figure 4.13: Ratio of 12-14 months custody vs. 9-11 months custody
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of the sample of male adult oﬀenders sentenced to less
than 12 months in custody and released in 2002 - 2008
Variable Mean Std. Dev.





Other ethnicity 0.01 0.11
Unknown ethnicity 0.01 0.08
Index oﬀence type Violence 0.19 0.39
Robbery 0.00 0.05
Public order or riot 0.04 0.20
Sexual oﬀence 0.01 0.09
Sexual oﬀence (child) 0.01 0.09
Soliciting 0.00 0.03
Domestic burglary 0.02 0.13
Other burglary 0.04 0.20
Theft 0.23 0.42
Handling 0.02 0.15
Fraud and forgery 0.03 0.17
Bail and oﬀences 0.03 0.18
Taking and driving away 0.03 0.16
Theft from vehicles 0.02 0.13
Other motoring oﬀences 0.18 0.38
Drink driving 0.05 0.23
Criminal manage 0.02 0.15
Drugs (trade/production) 0.01 0.07
Drugs (possession) 0.02 0.14
Other oﬀences 0.04 0.19
Custody variables Sentence length (days) 130.22 74.35
Post release licence 0.15 0.36
Criminal histories Previous prison spells 5.07 7.16
Previous convictions 15.14 15.39
Match rates NBD 0.78 0.41
P45 0.65 0.48
NBD & P45 0.61 0.49
N 263,146
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Table 4.2: RD estimates of treatment eﬀect on reoﬀending outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1y reoﬀ 0.006 0.009 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.006 0.015
(0.023) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.023) (0.021)
2y reoﬀ -0.014 -0.006 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.005 -0.010 0.001
(0.020) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.020) (0.019)
3y reoﬀ -0.013 -0.006 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.016 -0.005
(0.018) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017)
Bandwidth 3m 3m 6m 6m 12m 12m 12m 12m
Functional form Lin. Lin. Lin. Lin. Quad. Quad. Cubic Cubic
Control No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 6,758 6,758 13,366 13,366 26,966 26,966 26,966 26,966
• Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The outcome variables are whether of-
fenders reoﬀended within 1, 2 and 3 years after release from custody. The sample is
restricted to male with custody length <1 year. The set of control variables include
UK nationality, ethnicity, index oﬀence type, previous number of custody spell, pre-
vious number of conviction and custodial sentence length. Statistical signiﬁcance:
** 5% level, * 10% level.
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Table 4.3: RD estimates of treatment eﬀect on beneﬁt outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1y ben -0.031 -0.031 -0.015 -0.015 -0.018 -0.018 -0.032 -0.032
(0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021)
2y ben -0.029 -0.029 -0.009 -0.009 -0.014 -0.014 -0.027 -0.027
(0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018)
3y ben -0.026 -0.026 -0.013 -0.013 -0.015 -0.015 -0.028* -0.028*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016)
Bandwidth 3m 3m 6m 6m 12m 12m 12m 12m
Functional form Lin. Lin. Lin. Lin. Quad. Quad. Cubic Cubic
Weight N Y N Y N Y N Y
N 5,307 5,307 10,429 10,429 20,966 20,966 20,966 20,966
• Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The outcome variables are whether
oﬀenders ever claimed beneﬁt within 1, 2 and 3 years after release from custody. The
sample is restricted to male with custody length <1 year and matched PNC records
to the NBD. The set of control variables (UK nationality, ethnicity, index oﬀence
type, previous number of custody spell, previous number of conviction and custodial
sentence length and a binary beneﬁt variable during the year before custody) is
included in all speciﬁcations. Statistical signiﬁcance: ** 5% level, * 10% level.
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Table 4.4: RD estimates of treatment eﬀect on employment outcomes using non-random
P45 records
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1y emp -0.008 -0.008 -0.023 -0.023 -0.021 -0.021 -0.015 -0.015
(0.029) (0.029) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.029) (0.029)
2y emp -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.011 -0.011
(0.031) (0.031) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031)
3y emp -0.012 -0.012 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.011 -0.011
(0.031) (0.031) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031)
Bandwidth 3m 3m 6m 6m 12m 12m 12m 12m
Functional form Lin. Lin. Lin. Lin. Quad. Quad. Cubic Cubic
Weight N Y N Y N Y N Y
N 4,084 4,084 8,061 8,061 16,280 16,280 16,280 16,280
• Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The outcome variables are whether
oﬀenders ever worked in P45 employment within 1, 2 and 3 years after release
from custody. The sample is restricted to male with custody length <1 year and
only matched PNC records to the P45 database with non-random subseuquent P45
start dates. The set of control variables (UK nationality, ethnicity, index oﬀence
type, previous number of custody spell, previous number of conviction and custodial
sentence length and a binary employment variale during the year before custody)
is included in all speciﬁcations. Statistical signiﬁcance: ** 5% level, * 10% level.
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Table 4.5: RD estimates of treatment eﬀect on employment outcomes using all P45 records
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1y emp -0.007 -0.007 -0.025 -0.025 -0.022 -0.022 -0.014 -0.014
(0.028) (0.027) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027)
2y emp -0.018 -0.018 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.007 -0.007
(0.029) (0.029) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.029)
3y emp -0.018 -0.018 -0.008 -0.008 -0.002 -0.002 -0.017 -0.017
(0.029) (0.029) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.029)
Bandwidth 3m 3m 6m 6m 12m 12m 12m 12m
Functional form Lin. Lin. Lin. Lin. Quad. Quad. Cubic Cubic
Weight N Y N Y N Y N Y
N 4,648 4,648 9,134 9,134 18,507 18,507 18,507 18,507
• Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The outcome variables are whether
oﬀenders ever worked in P45 employment within 1, 2 and 3 years after release from
custody. The sample is restricted to male, age≥18, previous conviction events ≤1
and all matched PNC records to the P45 database. The set of control variables (age
on release, UK nationals, ethnicity, index oﬀence type, previous number of custody
spell, previous number of conviction, a binary beneﬁt variable during the year before
custody and a binary employment variale during the year before custody) is included
in all speciﬁcations. Statistical signiﬁcance: ** 5% level, * 10% level.
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Table 4.6: Duration analysis estimates of the treatment eﬀect on reoﬀending hazard
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment eﬀect (βˆm)
m= 1 -0.007 (0.074) 0.067 (0.052) 0.045 (0.048) -0.002 (0.06)
2 0.149 (0.087) 0.013 (0.061) -0.001 (0.052) -0.047 (0.063)
3 0.142 (0.097) 0.075 (0.068) 0.023 (0.057) -0.024 (0.067)
4 0.018 (0.105) 0.062 (0.075) 0.084 (0.061) 0.037 (0.071)
5 -0.192 (0.117) -0.128 (0.084) -0.058 (0.066) -0.104 (0.075)
6 -0.117 (0.126) 0.079 (0.09) 0.097 (0.07) 0.050 (0.079)
7 -0.097 (0.139) 0.023 (0.103) 0.098 (0.079) 0.051 (0.086)
8 -0.097 (0.148) 0.087 (0.11) 0.040 (0.084) -0.007 (0.091)
9 0.123 (0.167) 0.030 (0.116) 0.091 (0.087) 0.044 (0.094)
10 0.128 (0.179) 0.038 (0.124) 0.018 (0.091) -0.029 (0.098)
11 0.211 (0.2) 0.112 (0.134) 0.077 (0.097) 0.031 (0.103)
12 -0.036 (0.184) -0.106 (0.133) -0.016 (0.099) -0.062 (0.106)
13 -0.330 (0.218) -0.234 (0.15) -0.218** (0.11) -0.264** (0.116)
14 0.000 (0.24) 0.055 (0.163) 0.110 (0.116) 0.064 (0.122)
15 -0.077 (0.225) -0.098 (0.162) -0.101 (0.12) -0.148 (0.126)
16 -0.251 (0.237) -0.303* (0.169) -0.201* (0.12) -0.248** (0.125)
17 -0.142 (0.233) 0.030 (0.169) 0.084 (0.128) 0.038 (0.133)
18 -0.464 (0.278) 0.118 (0.184) 0.027 (0.132) -0.020 (0.137)
19 -0.072 (0.265) -0.121 (0.207) 0.037 (0.148) -0.009 (0.152)
20 -0.462 (0.299) 0.031 (0.222) 0.162 (0.152) 0.115 (0.156)
21 -0.200 (0.277) 0.100 (0.196) 0.330** (0.148) 0.283* (0.153)
22 0.067 (0.29) -0.118 (0.225) -0.013 (0.161) -0.059 (0.165)
23 0.358 (0.326) 0.198 (0.209) 0.125 (0.154) 0.079 (0.158)
24 0.500 (0.309) 0.401* (0.232) 0.126 (0.17) 0.080 (0.174)
25 0.188 (0.33) -0.184 (0.244) 0.185 (0.177) 0.138 (0.181)
26 -0.433 (0.411) -0.262 (0.285) 0.088 (0.184) 0.042 (0.187)
27 0.039 (0.374) -0.027 (0.282) -0.052 (0.2) -0.099 (0.203)
28 -0.334 (0.355) 0.085 (0.265) 0.140 (0.198) 0.094 (0.202)
29 0.170 (0.376) 0.180 (0.259) 0.117 (0.194) 0.070 (0.197)
30 -0.487 (0.486) 0.145 (0.356) 0.271 (0.223) 0.224 (0.226)
31 -1.098*** (0.442) -0.617** (0.302) -0.300 (0.231) -0.346 (0.234)
32 -0.062 (0.45) 0.092 (0.291) 0.150 (0.223) 0.103 (0.226)
33 0.298 (0.495) -0.162 (0.341) 0.205 (0.243) 0.159 (0.246)
34 -0.059 (0.474) -0.169 (0.298) -0.309 (0.234) -0.355 (0.237)
35 0.040 (0.439) 0.279 (0.334) -0.030 (0.246) -0.076 (0.248)
36 -1.449** (0.647) -0.860** (0.423) -0.231 (0.259) -0.278 (0.261)
Window 1 2 3 3
Functional form Linear Linear Quadratic Cubic
N 6,758 13,366 26,966 26,966
• Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Same sample as reoﬀending RD analysis.
No control variables are included. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** 1% level, ** 5% level,
* 10% level.
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Table 4.7: Duration analysis estimates of the treatment eﬀect on beneﬁt hazard
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment eﬀect (βˆm)
m= 1 -0.063 (0.061) -0.032 (0.043) -0.036 (0.044) -0.062 (0.058)
2 -0.153 (0.129) -0.012 (0.091) -0.017 (0.072) -0.043 (0.081)
3 0.026 (0.161) -0.151 (0.112) -0.104 (0.085) -0.129 (0.093)
4 0.091 (0.183) 0.088 (0.131) 0.102 (0.097) 0.076 (0.104)
5 0.172 (0.193) 0.179 (0.133) 0.111 (0.1) 0.086 (0.107)
6 -0.038 (0.2) 0.173 (0.145) 0.089 (0.105) 0.064 (0.111)
7 -0.194 (0.23) -0.091 (0.164) -0.179 (0.122) -0.205 (0.127)
8 -0.412* (0.243) -0.312* (0.169) -0.432*** (0.12) -0.457*** (0.126)
9 -0.217 (0.258) -0.211 (0.179) -0.100 (0.131) -0.126 (0.136)
10 -0.102 (0.249) 0.056 (0.175) -0.040 (0.131) -0.066 (0.137)
11 0.071 (0.263) 0.207 (0.196) -0.070 (0.139) -0.096 (0.144)
12 -0.684** (0.297) -0.604*** (0.217) -0.404*** (0.155) -0.430*** (0.16)
13 -0.047 (0.296) -0.074 (0.212) -0.108 (0.16) -0.134 (0.164)
14 0.011 (0.32) -0.028 (0.21) -0.203 (0.157) -0.228 (0.162)
15 0.659* (0.355) 0.489** (0.237) 0.083 (0.172) 0.057 (0.176)
16 -1.177*** (0.411) -0.316 (0.257) -0.176 (0.179) -0.201 (0.183)
17 0.017 (0.338) 0.190 (0.24) 0.067 (0.178) 0.042 (0.182)
18 -0.096 (0.32) -0.090 (0.245) -0.002 (0.183) -0.027 (0.186)
19 -0.646* (0.382) -0.437 (0.266) -0.094 (0.185) -0.120 (0.189)
20 0.174 (0.385) -0.084 (0.288) -0.208 (0.194) -0.234 (0.197)
21 0.245 (0.38) 0.137 (0.246) 0.191 (0.183) 0.165 (0.186)
22 -0.357 (0.424) -0.633** (0.274) -0.299 (0.207) -0.325 (0.211)
23 0.258 (0.495) 0.528 (0.336) 0.195 (0.21) 0.169 (0.213)
24 0.247 (0.417) -0.084 (0.294) 0.047 (0.225) 0.021 (0.228)
25 -0.407 (0.467) -0.473 (0.334) -0.254 (0.231) -0.279 (0.234)
26 0.091 (0.608) 0.508 (0.444) 0.404 (0.282) 0.378 (0.284)
27 -0.179 (0.42) -0.144 (0.318) -0.262 (0.224) -0.288 (0.227)
28 -0.089 (0.502) 0.034 (0.387) -0.178 (0.262) -0.204 (0.264)
29 -1.366*** (0.569) -0.579* (0.351) -0.322 (0.238) -0.348 (0.241)
30 0.214 (0.588) 0.536 (0.396) 0.049 (0.259) 0.023 (0.262)
31 0.176 (0.542) -0.270 (0.389) -0.408 (0.259) -0.434* (0.262)
32 0.742 (0.692) 0.426 (0.405) 0.127 (0.274) 0.101 (0.276)
33 -0.438 (0.588) 0.050 (0.419) -0.052 (0.257) -0.078 (0.26)
34 -0.656 (0.478) -0.630 (0.396) 0.056 (0.268) 0.030 (0.271)
35 0.208 (0.588) 0.322 (0.435) -0.282 (0.31) -0.308 (0.312)
36 -0.021 (0.134) -0.007 (0.097) -0.007 (0.075) -0.033 (0.084)
Window 1 2 3 3
Functional form Linear Linear Quadratic Cubic
N 5,307 10,429 20,966 20,966
• Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Same sample as beneﬁt RD analysis,
without propensity score weighting. No control variables are included. Statistical
signiﬁcance: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level.
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Table 4.8: Duration analysis estimates of the treatment eﬀect on employment hazard
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment eﬀect (βˆm)
m= 1 0.015 (0.146) -0.057 (0.102) -0.128 (0.083) -0.177* (0.096)
2 -0.113 (0.151) -0.095 (0.11) -0.154* (0.09) -0.203** (0.102)
3 -0.018 (0.17) 0.099 (0.124) -0.08 (0.097) -0.129 (0.109)
4 -0.256 (0.188) -0.12 (0.133) -0.045 (0.102) -0.094 (0.113)
5 0.1 (0.201) -0.095 (0.14) -0.066 (0.112) -0.115 (0.122)
6 -0.088 (0.222) -0.112 (0.154) -0.007 (0.116) -0.055 (0.126)
7 -0.552** (0.24) -0.352** (0.174) -0.228* (0.123) -0.277** (0.133)
8 -0.383 (0.238) -0.174 (0.175) -0.045 (0.126) -0.094 (0.135)
9 -0.154 (0.234) -0.053 (0.165) 0.009 (0.126) -0.04 (0.135)
10 -0.007 (0.255) -0.131 (0.186) 0.011 (0.135) -0.038 (0.144)
11 -0.342 (0.277) -0.032 (0.186) 0.015 (0.132) -0.034 (0.141)
12 -0.713*** (0.269) -0.528*** (0.193) -0.31** (0.14) -0.359*** (0.149)
13 -0.172 (0.246) -0.224 (0.178) -0.196 (0.132) -0.244* (0.141)
14 -0.141 (0.266) 0.026 (0.197) -0.021 (0.145) -0.07 (0.153)
15 0.555 (0.359) 0.251 (0.222) 0.352** (0.16) 0.304* (0.168)
16 -0.47 (0.3) -0.352* (0.198) -0.305** (0.155) -0.353** (0.163)
17 -0.275 (0.306) -0.01 (0.21) -0.106 (0.152) -0.154 (0.159)
18 0.164 (0.326) 0.033 (0.223) 0.027 (0.164) -0.021 (0.172)
19 -0.085 (0.327) -0.014 (0.223) -0.154 (0.168) -0.202 (0.175)
20 0.088 (0.342) 0.049 (0.232) -0.034 (0.169) -0.083 (0.176)
21 -0.725** (0.329) -0.646*** (0.242) -0.421*** (0.174) -0.47*** (0.18)
22 -0.008 (0.306) -0.249 (0.239) -0.29* (0.174) -0.339* (0.18)
23 0.204 (0.324) 0.34 (0.246) 0.308* (0.178) 0.26 (0.184)
24 0.276 (0.351) -0.105 (0.228) 0.041 (0.178) -0.007 (0.184)
25 -0.679* (0.384) -0.528* (0.272) -0.461*** (0.191) -0.51*** (0.197)
26 0.521 (0.348) 0.261 (0.246) 0.029 (0.172) -0.02 (0.179)
27 0.689** (0.34) 0.247 (0.247) 0.199 (0.185) 0.15 (0.191)
28 0.083 (0.317) 0.227 (0.23) -0.121 (0.174) -0.17 (0.181)
29 0.054 (0.399) 0.061 (0.277) 0.009 (0.186) -0.039 (0.193)
30 0.187 (0.387) -0.012 (0.281) -0.08 (0.196) -0.129 (0.202)
31 0.389 (0.454) 0.067 (0.282) 0.078 (0.187) 0.029 (0.193)
32 0.511 (0.381) 0.525* (0.297) 0.211 (0.197) 0.162 (0.203)
33 -0.777* (0.438) -0.339 (0.301) -0.553*** (0.212) -0.602*** (0.217)
34 0.096 (0.433) 0.235 (0.284) 0.187 (0.2) 0.138 (0.206)
35 0.02 (0.464) 0.141 (0.329) -0.057 (0.215) -0.106 (0.221)
36 -0.23** (0.113) -0.122 (0.079) -0.044 (0.07) -0.093 (0.085)
Window 1 2 3 3
Functional form Linear Linear Quadratic Cubic
N 4,084 8,061 16,280 16,280
• Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Same sample as employment RD ana-
lysis, excluding records with randomised start dates and without propensity score
weighting. No control variables are included. *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level.
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Table 4.9: Treatment coeﬃcients for RD regressions with control variables as outcomes
Estimates S.E.




Other ethnicity 0.002 (0.004)
Unknown ethnicity 0.001 (0.002)
Index oﬀence Violence 0.031** (0.014)
Robbery -0.003 (0.002)
Public order or riot -0.009 (0.008)
Sexual oﬀence 0.001 (0.002)
Sexual oﬀence (child) 0.001 (0.002)
Soliciting -0.001 (0.001)
Domestic burglary -0.009* (0.006)
Other burglary -0.006 (0.007)
Theft 0.015 (0.013)
Handling -0.003 (0.005)
Fraud and forgery 0.002 (0.005)
Bail and oﬀences 0.005 (0.007)
Taking and driving away 0.000 (0.007)
Theft from vehicles 0.001 (0.005)
Other motoring oﬀences -0.013 (0.014)
Drink driving -0.016*** (0.005)
Criminal manage 0.007 (0.006)
Drugs (trade/production) 0.001 (0.002)
Drugs (possession) -0.004 (0.005)
Other oﬀences -0.000 (0.007)
Custody Sentence length -1.414 (2.666)
Criminal histories Previous prison spells -0.265 (0.233)
Previous convictions -0.080 (0.096)
Other histories Beneﬁt claim -0.007 (0.017)
P45 Employment -0.003 (0.021)
N = 13,366
• Notes: All coeﬃcients are estimated using speciﬁcation (2) under table 2. The tre-
atment and control groups are statistically diﬀerent at the 5% level in the variables
in red. The beneﬁt and employment histories variables are deﬁned as whether the
oﬀender ever claimed beneﬁt / worked during the 1 year prior to custody. The
treatment coeﬃcients for these two histories variables are estimated using the NBD
and P45 matched samples respectively. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** 1% level, ** 5%
level, * 10% level.
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Table 4.10: Sensitivity of estimates to the inclusion of 9-11 months group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1y reoﬀ 0.017 0.019 1y ben -0.016 -0.015 1y emp -0.025 -0.033
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020)
2y reoﬀ 0.007 0.003 2y ben -0.009 -0.008 2y emp -0.014 -0.028
(0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.021)
3y reoﬀ 0.000 -0.001 3y ben -0.013 -0.011 3y emp -0.008 -0.020








N 13,366 12,038 N 10,429 9,390 N 9,134 8,185
• Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The speciﬁcation of linear functional
form in age with a bandwidth of 6 months is used. The full set of control covariates
is included. Statistical signiﬁcance: ** 5% level, * 10% level.
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Table 4.11: Sensitivity of estimates to criminal histories
(1) (2) (3)
1y reoﬀ -0.015 0.015 0.027*
(0.055) (0.070) (0.016)
2y reoﬀ 0.007 0.002 0.016
(0.062) (0.076) (0.013)
3y reoﬀ -0.013 0.007 0.009
(0.066) (0.076) (0.012)
Previous conviction 0 1 >1
N 892 731 11,743
(4) (5) (6)
1y ben -0.028 -0.077 -0.010
(0.075) (0.080) (0.015)
2y ben -0.051 -0.027 -0.003
(0.069) (0.074) (0.013)
3y ben -0.057 -0.042 -0.007
(0.065) (0.068) (0.011)
Previous conviction 0 1 >1
N 553 519 9,357
(7) (8) (9)
1y emp -0.018 -0.053 -0.023
(0.079) (0.089) (0.020)
2y emp 0.019 -0.013 -0.018
(0.075) (0.087) (0.022)
3y emp -0.015 0.061 -0.013
(0.070) (0.083) (0.022)
Previous conviction 0 1 >1
N 628 532 7,974
• Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The speciﬁcation of linear functional
form in age with a bandwidth of 6 months is used. Statistical signiﬁcance: ** 5%
level, * 10% level.
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Chapter 5
The labour market cost of a
criminal record
5.1 Introduction
What is the cost of crime? The term is most easily associated with damages to victims,
but criminals also face costs when they undertake crimes. Costs mainly come in two
forms: direct punishment cost such as a ﬁne or an incarceration spell, and potential cost
in terms of limited future options in employment (and travel, accommodation, insurance,
etc., to a lesser extent) due to social stigma, which I refer to as scarring. The former
is often observable and easy to measure, but the latter much less so. Of course, this
does not stop common wisdom to emerge about the extent of scarring. A quick search
of the eﬀect of a criminal record on the internet would return many mainstream media
commentaries and real-life stories about how ex-criminals struggle to resettle and ﬁnd a
job even after a long time. Take the speciﬁc case of the UK. The Government's view on
this issue is perfectly captured by the following quote of the then-Deupty Prime Minister
Nick Clegg in 2014 at the introduction of a new law to shorten the amount of time before
oﬀenders can legally hold back from revealing their past convictions: Making a mistake
and committing a minor crime when you are ﬁfteen shouldn't mean you are barred from
employment for the rest of your life. Clearly, the popular belief is that scarring has so
far been disproportionate. Is this claim supported by empirical research?
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Understanding and estimating the scarring cost is useful and important for several
reasons. Apart from scarring being a topic of immense public interest, it should be a com-
ponent of the behavioural process in any economic model of crime. Most dynamic models
of crime (Imai and Krishna 2004; Lochner 2004; Sickles and Williams 2008; McCrary
2010) attempt in some ways to incorporate the feature of agents taking into account of
future labour market implications in their current criminal decisions. It is important to
know what modelling assumptions about scarring would be supported by data. Empirical
research on the eﬀect of crime on labour market outcomes so far shows crime has negative
eﬀects, but probably not so much as life-ruining as it is popularly believed. Early empi-
rical work by Freeman (1991) and Waldfogel (1994) using self-reported longitudinal data
suggest that a spell in prison when young or a youth criminal record can have long-term
damage on adult employment and wages. More speciﬁcally, Freeman (1991) ﬁnds that a
young male in prison in 1979 worked 25% less than he otherwise would have in the next
8 years. More recently, Apel and Sweeten (2010) and Dominguez Alvarez and Loureiro
(2012) have come to similar conclusion about the relationship between imprisonment and
labour market outcomes using American and German self-report datasets respectively.
However, these ﬁndings are reliant on accurate self-reporting, and the samples sizes are
sometimes small. They also focus speciﬁcally on the eﬀect of imprisonment, not that
of criminal conviction, restricting the generalizability of their results. One alternative
and perhaps more direct way to estimate the scarring of a criminal record is by studying
employers behaviour through survey data or experiment. Holzer et al. (2002) ﬁnd using
US employers survey data that employers are much more reluctant to hire persons with
a criminal record, even when compared to other disadvantaged minority groups such as
beneﬁts recipients. More recently, Baert and Verhofstadt (2015) conduct a ﬁeld expe-
riment in Belgium by sending out two ﬁctitious applications of school-leavers, identical
bar the mention of a juvenile record in one of them, to nearly 500 vacancies for labour
market entry jobs. They ﬁnd that the callback rate for non-juvenile applications is 29%
higher that for juvenile. Another line of empiricial research exists and uses large-scale
administrative datasets. Grogger (1995) ﬁnds using an US administrative panel data of
arrest and earnings that historical arrests cause no damage to the employment and ear-
nings of young men after 6 quarters, and this is also true when the person is sentenced to
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prison. Kling (2006) ﬁnds that conditional on being a prisoner, incarceration length has
no eﬀect on job market outcomes. The literature largely agrees that scarring eﬀects are
heterogeneous by punishment type, but there is no sense of consensus on the magnitude
or persistence.
In this paper, I empirically estimate the scarring eﬀect of criminal convictions on la-
bour market outcomes by using the linked dataset described in chapter 3 that covers the
criminal record and earnings of individuals who were convicted or cautioned in England
and Wales between 2003 and 2013. By carrying out ﬁxed eﬀects analysis using a dis-
tributed lag model, I ﬁnd mild negative eﬀects of convictions on employment likelihood
that persists for at least 10 quarters, and some evidence that scarring on earnings dies
out after 10 quarters. This appears in line with a hypothesis of statistical discrimination
combined with employer learning. I estimate the scarring eﬀect by punishment type, and
ﬁnd consistent with the existing literature that a prison spell has the largest and most
persistent eﬀect, while less severe punishments like ﬁnes and police cautions have smaller
eﬀects. There is little evidence that crime types matter. I test another hypothesis whe-
reby employment experience to date becomes a more useful signal of true productivity in
the presence of a criminal record and ﬁnd mixed support. I carry out the analysis sepa-
rately for two periods, before and after the recent great economic crisis which started in
September 2008. I ﬁnd that the results are somewhat diﬀerent and inconsistent. The dif-
ference can be explained by a compositional change in the productivity of oﬀenders using
standard economic of crime, and anecdotal evidence suggests this could be the case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the
theory behind scarring. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 outlines the econometric
speciﬁcation. Results are discussed in section 5. In section 6 I present evidence on the
robustness of the analysis. Finally, section 7 concludes.
5.2 Theory of Employment Scarring
The adverse eﬀect of a criminal record can come in many forms, aﬀecting diﬀerent areas of
life. I focus on the scarring on employment outcomes, speciﬁcally the extent to which the
employment likelihood and/or earnings of an individual are reduced due to the existence
of a past conviction independent of his true productivity. I review the possible theories
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behind scarring, but do not discuss whether scarring is, or what magnitude of it would
be, fair.
Many countries have in the name of public interest placed legal restrictions on limiting
the jobs that oﬀenders can possibly take. For example, in the UK jobseekers with a
criminal record cannot take up posts to become say medical doctors or members of the
armed force. This legal restriction itself does not necessarily inﬂict a great deal of scarring
if the oﬀenders were not in those occupation in the ﬁrst place, and it only applies to
the minority of jobs and individuals are always free to seek jobs in many other sectors.
However, as Rasmusen (1996) points out, convicted criminals suﬀer from public penalties
as well as stigmatization, which could lead to reluctance of others to interact with them
socially and economically. In the UK, employers, though not legally bound to, often
ask job applicants to reveal their criminal history either at the start of the process or
during it. Individuals are legally obliged to reveal their history if the convictions have not
become 'spent'. The time it takes for a conviction to become spent varies by punishment
type. For example, up till the recent UK policy change in 2015, a conviction dealt with
by a ﬁne takes 5 years to become spent and a conviction dealt with by immediate custody
of between 6 months to 30 months takes 10 years to become spent. After this time,
applicants can legally lie about their criminal past, as long as the job they are applying
to is not from the few occupations that are exempted from this disclosure law, such as
carers or school teachers. In any case, an applicant can always request a copy of the
criminal background check himself to see what unspent convictions he needs to disclose
to prospective employers, and ﬁrms are also able to arrange such check on applicants
as employers. While a criminal record does not legally prevent someone from working
in the large majority of occupations and industries, the compulsory disclosure of recent
convictions when asked may easily induce stigmatization and therefore scarring.
Employers discriminating against a person with criminal record is a likely and often
discussed source of scarring. Employers may discriminate against a criminal record purely
based on taste and preference (Becker 1957) and not on productivity concerns. Under
this theory, if there are enough discriminating ﬁrms in the economy so that discrimination
cannot be competed away, a wage/hiring diﬀerential will emerge and sustain between
oﬀenders and non-oﬀenders of identical productivity. An alternative discrimination theory
78
to explain scarring is that of statistical discrimination (Phelps 1972; Arrow 1973; Aigner
and Cain 1977). Under this theory, employers form expectation about the group means
and/or variances of the productivity of oﬀenders and non-oﬀenders. General economic
theory of crime (Becker 1968) gives the insight that individuals with lower legitimate
earnings are more likely to engage in criminal activities. Based on this, employers may
form the belief that oﬀenders are a group within the working population with lower
average productivity and this may then be imbued in lower wage oﬀers and fewer interview
opportunities, resulting in a wage and/or hiring diﬀerential. On the other hand, given
how technology has changed productivity and also how the nature of crime has changed
over the recent years, it can also be the case that criminality in certain areas (e.g. white-
collar or internet crimes) are complementary to the skills that ﬁrms are looking for and
hence ﬁrms may not expect oﬀenders to have lower productivity on average. They may
instead expect a higher variance of skill levels within the oﬀenders group compared to the
population. If ﬁrms also are risk-averse (Aigner and Cain 1977), a gap in wage oﬀer and
hiring would then exist even if ﬁrms do not believe oﬀenders are less capable on average,
and the gap is bigger the more risk-averse the ﬁrms are.
One dimension of scarring is persistence, and links here can be made to the employer
learning literature (Altonji and Pierret 2001; Schoenberg 2007). Suppose discrimination
against oﬀenders is taste-based, then any wage and hiring gaps are likely to persist conditi-
onal on there is not enough non-discriminating ﬁrms to compete and that the competition
environment does not change over the analysis period. Alternatively, if discrimination is
statistical, under employer learning the wage gap that exists at ﬁrst between working
oﬀenders and working non-oﬀenders of same productivity will close over time. The hiring
gap would still persist over time because there is no scope to learn before employment
begins. An empirical analysis of the persistence in hiring and earnings gaps could reveal
the mode of discrimination through a theory of employer learning.
A ﬁnal area of the literature that I refer to is that of signalling costs and their con-
sequences. Golbe (1985) shows that in an environment where productivity is imperfectly
observed through a noisy signal and the proportion of high- and low-productivity workers
are the same across groups but minority workers face a higher cost in obtaining a good
signal, this can lead to an equilibrium where minority workers are rewarded more for the
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good signal. Applying the concept here, let's take workers with criminal record as the
minority, and the signal of productivity being work experience. Suppose the productivity
composition is the same for the groups of criminals and non-criminals, and this is likely
true for many types of less severe oﬀences, and oﬀenders face a higher cost to obtaining
a long and stable employment history than non-oﬀenders, say due to some correlating
factors that led them into committing crime in the ﬁrst place. Then, the same long em-
ployment history would reveal more positive information for an oﬀender than it would for
a non-oﬀender. In other words, the good signals are of better quality for oﬀenders and
should, at the margin, be worth more. I can test this hypothesis directly from the data.
5.3 Data
5.3.1 Component datasets
The empirical analysis is carried out using the linked PNC and P14 Earnings data re-
sulting from the data linkage initiative between the Ministry of Justice and Her Majesty's
Revenue and Customs. Refer to chapter 3 for general descriptions of the datasets as well
as the matching.
There are three data issues associated with the datasets that are relevant here. Firstly,
as discussed in chapter 3, the PNC records only oﬀences that are punishable by imprison-
ment plus many of the serious summary oﬀences (ie recordable oﬀences). It generally does
not cover less serious oﬀences that most likely attract ﬁnes as punishment, such as TV
license evasion, careless driving, driving without insurance, reproducing British currency
notes, etc. Despite missing out on information about non-recordable oﬀences which make
up a signiﬁcant part of overall crime, I argue this does not aﬀect my analysis. This is
because these oﬀences would not show up in most levels of criminal record checks that
employers or job applicants requested during the sample periods of the analysis, mea-
ning there was no stigma attached. The only possibility that they would matter for the
analysis is through inducing negative human capital eﬀects, but I deem this as unlikely.
Secondly, I choose to use P14 Earnings data in informing employment spell information
in this analysis over P45 Employment data, unlike in chapters 4 and 6. I have explained
in chapter 3 that there is not enough information to judge if P14 or P45 is more accurate
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with regards to employment spell, but since I am interested in the earnings aspect in this
analysis which is only available in P14, I choose to derive all the necessary information
consistently from it only. Finally, since the data linkage carried out by MoJ/DWP uses
the MoJ extract of PNC as the basis, I observe no employment information at all for
individuals who do not have a criminal record. This creates a unique problem in terms of
the creation of a suitable control group - ideally one would like to have information about
both oﬀenders and non-oﬀenders. I follow the approach in Grogger (1995), explained in
more detail below.
5.3.2 Analytical samples
Using PNC and P14 I create quarterly panel of criminal records and labour market
outcomes. I choose to focus on two periods of interest, both of which are 16 quarters
long: the pre-economic-crisis good period of April 2004  March 2008 and the post-
crisis bad period of October 2008  September 2012. The quarters are structured this
way to coincide with the UK ﬁnancial quarters that the P14 is aligned to. The issue
I have in constructing the analytical samples is the same as Grogger (1995) - that the
panel contains only individuals who have a criminal record and I need to create a suitable
control group from within. Following Grogger's (1995) method, I exploit the diﬀerences
in the timing of individuals' ﬁrst appearances on the PNC. Within each of the 16-quarter
periods, I treat those who ﬁrst appeared (ie convicted for the ﬁrst time in their lives) in
the ﬁrst 12 quarters as the treatment group and others who ﬁrst appeared between the
13th and 16th quarter as the control group. I then analyse employment outcomes only in
the ﬁrst 12 quarters. The basis of doing this is that the evolution of employment outcomes
for the control group during the ﬁrst 12 quarters should be free of any conviction eﬀects.
One person within each sample period consequently contributes 12 rows of quarterly
observations towards the panel. I randomly choose about 110,000 individuals in each
period to form the analysis panels and avoid using the full PNC which proves very large
when turned into a panel. The sampling rates are 15% and 21% respectively for the
two periods. The key statistics of the samples are well matched to the population and I
believe there are no representativeness concerns.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the descriptive statistics of the two samples. They show
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the averages of variables pooled over all 12 quarters. The ratios of treatment/control
groups size are about 3-4:1, consistent with the design that selection into the control
group is based on the individual's PNC record ﬁrst appearing in the last year of the
4-year analytical periods. The average age is about 34 in both periods, though it has
increased slightly in the later years. The gender and ethnicity mix is fairly constant
between groups and across time with about three-quarters being male, and also three-
quarters being white. On the surface, there is little support for claims that oﬀenders do a
lot worse in the labour market. The control groups in both samples, having no conviction
before and during the analysis periods, have better quarterly earnings, but surprisingly
not by much. The diﬀerences in employment rates are smaller, and subject to sampling
errors the control group in the good years even had a slightly but not statistically lower
quarterly employment rates. Notice that average quarterly employment rates of around
45-50% and quarterly earnings of about ¿1800 are poorer labour market outcomes than
the general population by some way, even though the control group individuals have had
no convictions. This suggests that potential criminals are not a random subset of the
working population even when they are not under the eﬀect of a proven conviction and
this must be taken into account in any analysis of scarring. Otherwise, cross-sectional
research designs may simply uncover spurious scarring.
5.4 Econometric speciﬁcation




X ′it−jβ + Z
′
itγ + ui + eit, (5.1)
where Yit is either the quarterly employment indicator or earnings
1 of person i in
period t, Xit−j the full vector of conviction variables lagged by j quarters including
the disposal and crime type interactions, Zit the vector of non-crime variables such as
age and age squared, ui the unobserved ﬁxed eﬀect that may correlate with all Xit−j
and eit a random unobserved error. When calculating standard errors, the errors are
clustered at the individual level. The number of lag I choose is 10. I use the within
1Interpreting the scarring coeﬃcients on earnings is not straight forward and requires caution. Theo-
retically, they involve both the external and internal margins, and are not clear-cut parameters.
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estimator to calculate the coeﬃcient vector of interest βˆ. My speciﬁcation is similar to
Grogger's (1995) but there are two main advantages over it. Firstly, my main explanatory
variable is conviction instead of arrest. Conviction is a much more accurate measure of
criminality since it does not include innocent individuals who were wrongly arrested and
later acquitted. For this reason it is also a more likely and direct cause of employer
stigmatization than simply arrest which employers may not observe at all, allowing me
to interpret the results much more conﬁdently using a scarring hypothesis. Secondly, I
allow a larger number of lags than 6. This is important because, as will be seen, scarring
can persist beyond the immediate short term and including more lags can reveal dynamic
patterms that are of interest.
The ﬁxed-eﬀect set-up takes advantage of the longitudinal nature of the datasets in
eliminating the time-invariant ui, which in our case represent a wide range of variables
that I do not have data on such as parental criminal history, area of upbringing, edu-
cation, substance misuse history, etc., and other genuinely unobservable characteristics
such as attitude and cognitive functioning. As these variables explain both labour market
performance and criminality, failure to deal with them would lead to inconsistent estima-
tion of the conviction coeﬃcients β. The distributed lag feature allows us to estimate the
eﬀect of current conviction on both current and future employment outcomes, to see how
scarring shape out dynamically. Other the other hand, there are, of course, limitations
to this method. I discuss further under the Robustness section and show the results are
in general valid under a diﬀerent speciﬁcation.
5.5 Results
I ﬁrst carry out ﬁxed-eﬀect analysis for the two samples. I start by discussing the empirical
results for the good years (2004-2008) sample. Columns 1 and 2 of table 3 show OLS
results for employment and earnings, and columns 3 and 4 show FE results. We know
that OLS is biased in the existence of ﬁxed eﬀect and this appears to be the case here.
The more negative OLS results are consistent with a theory of confounding unobservables
causing both poor labour market outcomes and more active criminal proﬁle. I focus on
FE results from here onwards. On the employment indicator regression, I see that the
baseline eﬀect of a current period conviction (j=0) on employment likelihood within the
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same quarter is -1.4% point. A conviction from the previous quarter reduces current
employment likelihood by 2.4% point. The eﬀect on current employment in general
rises the more lagged the conviction is, and by the tenth lag (j=10), the eﬀect is still
statistically signiﬁcant at -3.5% point. Relative to the quarterly employment rate of
this sample at 44%, the reduction in employment due to a past conviction ranges from
3% to 10% of the mean. While this is a clear departure from Grogger's (1995) ﬁnding
that no eﬀects are signiﬁcant for lags over 6 quarters old, it is still a long way from
being detrimental. Turning my attention to the scarring on earnings, I see a persistent
reduction of about ¿100, or equivalently 5-6% of this sample's quarterly average. This is
again diﬀerent from Grogger (1995)'s ﬁnding of diminishing scarring on earnings.
The baseline estimates so far are true for convictions of property crime with a sentence
of discharge. Table 4 and 5 show the eﬀects on employment and earnings for being sen-
tenced to diﬀerent disposals and for convicted of violent crime. The results are somewhat
consistent with the popular belief in the sense that a more severe punishment causes more
damage in the labour market. Certainly, a record of having been to prison reduces em-
ployment and earnings more at ﬁrst (up to over 30% of the mean) than a record of having
been to probation (up to over 10%), which in turn is more damaging at ﬁrst than a record
of discharge, police caution or ﬁne, although partly and especially at ﬁrst it can be due
to the incapacitating nature of the custodial sentences. However, all disposals appear to
have similar impact after 10 quarters have expired. This suggests that ultimately it is the
criminal record that matters, not necessarily the type of punishment. This is also true
for the type of crime convicted - violent and property crime convictions are more of less
equally damaging. Although not reported in the tables, analyses by further crime type
breakdown are available but they do not reveal any interesting patterns. For example,
fraud convictions are not found to be statistically more damaging to employment than
serious motoring oﬀences, as one might have conjectured.
I now move on to discuss the analysis of the 2008-2012 sample, with results shown in
tables 6-8. It provides an interesting comparison to the analysis of the previous good years
sample. The ﬁxed eﬀect coﬃcients of convictions on employment are of similar magnitude
to the previous sample albeit slightly higher, ranging between -2% points to -5% points
with a general trend of increase the higher the number of lags. The baseline eﬀects of
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conviction on earnings, on the other hand, look diﬀerent to before and resembles Grogger's
(1995) ﬁnding of a diminishing eﬀect, starting from a contemporaneous reduction of 6.8%
of the mean quarterly earnings and then down to statistically insigniﬁcant levels after 10
quarters. For the heterogenous eﬀects on employment, the general pattern again shows
that the initial scarring is proportionate to the severity of punishment but eventually
converges to similar levels, and the eﬀects of property and violent crime convictions are
largely similar. As for the heterogenous eﬀects on earnings, the correlation of damages to
severity of punishing remains and the diminishing pattern in the baseline case is apparent
for all disposals, but I see, diﬀerent from before, that violent crime convictions are now
more damaging.
Overall, the empirical results are indicative of the kind of discrimination and learning
behaviour that employers adopt. First of all, a hypothesis of pure taste-based discrimina-
tion against criminal record is not supported by either the diminishing eﬀect on earnings
detected in the 2008-2012 sample in this study or Grogger's (1995) previous ﬁnding. This
is because, if discrimination is based on taste, then any earnings gap would reﬂect the
time-constant distaste of employers to take on someone with a criminal record and this
cannot be alleviated in time through learning. A hypothesis of statistical discrimination,
on the other hand, is plausible and with additional normal assumptions the results would
suggest that statistical discrimination by group variance is more important than discrimi-
nation by group mean. Why? Let me take the simple model of criminal behaviour of the
Becker (1968) type where the marginal oﬀender is the person with a one-dimensional pro-
ductivity measure being just below the criminality threshold that makes it just worthwhile
for him to commit crime. As the economy turns from good to bad, unemployment rises
and the criminality threshold rises too because it becomes harder and more costly to ﬁnd
or stay in a job. Consequently, the marginal oﬀender now is going to have higher pro-
ductivity than before, leading to a higher mean and variance of productivity for the group
of oﬀenders. Now consider the group of non-oﬀenders. By virtue of the discussion above,
the average productivity of the group of non-oﬀenders is also going to be higher, but its
variance smaller. Overall, I know for sure that the gap in the group variances has increa-
sed, but the gap in the means has probably decreased. The latter is due to the fact that
if earnings in the population are approximately normally distributed and the marginal
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oﬀender's legitimate earning is less than the median, the increase in mean productivity
of the non-oﬀender group shall be less than that of the oﬀender group.2According to sta-
tistical discrimination theories, an increase in the variance gap would raise the eﬀect of
scarring, while a decrease in the mean gap would reduce it. Since I observe that scarring
is in general more severe both in magnitude and in relation to the average employment
likelihood and earnings during the later and economically worse years, it is suggestive
that statistical discrimination by variance is the more common type of strategy employed
by ﬁrms.
In terms of employer learning, I see some evidence of it in the 2008-2012 analysis. In
that sample, the employment scarring stays pretty constant in relation to the number of
lags, while the earnings scarring reduces with it. This can be attributed to the catching
up in earnings through time of the oﬀenders who managed to ﬁnd a job. Both obser-
vations can be explained by employer learning. If statistication discrimination against a
criminal record regardless of timing occurs at the point of appointment, the scarring on
employment would not diminish as there is no learning opportunities available to allevi-
ate it. However, for those oﬀenders who managed to get employed, employers can begin
the learning process and start rewarding oﬀenders more in accordance to their true pro-
ductivities over time. This plausibly explains the diminishing scarring eﬀect on earnings
in the 2008-2012 sample and Grogger's (1995) results. But why is it that there appears
no learning in the 2004-2008 sample? One possible explanation could be the selection
argument as outlined - people who choose to commit crime in economic good years are
less productive on average than those who commit crime in economic bad years, which
leaves ﬁrms a smaller margin to learn about and reward productivities during the good
years. It is potentially not that ﬁrms do not learn, but that there is not much to le-
arn. This is supported indicatively in the descriptive analysis in tables 1 and 2, where I
see that the PNC sample from the later, post-economic crisis years indeed demonstrates
higher employment rate and inﬂation-adjusted earnings. Analysis of the change in the
age proﬁle of ﬁrst-time PNC entrants throughout 2004-2012 in ﬁgure 1 also shows that
the distribution has signiﬁcantly shifted to the right, ie there were proportionately more
2This is actually not observed in the descriptive analysis of my two samples - the gap in quarterly
earnings between the groups increased slightly as the economic downturn took place. However, this is
subject to sampling errors.
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juveniles who would not have a working history and fewer adults making their ﬁrst entries
on PNC during the pre-crisis years than in the post-crisis years.
The conjecture that a criminal record makes more of a diﬀerence during recruitment
than during employment is supported by the transition probabilities in my data. Tables 9
and 10 show the proportion of individuals moving from their current employment status
into the future, with and without a historical criminal record for the two periods. I see that
during both periods, currently unemployed individuals without a criminal record are more
likely to get employment next quarter than those also unemployed but with a record, while
currently employed individuals without a criminal record actually face slightly higher
chances of losing employment in the next quarter than those currently employed with a
criminal record. Logit regressions of future employment status on current employment
status, possession of a criminal history and their interactions (with age, ethnicity and
gender control variables) conﬁrm that the coeﬃcient on the interactive term, as shown in
table 11, is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, adding weight to the argument here that
scarring is more severe at the recruitment stage and a criminal history matters less once
the individual manages to ﬁnd a job after the conviction.
I now dig deeper into a component of the ﬁxed eﬀect and investigate another dimension
of ﬁrms' behaviour by testing the hypothesis of Golbe (1985) whereby a long employment
history becomes a more useful signal of productivity in the presence of a criminal record
than otherwise. The idea is that if building a stable employment history is more costly
and harder to the oﬀender for whatever reason, such as being under the constant inﬂuence
of a criminal parent, then such a history could become a more valuable signal of his quality
to employers compared against that of a non-oﬀender. I study this by running regressions
that also include a variable h on the proportion of time worked since April 2002 (the
furthest back allowed by the dataset) in quadratic form and its interaction with all the
conviction lags. I normalize the scale of h to between 0 to 100. If the hypothesis is true,
the combination of the coeﬃcients on h and h2 would be such that at least for some large
values of h that they beneﬁt the convicted more than the unconvicted. Table 12 shows the
results. I suppress the coeﬃcients on the conviction variables and interactions but they are
available on request. my results show that there is mixed support for the hypothesis and
the general economic environment may again have a role to play. Columns 1 and 3 refer to
87
the employment and earning regressions using the good years sample. They show ﬁrst of
all that without a criminal record, time previously worked improves employment outcomes
at a decreasing rate. When convictions are considered, the estimated ﬁrst derivatives are
always lower (negative coeﬃcients on the interaction terms) but still positive, and the
second derivatives always higher. Actually, for most of the conviction lags considered in
columns 1 and 3, the second derivatives are high enough relative to the ﬁrst derivative
that there exists a high h where it beneﬁts the convicted more. An easy way to see
this is to pick the extreme value of h = 100 (so h2= 10000), ie the person has worked
all the time from April 2002 up till the observation period, and plug in. This supports
the hypothesis that a long employment history is a more useful signal of productivity
for oﬀenders. However, when I turn my attention to the bad years sample, ie columns 2
and 4, the picture looks diﬀerent. For the large majority of the conviction lags now, the
coeﬃcients on the second derivative are not large enough, even for h = 100, to overcome
the negative coeﬃcients on the ﬁrst derivative. This means that while on an absolute
term a long employment history still helps improving employment outcomes, it does not
improve them by more in the presence of a conviction. This is apparent evidence against
the hypothesis, and a diﬀerent result from the good year sample. However, it is important
to bear in mind that the hypothesis assumes equal productivity between oﬀenders and
non-oﬀenders. If it is true that the average productivity of oﬀenders is indeed lower than
non-oﬀenders as suggested by a simple economic model of crime, then the good year
results should be understood as strong evidence for the hypothesis while the bad year
results are ambiguous. The change in the results between the two samples coincides with
a downturn in the economy. Could the economy be an explanatory factor? One plausible
explanation is again that criminals in good economic times are more negatively selected
in terms of productivitiy. Realizing this, ﬁrms may regard a long employment history
as a more useful indicator of productivity than otherwise when the criminals are not as
negatively selected. I leave the investigation into the exact behaviour to future research,
and only document for now that the state of the economy appears also an important factor




I present two sets of robustness test in this section. First, I try adding ﬁrms' ﬁxed
eﬀects to the regressions. The results from this may not be informative as evidence for
the statistical discrimination and learning hypothesis outlined above, but they are useful
as proof against alternative hypotheses of why employment and earnings may respond
negatively to a criminal record. One example would be the loss of human capital after
conviction, leading to worse outcomes regardless of ﬁrms behaviour. If this alternative
hypothesis is true, ﬁrms ﬁxed eﬀects will not make a diﬀerence to the estimated coeﬃcients
on the eﬀect of conviction. Note that I cannot simply add ﬁrms' ﬁxed eﬀects to the
regressions above due to the presence of unemployment (since I cannot treat it as an
employer and assign a ﬁxed eﬀect). Instead, I restrict the sample to those who always
had employment in every quarter and run only the earnings regressions. When I rerun
the original regression without ﬁrms ﬁxed eﬀects for the subsample, I can see from table
13 that scarring eﬀects are stronger than before in absolute magnitude. This is somewhat
counter-intuitive, since this subsample being always employed is supposedly positively
selected. The reason behind this peculiar observation is likely because I have excluded
those who were always unemployed and whose earnings were not responsive to having a
criminal record, which in turn makes the earnings margin now more sensitive. When I
add the ﬁrms ﬁxed eﬀects, I see that most of the scarring eﬀects are gone, including some
of the eﬀects of imprisonment. Based on this result, I can reject hypotheses of the human
capital depreciation type in explaining the scarring eﬀect.
The second robustness test I present is one of econometric speciﬁcation. In the original
employment regression, I specify a linear probability model with distributed lags and indi-
vidual ﬁxed eﬀect. The issues with using linear probability model for binary employment
outcome are well-known but in the presence of ﬁxed eﬀect standard nonlinear methods
(e.g. logit or probit) has the problem of incidental parameters. Chamberlain (1980) sug-
gests an nonlinear estimator that solves the problem at the requirement of discarding
from the estimation individuals who always had the same outcome. Table 14 presents
the results of applying Chamberlian's estimator to the speciﬁc required subsamples. I
also provide linear regression results of the subsamples as comparison. After transfor-
ming the nonlinear estimates into odds and converting into comparable linear estimates
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using group means, I can see that the picture remains similar though the Chamberlain
estimates are slightly larger in magnitude. I hence determine that the linear probability
model does not pose a misspeciﬁcation problem.
5.7 Conclusion
It has long been the popular belief that a criminal record causes large and potentially
irreversible scarring to one's future employment prospects. While in cross-sectional ana-
lysis we are likely to observe large diﬀerences in employment outcomes of oﬀenders and
non-oﬀenders, empirical research into the causal relationship between criminal record and
employment prospects in general does not ﬁnd huge impact, but there is no consensus
on the magnitude. Existing evidence using administrative data largely points towards
a temporary scarring eﬀect, but this is somewhat conﬂicted by longitudinal survey or
ﬁeld experiment that ﬁnd larger and/or more persistent impact. Using a new UK micro-
dataset encompassing individuals' records in criminal justice and employment, my results
represent a common ground between the previous results. I detect a persistent scarring
eﬀect of a criminal record on employment likelihood. This is consistent with the longi-
tudinal self-report studies and is undocumented in a similar research by Grogger (1995),
who ﬁnds that all scarring vanishes for criminal records over 6 quarters old. The scarring
gap I identify while persistent is not considered to be overly large. The eﬀect diﬀers by
punishment type at ﬁrst, and at the most severe I ﬁnd an over 30% decrease in employ-
ment likelihood from the mean employment rate for an imprisonment record, but it fades
over time and eventually after 10 quarters, regardless of punishment type the scarring on
employment is down to about 5-10% of the mean. On earnings, I detect a diminishing
scarring eﬀect in the post-crisis years, much like Grogger's (1995) ﬁnding but lasts up to
the ninth quarter after conviction. The scarring on earnings appear to more persistent,
however, during the pre-crisis years. I attribute the employment scarring to a statistical
discrimination hypothesis and the diminishing scarring on earnings is consistent with an
employer learning hypothesis. I note a diﬀerence in the results between the good and bad
economic years, specﬁcally that apparently there is no learning in the post-crisis years.
Descriptive analysis suggests that this could be due to a change in the composition of the
oﬀenders population, in particular that criminals in a bad economic environment are of
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higher productivity on average and at the margin. I also test a hypothesis where a long
employment history becomes a more valuable signal of productivity in the presence of a
criminal record and ﬁnd mixed support. The state of the economy could well again play
a part in inﬂuencing how ﬁrms view the usefulness of employment history as a signal in
the presence of a criminal record.
What lessons or implications does this study have for policy? The bigger question on
the topic of scarring is whether it is well balanced (ie optimal) between acting as a crime
deterrent to stop one from becoming an oﬀender, while not ruling out the rehabilitation
opportunities for ex-oﬀenders to reintegrate into society properly and not fall back into
a career of crime due to restricted life choices. My results suggest that on the latter part
of rehabilitation, a criminal record is certainly not detrimental to future employment
prospects. I cannot judge by the results here alone whether the current level of scarring
is optimal or if it is currently eﬀective as a crime deterrent. These questions, as well as
those on what would an optimal level of scarring be and how it can be achieved, would
be very useful avenues for future economic and social research.
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Table 5.1: Quarterly averages of the analysis sample during Apr 2004 - Mar 2007
Treatment group Control group Overall
Data rows 1,009,728 299,772 1,309,500
Number of individuals 84,144 24,981 109,125
Employment 44.00% 43.74% 43.95%
Earnings ¿1773 ¿1864 ¿1794
Conviction rate 9.68% - 7.47%
Caution 4.06% - 3.13%
Fine 2.79% - 2.15%
Probation 1.43% - 1.10%
Prison 0.35% - 0.28%
Others 1.05% - 0.81%
Violence 0.87% - 0.67%
Male 75.75% 74.64% 75.49%
White 78.50% 77.60% 78.29%
Age (quarters) 135.91 136.57 136.06
Table 5.2: Quarterly averages of the analysis sample during Oct 2008 - Sep 2011
Treatment group Control group Overall
Data rows 1,042,032 251,988 1,294,020
Number of individuals 86,836 20,999 107,835
Employment 49.46% 50.11% 49.58%
Earnings ¿1818 ¿1934 ¿1840
Conviction rate 9.66% - 7.78%
Caution 4.29% - 3.46%
Fine 2.38% - 1.91%
Probation 1.62% - 1.30%
Prison 0.36% - 0.29%
Others 1.01% - 0.81%
Violence 0.75% - 0.61%
Male 73.66% 73.00% 73.53%
White 77.11% 76.33% 76.96%
Age (quarters) 138.27 140.54 138.71
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Table 5.3: Baseline eﬀect of convictions on employment outcomes, 2004-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment Earnings Employment Earnings
Conviction lag: OLS OLS FE % of mean FE % of mean
0 -0.062** -591** -0.014* -3.2% -116** -6.5%
(0.005) (25) (0.004) (17)
1 -0.067** -563** -0.024** -5.2% -106** -5.9%
(0.005) (41) (0.004) (35)
2 -0.060** -522** -0.023** -5.0% -90** -5.0%
(0.005) (44) (0.004) (38)
3 -0.056** -475** -0.024** -5.2% -71* -3.9%
(0.005) (49) (0.005) (42)
4 -0.047** -449** -0.021** -4.6% -73 -4.0%
(0.006) (55) (0.005) (45)
5 -0.053** -518** -0.027** -5.9% -110** -6.1%
(0.006) (34) (0.006) (31)
6 -0.047** -503** -0.027** -5.9% -115** -6.4%
(0.007) (37) (0.006) (32)
7 -0.051** -465** -0.037** -8.4% -100** -5.6%
(0.008) (41) (0.007) (35)
8 -0.042** -407** -0.04** -10.0% -114** -6.4%
(0.009) (49) (0.007) (39)
9 -0.047** -449** -0.045** -10.0% -117** -6.5%
(0.011) (57) (0.008) (44)
10 -0.035** -388** -0.035** -7.7% -92* -5.1%
(0.013) (71) (0.009) (51)
N 1,309,500 1,309,500 1,309,500 1,309,500
Standard errors in parenthesis. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The set of control covariates inclu-
des interactions of the binary conviction variable with punishment type and crime type
indicator for lags of up to 10 quarters, age, age squared, gender and ethnicity. Gender
and ethnicity drop out of the ﬁxed eﬀect estimation.
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Table 5.4: Heterogenous eﬀects on employment, 2004-2007
The eﬀects of being sentenced to:
Conviction % of Police % of % of % of % of Violent % of
lag: Baseline mean caution mean Fine mean Probation mean Prison mean Crime mean
0 -0.014* -3.2% -0.003 -0.7% 0.001 0.2% -0.025** -5.7% -0.054** -12.3% -0.014** -3.2%
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
1 -0.024** -5.2% -0.014** -3.2% -0.011** -2.5% -0.035** -8.0% -0.127** -28.9% -0.025** -5.7%
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
2 -0.023** -5.0% -0.016** -3.6% -0.017** -3.9% -0.037** -8.4% -0.102** -23.2% -0.026** -5.9%
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007)
3 -0.024** -5.2% -0.017** -3.9% -0.021** -4.8% -0.039** -8.9% -0.078** -17.7% -0.03** -6.8%
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007)
4 -0.021** -4.6% -0.019** -4.3% -0.024** -5.5% -0.04** -9.1% -0.061** -13.9% -0.029** -6.6%
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008)
5 -0.027** -5.9% -0.021** -4.8% -0.026** -5.9% -0.041** -9.3% -0.062** -14.1% -0.027** -6.1%
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.01) (0.008)
6 -0.027** -5.9% -0.025** -5.7% -0.031** -7.1% -0.043** -9.8% -0.047** -10.7% -0.029** -6.6%
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.01) (0.009)
7 -0.037** -8.4% -0.03** -6.8% -0.037** -8.4% -0.044** -10.0% -0.04** -9.1% -0.042** -9.6%
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.01)
8 -0.04** -10.0% -0.034** -7.7% -0.041** -9.3% -0.047** -10.7% -0.052** -11.8% -0.046** -10.5%
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011)
9 -0.045** -10.0% -0.036** -8.2% -0.04** -9.1% -0.053** -12.1% -0.047** -10.7% -0.044** -10.0%
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012)
10 -0.035** -7.7% -0.036** -8.2% -0.042** -9.6% -0.052** -11.8% -0.033** -7.5% -0.036** -8.2%
(0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.017) (0.015)
N 1,309,500
Standard errors in parenthesis. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The set of control covariates inclu-
des interactions of the binary conviction variable with punishment type and crime type
indicator for lags of up to 10 quarters, age, age squared, gender and ethnicity. Gender
and ethnicity drop out of the ﬁxed eﬀect estimation.
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Table 5.5: Heterogenous eﬀects on earnings, 2004-2007
The additional eﬀects of being sentenced to:
Conviction % of Police % of % of % of % of Violent % of
lag: Baseline mean caution mean Fine mean Probation mean Prison mean Crime mean
0 -116** -6.5% -94** -5.2% -24 -1.3% -181** -10.1% -437** -24.4% -100** -5.6%
(17) (21) (21) (17) (32) (32)
1 -106** -5.9% -125** -7.0% -100** -5.6% -214** -11.9% -657** -36.6% -97** -5.4%
(35) (27) (23) (19) (37) (46)
2 -90** -5.0% -108** -6.0% -97** -5.4% -217** -12.1% -585** -32.6% -104** -5.8%
(38) (29) (24) (21) (39) (50)
3 -71* -3.9% -81** -4.5% -112** -6.2% -189** -10.5% -476** -26.5% -107** -6.0%
(42) (26) (26) (23) (42) (52)
4 -73 -4.0% -81** -4.5% -109** -6.1% -208** -11.6% -427** -23.8% -115** -6.4%
(45) (28) (29) (24) (45) (54)
5 -110** -6.1% -70** -3.9% -120** -6.7% -209** -11.6% -370** -20.6% -115** -6.4%
(31) (24) (32) (27) (47) (45)
6 -115** -6.4% -52* -2.9% -117** -6.5% -213** -11.9% -299** -16.7% -162** -9.0%
(32) (27) (37) (30) (51) (48)
7 -100** -5.6% -69** -3.8% 87 4.8% -183** -10.2% -229** -12.8% -168** -9.4%
(35) (31) (133) (33) (56) (55)
8 -114** -6.4% -101** -5.6% 153 8.5% -235** -13.1% -224** -12.5% -150** -8.4%
(39) (34) (168) (37) (62) (61)
9 -117** -6.5% -101** -5.6% 240 13.4% -240** -13.4% -189** -10.5% -171** -9.5%
(44) (38) (221) (43) (71) (70)
10 -92* -5.1% -98** -5.5% 329 18.3% -232** -12.9% -82 -4.6% -91 -5.1%
(51) (42) (308) (51) (83) (81)
N 1,309,500
Standard errors in parenthesis. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The set of control covariates inclu-
des interactions of the binary conviction variable with punishment type and crime type
indicator for lags of up to 10 quarters, age, age squared, gender and ethnicity. Gender
and ethnicity drop out of the ﬁxed eﬀect estimation.
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Table 5.6: Baseline eﬀect of convictions on employment outcomes, 2008-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment Earnings Employment Earnings
Conviction lag: OLS OLS FE % of mean FE % of mean
0 -0.072** -558** -0.020** -4.0% -125** -6.8%
(0.005) (26) (0.004) (15)
1 -0.077** -545** -0.031** -6.3% -142** -7.7%
(0.005) (28) (0.004) (18)
2 -0.072** -520** -0.033** -6.6% -130** -7.1%
(0.005) (28) (0.004) (19)
3 -0.066** -498** -0.034** -6.8% -120** -6.5%
(0.005) (30) (0.005) (20)
4 -0.058** -488** -0.030** -6.1% -107** -5.8%
(0.006) (32) (0.005) (22)
5 -0.052** -459** -0.029** -5.8% -86** -4.7%
(0.006) (35) (0.006) (23)
6 -0.048** -460** -0.030** -6.1% -83** -4.5%
(0.007) (39) (0.006) (25)
7 -0.040** -414** -0.031** -6.3% -55** -3.0%
(0.008) (45) (0.007) (28)
8 -0.033** -403** -0.033** -6.7% -51* -2.8%
(0.009) (55) (0.008) (31)
9 -0.040** -367** -0.043** -8.6% -60* -3.2%
(0.011) (71) (0.008) (34.94)
10 -0.047** -335** -0.052** -10.6% -66 -3.6%
(0.014) (77) (0.010) (43.05)
N 1,294,020 1,294,020 1,294,020 1,294,020
Standard errors in parenthesis. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The set of control covariates inclu-
des interactions of the binary conviction variable with punishment type and crime type
indicator for lags of up to 10 quarters, age, age squared, gender and ethnicity. Gender
and ethnicity drop out of the ﬁxed eﬀect estimation.
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Table 5.7: Heterogenous eﬀects on employment, 2008-2011
The additional eﬀects of being sentenced to:
Conviction % of Police % of % of % of % of Violent % of
lag: Baseline mean caution mean Fine mean Probation mean Prison mean Crime mean
0 -0.020** -4.0% 0.001 0.2% 0.008** 1.6% -0.024** -4.8% -0.063** -12.7% -0.022** -4.4%
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005)
1 -0.031** -6.3% -0.014** -2.8% -0.011** -2.2% -0.039** -7.9% -0.16** -32.3% -0.033** -6.7%
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006)
2 -0.033** -6.6% -0.013** -2.6% -0.02** -4.0% -0.041** -8.3% -0.152** -30.7% -0.035** -7.1%
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007)
3 -0.034** -6.8% -0.012** -2.4% -0.026** -5.2% -0.038** -7.7% -0.13** -26.2% -0.034** -6.9%
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007)
4 -0.030** -6.1% -0.015** -3.0% -0.029** -5.9% -0.042** -8.5% -0.125** -25.2% -0.027** -5.4%
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.01) (0.008)
5 -0.029** -5.8% -0.015** -3.0% -0.03** -6.1% -0.039** -7.9% -0.113** -22.8% -0.035** -7.1%
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.01) (0.008)
6 -0.030** -6.1% -0.016** -3.2% -0.035** -7.1% -0.038** -7.7% -0.107** -21.6% -0.036** -7.3%
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009)
7 -0.031** -6.3% -0.018** -3.6% -0.034** -6.9% -0.04** -8.1% -0.095** -19.2% -0.04** -8.1%
(0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.01)
8 -0.033** -6.7% -0.019** -3.8% -0.035** -7.1% -0.035** -7.1% -0.064** -12.9% -0.042** -8.5%
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.011)
9 -0.043** -8.6% -0.023** -4.6% -0.034** -6.9% -0.038** -7.7% -0.046** -9.3% -0.046** -9.3%
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.016) (0.012)
10 -0.052** -10.6% -0.023** -4.6% -0.042** -8.5% -0.042** -8.5% -0.068** -13.7% -0.045** -9.1%
(0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.018) (0.014)
N 1,294,020
Standard errors in parenthesis. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The set of control covariates inclu-
des interactions of the binary conviction variable with punishment type and crime type
indicator for lags of up to 10 quarters, age, age squared, gender and ethnicity. Gender
and ethnicity drop out of the ﬁxed eﬀect estimation.
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Table 5.8: Heterogenous eﬀects on earnings, 2008-2011
The additional eﬀects of being sentenced to:
Conviction % of Police % of % of % of % of Violent % of
lag: Baseline mean caution mean Fine mean Probation mean Prison mean Crime mean
0 -125** -6.8% -66** -3.6% -18 -1.0% -203** -11.0% -463** -25.2% -102** -5.5%
(15) (11) (15) (15) (30) (38)
1 -142** -7.7% -63 -3.4% -102** -5.5% -251** -13.6% -750** -40.8% -189** -10.3%
(18) (42) (24) (17) (37) (51)
2 -130** -7.1% -76** -4.1% -122** -6.6% -230** -12.5% -678** -36.8% -162** -8.8%
(19) (15) (20) (17) (39) (50)
3 -120** -6.5% -55** -3.0% -118** -6.4% -189** -10.3% -578** -31.4% -164** -8.9%
(20) (17) (24) (24) (40) (50)
4 -107** -5.8% -56** -3.0% -111** -6.0% -180** -9.8% -526** -28.6% -161** -8.8%
(22) (18) (26) (19) (41) (54)
5 -86** -4.7% -44** -2.4% -113** -6.1% -166** -9.0% -468** -25.4% -145** -7.9%
(23) (19) (26) (21) (42) (59)
6 -83** -4.5% -40* -2.2% -73** -4.0% -133** -7.2% -437** -23.8% -122** -6.6%
(25) (21) (26) (22) (43) (55)
7 -55** -3.0% 2 0.1% -37 -2.0% -111** -6.0% -354** -19.2% -127** -6.9%
(28) (32) (36) (25) (46) (62)
8 -51* -2.8% 10 0.5% -52* -2.8% -65** -3.5% -250** -13.6% -137** -7.4%
(31) (38) (31) (31) (54) (62)
9 -60* -3.2% -45 -2.4% -40 -2.2% -68* -3.7% -159** -8.6% -138** -7.5%
(34.94) (28) (33) (37) (66) (67)
10 -66 -3.6% -10 -0.5% -21 -1.1% -99** -5.4% -208** -11.3% -154* -8.4%
(43.05) (50) (41) (37) (87) (88)
N 1,294,020
Standard errors in parenthesis. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The set of control covariates inclu-
des interactions of the binary conviction variable with punishment type and crime type
indicator for lags of up to 10 quarters, age, age squared, gender and ethnicity. Gender
and ethnicity drop out of the ﬁxed eﬀect estimation.
Table 5.9: Employment transition probabilities, 2004-2007
Next period:
Current period: Unemployed Employed Row total
With criminal history 199,771 13,436 213,207
Unemployed (93.70%) (6.30%) (100%)
Without criminal hitory 367,197 28,319 395,516
(92.84%) (7.16%) (100%)
With criminal history 13,919 155,545 169,464
Employed (8.21%) (91.79%) (100%)
Without criminal hitory 26,645 286,409 313,063
(8.51%) (91.49%) (100%)
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Table 5.10: Employment transition probabilities, 2008-2011
Next period:
Current period: Unemployed Employed Row total
With criminal history 193,335 18,662 211,997
Unemployed (91.20%) (8.80%) (100%)
Without criminal hitory 299,379 32,932 332,311
(90.09%) (9.91%) (100%)
With criminal history 14,446 195,935 210,381
Employed (6.87%) (93.13%) (100%)
Without criminal hitory 23,545 300,116 323,661
(7.27%) (92.73%) (100%)
Table 5.11: Logit regressions of future employment on current employment, criminal
history and their interaction
(1) (2)
Current Employment 5.002** 4.840**
(0.009) (0.009)
Criminal history -0.111** -0.089**
(0.011) (0.010)
Employment x 0.169** 0.168**
Criminal History (0.015) (0.015)
Sample 04-07 08-11
N 1,091,250 1,078,350
Standard errors in parenthesis. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Both logit regressions. The set of
control covariates includes age, age squared, ethnicity, gender and quarter indicators.
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Table 5.12: Eﬀect of employment history on employment and earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: Employment Earnings
Baseline h 1.88** 1.62** 76.90** 41.89**
estimates h2 -0.0113** -0.008** -0.402** 0.0906**
Interacted with
conviction lag:
0 h -0.150** -0.0527** -15.66** -7.060**
h2 0.00155** 0.000275* 0.143** 0.0178
1 h -0.148** -0.140** -13.77** -10.34**
h2 0.00174** 0.000989** 0.138** 0.0471**
2 h -0.174** -0.149** -13.45** -9.370**
h2 0.00277** 0.00103** 0.150** 0.0276
3 h -0.199** -0.135** -14.32** -10.06**
h2 0.0027** 0.000974** 0.178** 0.0400**
4 h -0.222** -0.129** -14.61** -11.18**
h2 0.00301** 0.000993** 0.192** 0.0530**
5 h -0.209** -0.111** -16.37** -9.841**
h2 0.00305** 0.000874** 0.218** 0.0448**
6 h -0.222** -0.133** -16.51** -8.452**
h2 0.00337** 0.00109** 0.225** 0.0331
7 h -0.229** -0.112** -16.23** -6.405**
h2 0.00352** 0.00104** 0.258** 0.0216
8 h -0.256** -0.0866** -17.01** -6.316**
h2 0.00375** 0.000957** 0.288** 0.0242
9 h -0.256** -0.105** -18.64** -6.118**
h2 0.00394** 0.00123** 0.326** 0.0201
10 h -0.296** -0.0720** -24.22** -1.862
h2 0.00444** 0.000847** 0.414** -0.0108
Sample 04-07 08-11 04-07 08-11
N 1,309,500 1,294,020 1,309,500 1,294,020
Standard errors not reported. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All OLS estimations. The set of control covariates
includes interactions of the binary conviction variable with punishment type and crime type indicator for
lags of up to 10 quarters, age, age squared, ethnicity and gender.
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Table 5.13: Eﬀects on earnings for those who always worked, with and without ﬁrms ﬁxed
eﬀect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conviction lag: Baseline Prison Baseline Prison Baseline Prison Baseline Prison
0 -166** -981** -55 -863** -110** -752.6** -44 -526**
(58) (136) (65) (135) (43) (137.7) (39) (110)
1 -17 -946** 167 -1084** -119** -965.4** -2 -561**
(191) (140) (229) (149) (54) (154.2) (47) (113)
2 30 -725** 211 -705** -139** -566.0** -21 -214**
(206) (143) (253) (151) (50) (154.3) (40) (104)
3 117 -583** 258 -558** -141** -416.7** -7 -153*
(222) (149) (274) (141) (53) (146.5) (47) (86)
4 149 -524** 298 -329** -134** -194.9 -10 -20
(236) (158) (289) (143) (62) (150.6) (54) (83)
5 39 -325* 184 -298** -128** -170.6 2 -11
(123) (168) (166) (133) (62) (138.5) (49) (86)
6 -5 -436** 153 -275** -121* -153.7 -16 -17
(129) (170) (168) (132) (65) (136.1) (59) (89)
7 -1 -211 133 -217 -47 -170.3 2 144
(134) (180) (171) (178) (71) (182.4) (64) (119)
8 -3 -60 132 -224 -26 -197.4 -5 156
(138) (180) (173) (198) (81) (203.8) (70) (138)
9 -77 -136 86 87 -22 109.8 -37 435
(152) (212) (177) (300) (90) (304.3) (76) (296)
10 -84 77 85 484 35 448.9 50 584
(165) (235) (182) (489) (103) (495.1) (83) (445)
Firms FE No Yes No Yes
Sample 04-07 04-07 08-11 08-11
N 280,860 280,860 320,592 320,592
Standard errors in parenthesis. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All ﬁxed eﬀect estimation. The set of
control covariates includes interactions of the binary conviction variable with punishment
type and crime type indicator for lags of up to 10 quarters, age, age squared.
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Table 5.14: Chamberlain's (1980) nonlinear estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conviction lag: Baseline Prison Baseline Prison Baseline Prison Baseline Prison
0 -0.038** -0.141** -0.031** -0.119** -0.054** -0.161** -0.041** -0.124**
1 -0.065** -0.289** -0.053** -0.277** -0.083** -0.345** -0.064** -0.306**
2 -0.06** -0.244** -0.050** -0.224** -0.088** -0.334** -0.066** -0.293**
3 -0.063** -0.192** -0.052** -0.169** -0.092** -0.302** -0.070** -0.257**
4 -0.053** -0.155** -0.044** -0.134** -0.083** -0.292** -0.062** -0.248**
5 -0.069** -0.157** -0.057** -0.136** -0.079** -0.271** -0.059** -0.225**
6 -0.068** -0.121** -0.059** -0.103** -0.078** -0.26** -0.059** -0.215**
7 -0.096** -0.101** -0.082** -0.085** -0.083** -0.237** -0.062** -0.196**
8 -0.113** -0.129** -0.097** -0.110** -0.09** -0.174** -0.068** -0.141**
9 -0.116** -0.114** -0.097** -0.098** -0.11** -0.134** -0.084** -0.101**
10 -0.089** -0.071** -0.075** -0.060** -0.132** -0.189** -0.100** -0.158**
Method Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear Linear
Sample 04-07 04-07 08-11 08-11
N 280,860 280,860 320,592 320,592
Standard errors not reported. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Nonlinear estimations are done
according to Chamberlain's (1980) conditional logit estimator. Linear estimations are FE
regressions. The set of control covariates includes interactions of the binary conviction
variable with punishment type and crime type indicator for lags of up to 10 quarters, age,
age squared.
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Figure 5.1: Trends in the age proﬁle of under-25 ﬁrst-time PNC entrants 2004-2012
Shown above are trends in the relative, not absolute, distribution of the age of under-




After Prison - the natural
experiment of England riots 2011
6.1 Introduction
Incarceration is a prominent feature of any criminal justice system. According to the latest
edition of World Prison Population List, in 2016 there were more than 10.35 million people
held in penal institutions. The global prison population rate is estimated to be 144 per
100,000. This is a sizable number. Furthermore, the growth of prison population since
2000 is estimated to have outpaced that of global population by 2% point. Take England
and Wales as an example. The prison population in mid 1993 stood at about 44,000. At
the beginning of 2017, the number has increased almost twofold to about 85,000 (MoJ
2016b, 2017b). At the same time, the use of less punitive punishment such as ﬁnes have
come down, alongside a general decrease in the number of individuals entering the criminal
justice system (MoJ 2014b). What has driven this movement towards a more active and
punitive approach? It is unlikely to be a story of demand. Over the same period there
was a mild decrease in police recorded crime and a much sharper fall in Crime Survey
estimates of total number of crime (excluding fraud and misuse of computer). While
there is evidence of an increase in the severity of crime towards more violence, but the
scale was diﬀerent - the prevalence rate according to the Crime Survey has gone up from
18% to just under 21%. Also, within violent crime the composition has shifted towards
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more non-injury crime, from 37% to 50% (ONS 2017). However, these mild trends in
reported violence are not fully transferred to entries into the criminal justice system. For
example, between 1999 and 2010 the proportion of violence out of all oﬀences brought to
justice has gone up from 20% to 29% (MoJ 2012a). Clearly, the increase of 100% in prison
population over a 24-year period is out of scale with the underlying trends in crime. It
is likely that the dramatic movement is at least partly driven by a shift in policy and
attitude towards believing that the beneﬁts of incarceration as a punishment outweight
the costs. Indeed it might be tempting just looking at the ﬁgures to view the decrease in
crime as a winner for the incarceration policy - crime has drastically decreased after all.
However, the crime trend is in fact observed in many of the advanced economies, despite
a variety of approaches to incarceration, and is likely part of a global development rather
than a direct consequence of the UK incarceration policy , as can be see in table 1.
This brings the questions of what the policy rationales of such drastic incarceration
are, and what eﬀects it can achieve. Around the world there is no consensus on the
right approach with regards to prison as seen by the variance in the levels of prison
population per capita and the trends. The US is notorious for its prison policy, having
the globally second highest per capita incarceration rate of about 700 per 100,000. In
contrast, Europe, especially Scandinavia, has a much lower rate and takes a much less
punitive approach. The commonly discussed beneﬁts of incarceration in the literature, as
discussed in chapter 2, are general deterrence (Becker 1968), speciﬁc deterrence (Smith
and Gartin 1989), incapacitation (Ehrlich 1981) and rehabilitation (Ehrlich 1981). On
the other hand, compared to non-custodial sentence the drawbacks are stigma (Rasmusen
1996), loss of human capital (Ehrlich 1981, Lochner 2004), loss of social capital (Sickles
and Williams 2008), build-up of criminal capital and network (Bayer et al 2009) and
disruption to life courses in general. Of course, prisons are also much more expensive to
run than its criminal justice alternatives. In 2016, the estimated average annual cost of
a prison place in England and Wales stood at ¿35,182 (MoJ, 2016a).
A large part of the cost-beneﬁt analysis, as can be seen in above discussion, is focussed
on the eﬀect of incarceration on later outcomes of inmates. Imprisonment can reduce
reoﬀending via speciﬁc deterrence, ie prisoners are deterred from future crime due to the
negative experience in prison, and also through a positive rehabilitative eﬀect on labour
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market outcomes if the right training and help is given while in prison. But the more time
they spend in prison they may be more likely to be discriminated against by propsective
employers either directly or statistically. Oﬃcial ﬁgures from England and Wales in 2013
show that the one-year recidivism rates of oﬀenders receiving the disposals of discharge,
community order, ﬁne and imprisonment are 33.4%, 34.3%, 28.9% and 45.8%. These
numbers suggest prisons caused the worst outcome but of course they mean little without
controlling for other factors and selection. An increasing body of empirical evidence is
emerging from the literature on the eﬀect of prisons on later outcomes. Largely there
are two approaches in overcoming the issue of selection. Matching methods are employed
by social scientists and they tend to ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative eﬀects of imprisonment.
Nieuwbeerta et al. (2009) using data from a longitudinal study in the Netherlands ﬁnd
that ﬁrst time imprisonment increases recidivism by 1.9 times over the 3 years after
release. Apel and Sweeten (2010) using the American National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1997 data ﬁnd that ﬁrst time imprisonment signiﬁcantly reduces the probability of
employment compared to non-custodial punishment, even if the spell of incarceration is
only a few months long. They show evidence that the gap is due to ex-inmates not looking
for jobs rather than being unable to get jobs, suggesting a human capital story rather
than a stigma one. On the other hand, economists typically take an alternative approach
in tackling selection. A very common strategy is to utilise randomisation of court cases to
judges as quasi-experiment, since diﬀerent judges demonstrate diﬀerent levels of intrinsic
harshness. Recent examples include Kling (2006), Green and Winik (2010), Di Tella
and Schargrodsky (2013), Nagin and Snodgrass (2013), Loeer (2013), Aizer and Doyle
(2015), Mueller-Smith (2015) and Bhuller et. al (2016). In general this literature ﬁnds
that custody or sentence length has little eﬀect on later reoﬀending and employment
outcomes. This is perhaps not overly surprisingly given the well-known problem of severe
self-selection in criminal justice. There are several exceptions, however. Di Tella and
Schargrodsky (2013) focus on juveniles in particular and ﬁnd that incarceration causes
signiﬁcantly worse outcomes than the softer alternative of electronic monitoring. Aligning
this with the majority of the empirical evidence suggests that individual criminal ﬁxed
eﬀects are perhaps not ﬁxed until adulthood. Mueller-Smith (2015) argue that the popular
approach of using judge randomisation as instrument suﬀers from the assumption of
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monotonicity and exclusion, and shows that bias can result if they are violated. He
proposes an improved estimation procedure that takes into account of this and ﬁnds
that prisons are criminogenic instead of having no eﬀects. Another result that deviates
from the norm is that of Bhuller et.al (2016), where it is found that incarceration can
greatly improve reoﬀending and employment outcomes. This may, however, be a unique
result speciﬁc to the setting in Norway which is where their study is based and where
the approach to incarceration is one of the most pro-rehabilitation in the world. It
is reported in their study that imprisonment causes a 34 percentage point increase in
participation in job training programs for the previously nonemployed, and within 5 years,
their employment rate increases by 40 percentage points, which is no doubt credible but
nonetheless strikes as an anomaly given the policy setting.
I contribute to the literature by taking a diﬀerent approach in this research to tackle
the same problem. Instead of utilising judge-level randomisation of court cases as the
quasi-experiment, which can have issues with judges not necessarily being highly self-
consistent through time, I use the random event of the England riots of August 2011 as an
instrument for the endogenous prison outcome. My hypothesis is that during the immedi-
ate period after the riot, which caught global attention and attracted very swift and harsh
criminal justice reaction (MoJ 2012b, Bell et al 2014), judges in the riot areas became
harsher towards oﬀenders who had nothing to do with the riots but merely committed
oﬀences similar to the riot oﬀences. The ﬁrst stage diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regression
conﬁrms this - the riots appear to have exogenously shifted judges' sentiment towards
some oﬀences in the riot areas, creating a temporary random shock in the probability of
handing out imprisonment as the disposal. This makes the riots a valid instrument in
identifying the eﬀect of incarceration on outcomes. Using Instrumental Variable, I ﬁnd
that incarceration induces very short-lived speciﬁc deterrence eﬀect as theorised but it
fades away after 6 months and gives way to criminogenic factors. There is no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on employment at least within one year. This may be due to the lack of variation
within the relatively small sample but if anything the sign of the estimated coeﬃcient
suggests the eﬀect is more positive than negative. The analysis also shows that prior em-
ployment record explains quite a lot of the variation in post-custody outcomes, suggesting
ﬁxed eﬀects at the point of prison entry is important.
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The rest of the chapter is structured as followed. Section 2 provides the background
to the England Riots and the subsequent criminal justice response that makes it a valid
instrument. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy. Section 4 discusses the results
and ﬁnally section 5 concludes.
6.2 England Riots 2011
The England Riots of 2011 were not anticipated and the scale at which they escalated
and the contagion were a surprise. It is reasonable to expect that they were a shock to
the judicial and criminal justice system as recent history of England suggests that rioting
at that level and scale is uncommon. The last time England saw widespread disturbances
on a similar scale was in the 1980's. In 1981, riots happened in Brixton, London in
April and there were further riots in Liverpool, Leeds and Birmingham in July, leaving
hundreds injured. Later in late 1985, another wave of riots, each had a diﬀerent local
trigger, took place across Brixton, Tottenham (both London) and Birmingham. Most
of these riots were initially sparked by conﬂicts between the local black community and
the police, against a backdrop of poverty, deprivation, high unemployment, racial tension
and inequality. Since then, nationwide riots were unseen but local ones did take place
occasionally, for example in Brixton again in 1995 and Leeds in 2001. It is therefore fair
to say that dealing with riot oﬀences is not commonplace in recent English courts and
the riots in 2011 came as an exogenous event.
Similar to most other riots in modern English history, the starting point of the one
in 2011 was a conﬂict between the local black community and the police. On 4 August
2011, 29-year-old Mark Duggan's vehicle was stopped by a police oﬃcer near Tottenham
Hale Station in North London as part of an intelligence-led stop-and-search procedure
to investigate gun crime within the local black community. During the incident, Duggan
who was in possession of a gun that he did not ﬁre was shot and later died. Later after a
lengthy inquiry, the killing of Duggan was found to be lawful but during the immediate
aftermath, the local community was dissatisﬁed with the police response and a protest
march organised by relatives and friends of Duggan demanding justice took place 2 days
later, starting from Broadwater Farm, where a riot took place in 1985, and fnishing at
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the Tottenham Police Station. The protest was initially peaceful but rumour began to
spread on social media that a 16-year-old girl sustained injury while confronted by the
police. The rumour remain unconﬁrmed to this date but at the time it was enough to
trigger an escalation of events.
Looting and rioting in the Tottenham area soon began, and over the next few days
copy-cat riots spread widely and rapidly to many other regions of London including but
not limited to Enﬁeld, Brixton, Wood Green, Woolwich, Croydon, Islington, Hackney,
Battersea, Ealing etc. Even centre areas such as Oxford Circus and Sloane Square were
aﬀected. The most vivd image of the London riots was perhaps the burning down of the
House of Reeves, a large local furniture shop that had been trading in Croydon since 1867,
as a result of arson set oﬀ by the rioters. The police failed to subdue the disturbances
in London and soon rioting was spreading to many other parts of the country, such as
Manchester, Salford, Liverpool, Birmingham, West Bromwich, Wolverhampton, Leeds,
Nottingham, etc. Eventually, after 5 days of heavy chaos on a nationwide scale the
situation was back under control again by 11 August 2011 when only a handful of new
events took place. By then, the country has seen the worst riots in its modern history
with 4 civilian deaths and nearly 200 police injuries. It is estimated that 13,000 to 15,000
people were actively involved (Singh et al 2012). Many shops and property was damaged
- according to Singh et al (2012) the estimated total cost of the riots is more than half a
billion pounds. Much of the damage was concentrated in areas that were aﬀected by the
economic downturn several years back where deprivation and youth unemployment were
high. In fact, local economic conditions and inequality are often attributed as contributing
factors to the England riots, amongst other facts such as racial tension, class tension, gang
culture, policing and the rise of social media in facilitating the spread of rumours and the
organisation of riots (see for example LSE 2011, Singh et al 2012). Evidently the riots
were not endogenous to the penal system and local judges, which is crucial for establishing
the exclusion restriction of a valid instrument.
The criminal justice response to the riot was swift. By 11 August 2011, 5 days after
the beginning of the riots, over 1,200 arrests had been made across the country. Over 900
of them were in London and 400 of those were already charged. At the peak of the events,
several courts, such as Westminster Magistrates' Court and Highbury Magistrates' Court,
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were even running 24 hours to hear the trials. One year later, over 3,000 oﬀenders related
to the riots appeared before court. According to a report published in the Daily Telegraph
on 15 August 2011 (the Daily Telegraph 2011), courts and magistrates were advised to
ignore sentencing guidelines and hand out tougher sentences to rioters and looters. An
example of this was a teenager from West Midlands being sentenced to custody for 10
months after turning herself in for stealing two left-footed trainers and then leaving them
outside the shop in Wolverhampton. Another example was two men being jailed for
four years for using social media to incite a riot gathering that never took place. This
had led to some public ﬁgures, including the then-President of Howard League for Penal
Reform Lord Carlile, to voice concern over the disproportionate toughness of some of
the responses. However, then-Prime Minister David Cameron also openly supported the
decisions of the courts. Anecdotal evidence published by the Ministry of Justice (2012)
and Bell et. al (2014) clearly show that judges in dealing with oﬀenders related to the
riot were a lot harsher than they were historically, even conditional on the same oﬀences
and oﬀender characteristics. According to Bell et. al (2014), the probability of being
sentenced to immediate custody is more than doubling from 0.247 for non-rioters to 0.550
for rioters, and the average custodial for rioters was also 1.6 months (or 13%) longer.
Given the established deviation from the sentencing guidelines of the judges for rioters,
the stress that the criminal justice system was under and the public attention that the
events attracted, I feel it is natural to inquire if the England riots acted as a temporary
shock to the general sentencing behaviour of judges, not just towards rioters. Judges
who were involved with the riot cases may carry over their sense of righteousness and
the need to send the right message to other similar cases that were unrelated to the
riots that they were dealing with during the same time without consciously realising,
and hence be handing out prison sentences with higher probability. In contrast, judges
in areas not aﬀected by riot would not have seen an increase in work stress and would
not have experienced the abnormal deviation from following the sentencing guidelines.
I hypothesise that the exogenous event of the England riots in August 2011 can act as
a shock to the sentencing system whereby a temporary wedge in judges harshness, as
measured by the probability of handing down custody as disposal, is created as a result
and courts in riot and non-riot areas diverge in their handling of cases that resemble but
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have nothing to do with the riot cases. In other words, the riots can act as a source of
independent and exogenous variation in the likelihood of an oﬀender receiving custody in
the identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of incarceration on later outcomes such as reoﬀending and
employment.
6.3 Sample and First Stage Analysis
The analysis sample is taken from the Police National Computer, with employment out-
comes and history generated using employment spell information from P45 Employment
data after linking to the PNC, as described in chapter 3. Analytical issues here with the
datasets are shared with previous chapters, namely incomplete recording of oﬀences on
PNC and random start and end dates of employment spell in P45. See chapter 4 for the
previous discussion. The ﬁrst issue, I argue, is not a problem here because I am only
interested in oﬀences that can lead to custody. The second issue about employment spell
is more problematic but various sensitivity analyses in chapter 4 already show there that
it does not aﬀect the conclusions about employment outcomes. In this chapter I am going
to build on that result and simply take the imputed dates on face value.
When coming up with the sample, I restrict the time dimension to a relatively small
window - 1 year before and after the riots. The reason for doing this is because the
additional sentiment of righteousness from the judges should die out over that period.
Moreover, observations outside the proposed sample period may bear little relevance to
the analysis designed around the riots. I restrict the analysis to oﬀences that were classed
as either burglary, theft or violence, which were the classes most associated with the
riot cases according to MoJ statistics in 2012 (MoJ 2012b). I deﬁne the riot areas to
be the Police Force Areas of London Metropolitan, Greater Manchester, West Midlands
and Merseyside. According to same MoJ statistics, these were the areas with the highest
number of court cases in relation to the riot, accounting for over 94% of the 3,103 riot
cases heard within one year of August 2011. Using the deﬁnition of riot areas, I restrict
the analysis to exclude rioters, crudely deﬁned as PNC observations that took place
between 6-10 August 2011 in the riot areas. I do this because the focus of this analysis
is on the riot eﬀect on oﬀenders who had nothing to do with the riots and the eﬀect of
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custody on their outcomes. I further restrict the maximum custodial length to be one
year. There are intentions behind this. Firstly the maximum custodial length that can
be imposed by magistrates' courts, which deal with the largest number of hearings out
of all court types and a tier down from the Crown courts which deal the more serious
crimes, is 12 months (though this limit is reserved for oﬀenders with multiple triable
either-way oﬀences for which they are guilty). Since the magistrates took up most of the
heavy workload at the peak of the riots I expect the majority of the riot eﬀect on general
sentencing to be borne out in the magistrates' sentencing decisions rather than the Crown
judges. This makes it sensible to focus on the sentences that could be given out by the
magistrates rather than ones that are handed out by Crown judges. The other reason to
ignore custodial punishment over 1 year, which must only given out in a Crown Court,
is that while Crown judges may also be aﬀected by the riot in their sentencing decision,
the typical nature of a case that arrives at a magistrates' court compared against one
at a Crown court means that the latter is often more complex, requires trial jury and
more careful consideration. There is less scope for a Crown Court case to be aﬀected
by an exogenous surge of rigteousness of the judges. Putting together all the restrictions
results in a ﬁnal analysis sample of 330,340 unique oﬀender-conviction date records (or
230,672 unique oﬀenders). Table 2 displays the summary statistics of the sample for
breakdowns by pre-/post-riot and within riot/non-riot areas. The characteristics of the
riot and non-riot areas subsamples diﬀer majorly in the proportion of white. This is due
to the riot areas as deﬁned being some of the most metropolitan and ethnically mixed
cities in England. Another obvious diﬀerence between the areas is the oﬀence mix and
the likelihood of receiving custodial sentence: oﬀenders in the big cities tend to commit
crime of more serious nature and as a result attract more severe punishment.
I use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach in establishing the relevance condition of the
riot as a valid instrument in identifying the eﬀect of custody on subsequent outcomes.
This is also, of course, known as the ﬁrst stage regression in the instrumental variable
estimation procedure, which I specify as follows:








iβ5 + ui, (6.1)
where xi is a binary outcome variable that indicates if the punishment of PNC record
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i is custodial sentence, rioti a binary indicator of if oﬀence i happened in a riot area,
and zi a vector of oﬀender characteristics related to i including age of oﬀender, age
squared, gender, ethnicity, and employment history. The other variables timei, areai
and offencei are vectors of self-explanatory binary indicators describing the month,
police force area in which the oﬀence i took place and what oﬀence type out of burglary,
violence and theft the oﬀence is. Note that xi, as shall be described in the next section,
is the endogenous independent variable of interest in the reoﬀending and post-custody
employment equations. Before looking at the regression results it is perhaps more intuitive
to visualise the impact of riot through ﬁgure 1.
There are 7 disposal outcomes available - police caution, absolute discharge, condi-
tional discharge, ﬁne, community penalty, suspended sentence and custodial sentence -
and each graph plots the evolution of the usage of the referred disposal as a % of total
disposals within the same month by riot and non-riot police force areas over a symmetric
2-year period around the England riots in August 2011 (referenced as the base period 0).
It is obvious to see that the non-riot area series are all very smooth and show no reaction
to the riot events in period 0. There is a general shift from police caution to more onerous
types of punishment such as ﬁnes, suspended sentence and custody. The trend in the use
of community punishment in non-riot areas is largely ﬂat. As mentioned above, the usage
of disposal has a diﬀerent proﬁle in the riot areas mainly due to the diﬀerent composition
of crimes in the metropolitan areas. The more severe punishment such as communty pu-
nishment, suspended sentence and custody are more commonplace in riot areas, causing
disposal-speciﬁc wedges to be observed, but nonetheless the national trends as observed
in the non-riot areas are all present in the riot areas. The major diﬀerence between the
riot and non-riot area series however is that a statistically signiﬁcant structural break
(without controlling for the range of ﬁxed eﬀects and oﬀender characteristics) in the riot
areas can be easily observed in the graph for custody at period 0, increasing the wedge and
indicating a very clear riot eﬀect in sentencing as hypothesised. While more people were
sentenced to prison, there is not an obvious discontinuity in the average custodial length
as shown in the ﬁnal panel of ﬁgure 1, suggesting there was no up-tariﬃng conditional
on a custodial sentence. Interestingly, the riot eﬀect on probability of imprisonment as
represented by the increase in the wedge looks fairly constant at 1.5% over the one year
113
after riot rather than dissipating, providing justiﬁcation to the ﬁrst stage speciﬁcation
of a time-constant riot eﬀect within the analysis window rather than a time-dependent
eﬀect. This could be due to the judges facing a constant stream of riot cases to deal with
over that time so the surge of sense of righteousness remained throughout. In face of the
structure break in the likelihood of custodial sentences in the riot areas at period 0, there
is a corresponding statistically signiﬁcant decrease in the use of conditional discharge in
riot areas, and it appears the usage of other disposals is not aﬀected. While it is tempting
to attribute the rise in one wedge to a direct substituting decrease in another, in reality
if sentencing is linear then it could be a general upward shift that get transmitted to
the top (custody) without showing obvious signs in the intermediate punishment, or the
more likely scenario is that we have non-linear sentencing so the substitution is spread
over a range of disposals. A statistical analysis controlling for the oﬀence-level ﬁxed eﬀect
and oﬀender characteristics can increase estimation precision of the riot eﬀect and may
provide insight into the nature of the shift, which is directly linked to the counterfactual
scenario that the second stage analysis is concerned with.
Table 3 shows the results of the statistical analysis as speciﬁed above, using all disposal
outcomes in turn. The results bring out the pattern in the upscaling of sentencing more -
we also now detect decrease in the use of ﬁne and an increase in suspended sentence, which
is a more severe version of conditional discharge as it also involves a criminal conviction
record. Even then, it is not clear whether suspended sentence should be regarded as
the direct counterfactual to conditional discharge, which would leave ﬁne as the direct
counterfactual to incarceration. I do not have enough empirical evidence to be certain of
the counterfactual to incarceration. This caveat should be borne in mind as we discuss the
main results. According to coumn 1 in table 3 the riot eﬀect on the likelihood of receiving
custodial sentence is 0.0129, or a 1.29% point increase, and is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
The F-statistics for joint-signiﬁcance stands at 82.3, well above the recommended 10 for
testing weak instrument, conﬁrming a strongly relevant ﬁrst stage regression. As a note,
the change may seem economically insigniﬁcant but considering the base likelihood of
imprisonment in the year preceding the riot was about 13% according to table 2, the riot
eﬀect can be understood as a 10% increase in odds. For a punishment that is the most
severe in the system and the consequences potentially costly to life courses, particuarly
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given there was no change in sentencing guideline in the usage of incarceration and the
fact that I am looking at oﬀenders who had nothing to do with the riots, this change in
odds that persisted a year is actually not economically insigniﬁcant at all. Though, of
course, the more pressing issue here for the second stage analysis is whether the exogenous
variation in the likelihood of receiving custody due to the riot is suﬃcient to limit the
bounds of the standard errors of the IV estimates in the second stage to a small enough
band to allow statistical signiﬁcance and a meaningful interpretation of the results.
Regardless, in this section I have demonstrated through a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
set up that the riot has not only led to judges in the riot areas dish out more severe
punishment to rioters as documented by MoJ (2012a) and Bell et al (2014), but has also
created a spillover eﬀect to all non-riot oﬀenders in the aﬀected area afterwards whereby
judges have become harsher towards them in general as well, perhaps out of an additional
sense of righteousness and the surge in willingness to punish induced by the riots. The
statistical analysis clearly shows that the relevance condition for instrumental variable
estimation is satisﬁed. And as discussed in section 2, the trigger of the riot was the
random event of the death of Mark Duggan, so exclusion restriction of the instrument
is theoretically sound. In the next section, I outline the second stage speciﬁcation and
discuss results from the main analysis.
6.4 Main analysis
The main equation of interest, or the second stage, is as follows:








iγ5k + vik, (6.2)
for k =1,...,12, where yik is the outcome, either the number of reoﬀences (I use the
variable on date of oﬀence to compute this, rather than date of conviction) or a binary
employment indicator, for person i in the k-th period after conviction or release from
prison. The idea is that a collection of the γˆ1k,IV should display the proﬁle of prison
eﬀects on outcome over time. Note that it is not a trivial point that the outcome is
measured slightly diﬀerently for prisoners and non-prisoners. While both may have been
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convicted to on the same day, non-prisoners regain their freedom right after court and
free to commit further crime or ﬁnd a job, and prisoners have to wait until their sentences
are over. This means that the counterfactuals of the experiment lie on displaced time
planes, ie conditional on timei, which is the period of conviction, the yik for prisoners
and non-prisoners are most likely measured at diﬀerent points in time and the diﬀerence
in time exactly equals the prisoners' sentence length. While this issue does cause some
problems, I argue that the eﬀect is minimal because the maximum custodial sentence
length is 1 year. Given the automatic release at half-way point, this means that the
maximum counterfactual time displacement is 6 months, with the majority much lower
than that (table 2 suggests that the average is 50% of 74 days, so about 5 weeks).
A more intuitive stacked speciﬁcation of the second stage is as follows:
yi = σ0+xiσ1+ximonthσ2+monthiσ3+controls+Interactionswithmonthi+i, (6.3)
where monthi denotes the number of months since freedom is gained. I have imposed
parametric restriction (linear) on the evolution of the prison eﬀects but the advantage
is that the specﬁciation now provides a neat imterpretation of the parameters. We can
easily interpret σˆ1,IV as the speciﬁc deterrence eﬀect upon release from prison, and σˆ2,IV
as the linear decay of prison eﬀects over time. Obviously, the model can be altered to
accommodate higher polynomial evolution of the prison eﬀects.
6.4.1 Reoﬀending equation
Before discussing the main analysis, I turn to the reduced form results ﬁrst. The reduced
form is a regression of the outcome variable on the instrument and controls, ie:








iα5k + ζik. (6.4)
Results from table 4 show that for k≤4, the estimated coeﬃcients of αˆ1 are negative, some
of which are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and in general the estimates become
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more positive as k becomes larger. The parameters of interest in the equation (2), γˆ1k,
are known to be ratios of the reduced form estimates of αˆ1k and the ﬁrst stage estimate
of βˆ1, so we can expect already the signs of the casual eﬀect of prisons on reoﬀending to
be at ﬁrst negative and later deteriorates.
OLS and IV results of the reoﬀending analysis are presented numerically in table 5,
and graphically in ﬁgure 2. Columns 1 and 2 of table 5 are results of ﬂexible estimation
of prison eﬀects using the speciﬁcation in equation (2), while columns 3 and 4 are results
of the stacked linear speciﬁcation as in equation (3). The OLS results in columns 1
and 3 are perhaps consistent with the popular belief of the eﬀect of prison, that the
associated stigma is strong such that criminals having left prison have limited options
and are persistently more likely to be reoﬀending. The estimated eﬀect on month 1
reoﬀending after prison release, reading from column 3, is an additional 0.23 oﬀence. The
results from column (1) suggest the evolution of eﬀect over time is highly linear (at least
during the ﬁrst year) and column 3 shows a monthly decline of about 0.01 oﬀence. This
suggests that while the prison eﬀect declines over time, at least over the ﬁrst 2 years
ex-prisoners are likely reoﬀending more than non-prisoners (though bear in mind this is
a out-of-sample prediction for the analysis). This is not surprising - as noted above the
eﬀect of prison on reoﬀending is a priori ambiguous. On the 'positive' side there are
speciﬁc deterrent and rehabilitative eﬀects, but on the other hand there are also criminal
network, stigma and scarring eﬀects. On the whole it appears that higher reoﬀending is
correlated with going to prison, and this (prisons appearing criminogenic) is actually a
common observation from cross-sectional or OLS studies (e.g. Grogger 1995 or analysis in
Chapter 5). However, an obvious problem with OLS is that it assumes the probability of
going to prison is exogenous, which is very unlikely to hold. Previous research has shown
that ﬁxed eﬀects are important in this area (e.g. Grogger 1995 or analysis in Chapter 5)
in explaining outcomes. It is likely that criminals who are sentenced to prison are also
tougher criminals who have committed more serious crime and are more likely to reoﬀend
in the future. In this regard OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent.
Using the England riots as an instrument for the likelihood of getting a prison sentence
has been discussed above as a valid strategy to identify the causal eﬀect of incarceration
on outcomes, getting round the issue of endogeneity. Columns 2 and 4 from table 5 show
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the results of IV analysis. From the ﬂexible speciﬁcation it can be seen that, as informed
by the reduced form analysis, the estimates for k≤4 are indeed negative, with month 1
and month 3 signiﬁcantly so. Eyeballing the IV estimates for all k = 1,...,12, it is clear
that the evolution over time resembles a linear trend. When I impose the stacked linear
speciﬁcation, the estimated speciﬁc deterrence at the outset of prison release is -0.57 and
is signiﬁcant, ie prisons deter over half an oﬀence per prisoner during their ﬁrst month
of release. However, this speciﬁc deterrence deteriorates over time at a high estimated
rate of 0.1 oﬀence per additional month since release, meaning that by 6 months after
release prisons no longer have any rehabilitative or deterrent value and turns criminogenic
afterwards.
There are several discussion points around the results. Firstly, the IV results are cle-
arly diﬀerent from the OLS results both in terms of the initial eﬀect and the direction of
evolution, and conﬁrmed by a Hausman test as discussed later in section 4.3. This indi-
cates that endogeneity exists in the original OLS analysis - the universally criminogenic
nature of incarceration is to some extent spurious due to the inﬂuence of ﬁxed eﬀects.
However, despite successful identiﬁcation of speciﬁc deterrence, which is a uncommon
result in the literature and a conﬁrmation of the positive value that prisons can have,
the eﬀect also deteriorates very quickly, suggesting the negative eﬀects such as stigma
(looked at more closely in the next subsection under employment outcomes) and criminal
capital/network eﬀect eventually dominate. The diﬀerence in the proﬁle of the eﬀects can
have an impact on the cost-beneﬁt evaluation of prison-related policies and is important
to note both for academic and policy purposes. Secondly, while the level of statistical
signiﬁcance is barely enough to identify the speciﬁc deterrence eﬀect, especially in the
ﬂexible speciﬁcation, I argue that the issue is not one of signifcant concern. The problem
inherent in the current study design is that, while the ﬁrst stage analysis conﬁrms a sig-
niﬁcant riot eﬀect on the likelihood of incarceration, the absolute magnitude of the ﬁrst
stage estimate is rather small (even though economically speaking a 10% increase in the
odds is quite igniﬁcant) so there is not as much exogenous variation to be utilised as one
might have hoped. Better data in terms of exact court locations (currently riot eﬀects
in the courts are proxied at the police force area level for big areas like London Metro-
politan and this reduces the precision of the data since there are courts within London
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Metropolitan Police that did not deal with the riots at all) and a bigger theoretical churn
through the courts size will help. Even without them, some sigiﬁcance is already detected
and the trend is strong enough that I argue the result does not look like anomaly.
6.4.2 Employment equation
Apart from studying reoﬀending, this analysis also looks as employment after prison
release as an outcome. Reduced form regression results presented in table 4 suggests
rather little of interest - none of the estimates are statistically signiﬁcant and they seem
to scatter around zero. Unsurprisingly the same pattern is carried forward to the second
stage analysis. OLS and IV results are summarized in table 6 and ﬁgure 3.
OLS estimates from columns 1 and 4 of table 6 tell the typical cross-section story -
prisoners are less likely to be employed than a criminal otherwise punished, possible due
to stigma and criminal network or criminal capital eﬀects. As we hone in on the OLS
results in columns 1 and 2, we can see that the eﬀect of controlling for employment status
at the point of conviction is important in explaining post-release employment. Without
controlling for it, incarceration is estimated to reduce employment upon release by 10
percentage point at ﬁrst, and declining to 7 percentage point after a year has lapsed.
This is a less dramatic eﬀect than the popular belief, suggesting that the incremental
eﬀect of prison over and above that of criminal record is not big, echoing the analysis
presented in Chapter 5. Interestingly, when employment status at conviction is controlled
for, the estimated incarceration eﬀect reduces to only a 2 percentage point decrease, but
the proﬁle increases over time to 4 percentage point after a year. Due to the presence
of endogeneity in the OLS model as previously discussed, I refrain from drawing too
much insights from the results, but it is useful to note that individual ﬁxed eﬀects such as
pre-prison employment status are important factors in explaining post-custody outcomes.
This ﬁnding is borne out in other chapters of this thesis.
IV estimates that are free from the endogeneity problem paint a rather diﬀerent picture
from the OLS estimates. Evidently the standard errors of the IV estimates in columns 3
and 5 of table 6 are far too big to allow any statistical signiﬁcance, which again arguably
is a sample size issue. Nonetheless the IV estimates at least from the ﬂexible model in
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column 2 suggest that the prison eﬀect during the ﬁrst 9 months after release is positive,
despite eventually dipping below zero after 10 months. This has some interesting sym-
metry with the results from the reoﬀending equation - the identiﬁed short term speciﬁc
deterrence eﬀect coincide with a short period of positive employment and then both go
in the undesired direction.
That the estimates are suggesting the causal eﬀect of incarceration on employment
can be more positive than negative at ﬁrst (albeit not statistically signiﬁcant) is a surprise
in relation to other existing estimates in the literature. This result is also at odds with
ﬁndings from Chapter 5. The most plausible reason is that, as suggested by the large
standard errors, the estimates contain random noises and must be disregarded somewhat.
That said, another reason why this temporary positive eﬀect, potentially induced by
speciﬁc deterrence, has not been picked up in the literature is because of the timeframe
of the analysis. Most other studies do not study immediate outcomes and focus rather on
longer term eﬀects. This is mostly due to the way the counterfactual is set up diﬀerently -
the clock for prisoners in other papers usually start at the point of conviction hence the
results in the early periods from the clock start are disregarded to avoid the contamination
of incapacitation eﬀects. For example, Bhuller et. al (2016) reports prison eﬀects from 2
years on. The IV results here show that by 1 year after release, the incarceration eﬀects
on reoﬀending and employment would appear criminogenic already (ie consistent with the
rest of the literature) so it is possible that the other studies are simply not set up to detect
the very short-lived positive eﬀect of prisons on outcomes. In terms of a consistent theory
for the apparently counter-intuitive ﬁnding, it's useful to bear in mind at the beginning
of this chapter that I mention the channels through which prisons aﬀect outcomes are
multi-faceted, complex and ambiguous overall.
6.4.3 Robustness
I am unable to undertake the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions in this
case due to exact identiﬁcation in the research design. Instead I undertake the Hausman
test to check for endogeneity. Because of the clustering I can no longer implement the
classic Hausman test, which is based on the unlikely assumption that the OLS estimates
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are eﬃcient under the null hypothesis. I implement a robust version of the Hausman
test that is based on bootstrapping, on the linearised models. Results from column 1
of table 7 shows that endogeneity exists in the reoﬀending speciﬁcation. A p-value of
0.049 means that the null hypothesis of the IV estimates of σˆ being equal to the OLS
estimates is rejected at the 95% conﬁdence level, conﬁrming the public myth resulting
from cross-sectional analyses is indeed confounded in a causal analysis. In the case of
employment equation, the p-value is instead 0.865, suggest the null hypothesis of no
endogeneity cannot be rejected. This is interesting but most probably due to the large
standard errors of the IV estimates as noted above.
A second type of speciﬁcation robustness test I do is on the degree of polynomial in
the regression speciﬁcation. Equation 3 speciﬁes a linear evolution of the incarcernation
eﬀects which provide a neat interpretation that allows easy cost-beneﬁt analysis if one
wishes. I test whether the assumption is robust by adding higher degree polynomial terms
in both the reoﬀending and employment IV regressions. In terms of reoﬀending, columns
2 and 3 from table 8 show that higher degree polynomial terms are not estimated to
have statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect and the signs do not change, suggesting the original
speciﬁcation is robust. In terms of employment, however, column 5 shows that the qua-
dratic speciﬁcation ﬁts better and produces some statistical signiﬁcance especially to the
negative quadratic term. This is not a surprise given the proﬁle of eﬀects uncovered in
Figure 3. In any case the message borne out by the quadratic speciﬁcation is not con-
tradictory to the linear speciﬁcation - there are beneﬁts at ﬁrst but they eventually gives
way over time. The cubic speciﬁcation returns no estimates of statistical signiﬁcance.
Given the imprecise nature of the original estimates, it is hard to conclude that the linear
speciﬁcation to employment equation is robust, but although the quadratic speciﬁcation
ﬁts better, it sends a similar message.
6.5 Conclusion
The eﬀect of incarceration on later outcomes is an important policy topic that have been
debated much in the past, albeit unfortunately without much robust empirical evidence.
Given the rise in priosn population observed in the recent history in developed countries
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and the improvement to availability of micro-dataset, there is not a better time to re-
visit the question. The cross-sectional observation of a correlation between more severe
punishment and poorer post-custody recividivism and employment outcomes has led to
the popular belief that incarceration leads to poor outcomes possibly via stigma, deterio-
ration of human capital and criminal network eﬀects. Theoretical positive eﬀects such as
speciﬁc deterrence and rehabilitation are not given much consideration, and are in fact
largely undetected in the literature. A large part of this I believe is because research
design on the topic has historically been quite bad at dealing with endogeneity, limited
by the non-availability of micro-dataset with a suﬃcient time dimension that allows im-
plementation of quasi-/natural experimental methods. However, this is fast-changing and
an increasing body of empircal work is revisiting this policy area and returning robust
estimates using diﬀerent data sources.
This analysis is part of the aforementioned literature. I take a diﬀerent approach in
dealing with endogeneity from the popular method of utilising judge-level randomisation,
ie achieving identiﬁcation oﬀ judges' innate diﬀerences in their likelihood of giving harsh
punishment in face of the same oﬀence. My approach instead is to utilise natural experi-
ment, in this case the England riots in 2011, which as I demonstrate empirically increased
the likelihood of being given custody as punishment in the riot-aﬀected areas. Since the
event was exogenous, triggered by the unexpected death of a member of public, I argue
this makes my approach, in theory at least, superior than judge-level randomisation since
the driver of the variation in custody likelihood is demonstrably clearer and perhaps more
robust than if it is attributed to innate diﬀerences between individuals. While it is not
a requirement for the IV relevance condition to understand how innate diﬀerences lead
to diﬀerential custodial probability as long as the eﬀect is present (though presence of
monotonicity is highly preferred as discussed in Mueller-Smith 2015), criminal cases are
complex so even in the case of case randomisation when the diﬀerences are not understood
there may still be a small degree of endogeneity.
Using the England riots as an instrument, I ﬁnd short-lived speciﬁc deterrence eﬀect
of incarceration on recidivism, ie a reduction of reoﬀending, but it gives way to more cri-
minogenic eﬀect after 6 months. As far as I am aware, this is the ﬁrst quasi-experimental
study to empirically ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of speciﬁc deterrence. Bhuller et al (2016)
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also ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of incarceration on outcomes but since they are looking at longer
term outcomes they are much more likely to be rehabilitative eﬀects, particularly given
the way prisons and rehabilitation programs are set up in Norway (with a much more
positive, open and freedom-based approach compared to other countries). I also ﬁnd that
spending a short time in prison does not signiﬁcantly reduce employment prospects, at
least in the short term anyway. While the eﬀects are not statistically signiﬁcant, they are
more positive than negative in magnitude, springing further surprises. This demonstrates
clearly that the way prison impacts on individuals is complex and multi-faceted, with
many eﬀects competing with and countering each other over both short term and long
term. I believe I am able to detect results that are previously unreported because I have
focussed on a much shorter timescale than the rest of the literature.
In terms of policy implications, this study brings to light a couple. Firstly, even though
the positive eﬀect of prisons on reoﬀending is short-lived, it is previously undetected and
can change the cost-beneﬁt calculations in the appraisal of prison policy planning. Figure
2 shows that within the ﬁrst 6 months an estimated total of 2.1 reoﬀences are prevented
per ex-inmate. Back-of-envelop calculations using a combination of a Home Oﬃce (2005)
study on the cost of crimes against persons and latest ONS Crime in England and Wales
(2017) ﬁgures, and inﬂating appropriately, suggest the average cost of a typical oﬀence
against persons stands at about ¿2,600. Note that crimes against businesses are excluded
due to unavailabilty of both reliable data and cost estimates. Assuming an annual prison
release of 73,560 inmates using the latest MoJ (2017a) ﬁgure, together the numbers suggest
prisons could bring in around ¿400 million annually on social cost savings just due to the
short-lived speciﬁc deterrence that was previously unaccounted for. Considering the MoJ
annual budget of around ¿9 billion, the beneﬁt is not unsubstantial, standing at almost
5%. Of course, the analysis also shows that ex-inmates reoﬀend more after 6 months and
this cancels out speciﬁc deterrence, but such negative eﬀects are most probably included,
if not exaggerated, in existing calculations already given the previous body of research
and the popular belief. This point should not be taken as a nod for building more prisons,
merely that the estimates here are part of the big puzzle that needs to be solved.
Secondly, echoing results from previous chapters, the observation that prisoners, or
criminals, generally have poor outcomes is largely due to pre-determined factors before
123
they enter the criminal justice system, rather than due to the criminal justice system,
as I see that the causal estimates are much smaller than OLS estimates. Hypotheses
about social stigma of convictions or negative human capital eﬀects are not supported
here. To migitate those pre-determined factors, criminal justice can have a role to play, as
evident by Norway's very successful rehabilitation program (Bhuller et al 2016). However,
interventions that take place before entry into criminal justice system or at the onset of
criminal career may be more eﬀective in general in improving future outcomes of criminals.
Such interventions are likely outside the remit of the criminal justice system, such as
education, vocational training or even fostering the neighbourhood and environment in
which vulnerable children grow up in. Such interventions could provide individuals with
marketable skill sets and values that deter them from starting a criminal career or ensure
they can absorb the negative shock of a criminal conviction. For the UK, from the
evidence here at least, despite prisons having some beneﬁts putting more people to jail is
unlikely to be the ailment, nor is it a heavy aggravating factor, for recidivism.
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Figures and tables
Table 6.1: Comparison of assault and incarceration rate changes for selected developed
economies
Rate of incarceration Rate of assault
2004 2014 ∆% 2004 2014 ∆%
England and Wales 141 149 6% 965.5 649.1 -33%
United States of America 725 693 -4% 288.7 232.1 -20%
Japan 60 48 -20% 47 21 -55%
Denmark 70 67 -4% 203.8 164.6 -19%
Norway 66 72 9% 62.8 46.2 -26%
Portugal 125 135 8% 399.5 239.1 -40%
Germany 96 76 -21% 582.9 155.9 -73%
Source: United Nations Oﬃce on Drugs and Crime.
Note: The rates are per 100,000 population.
Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics of the analysis sample
Before riot: Riot areas Non-riot areas
Age (years) 31.2 (11.6) 29.8 (11.7)
White 0.677 (0.468) 0.908 (0.289)
Male 0.75 (0.433) 0.759 (0.428)
Pr(prison) 0.128 (0.334) 0.107 (0.309)
Pr(violence) 0.287 (0.452) 0.255 (0.436)
Pr(theft) 0.645 (0.479) 0.669 (0.471)
In a job currently? 0.123 (0.328) 0.132 (0.339)
Average prison length (days) 74.2 (48.3) 73.5 (48.9)
N 44,454 129,302
After riot: Riot areas Non-riot areas
Age (years) 32.4 (11.6) 31.3 (11.6)
White 0.692 (0.462) 0.91 (0.287)
Male 0.77 (0.421) 0.767 (0.423)
Pr(prison) 0.164 (0.371) 0.128 (0.334)
Pr(violence) 0.281 (0.45) 0.229 (0.42)
Pr(theft) 0.646 (0.478) 0.698 (0.459)
In a job currently? 0.103 (0.304) 0.109 (0.311)
Average prison length (days) 74.8 (48.1) 70.9 (47.8)
N 35,823 117,961
Standard deviations in parenthesis
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Table 6.4: Reduced form regression of outcomes on riot
Recidivism Employment
Riot eﬀect in month: (1) (2)
1 -0.932** (0.414) 0.015 (0.116)
2 -0.058 (0.370) -0.108 (0.173)
3 -0.762** (0.365) 0.015 (0.200)
4 -0.393 (0.344) 0.120 (0.212)
5 0.104 (0.344) 0.284 (0.224)
6 0.065 (0.326) 0.282 (0.227)
7 0.764** (0.312) 0.229 (0.231)
8 0.301 (0.302) 0.080 (0.234)
9 0.264 (0.293) -0.011 (0.234)
10 0.545* (0.281) -0.162 (0.235)
11 0.800** (0.271) -0.282 (0.235)
12 0.683** (0.263) -0.290 (0.236)
N 330,340
Note: The reported employment estimates are multiplied by 100. Controls include age,
age squared, police force area, crime type, ethnicity, gender, time and current employment.
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. **/* denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the
5%/10% level.
Table 6.3: Riot eﬀects on diﬀerent punishment outcomes
Outcome: Prison, Caution AD CD Fine CP SS
ﬁrst stage
βˆ × 100 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Riot 1.29** 0.251 -0.037 -0.920** -1.00** -0.475 0.572**
(0.319) (0.346) (0.039) (0.242) (0.233) (0.374) (0.266)
F 82.3
N 330,340
Note: controls include age, age squared, police force area, crime type, ethnicity, gender,
time and current employment. Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. **/* denotes
statistical signiﬁcance at the 5%/10% level.
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Table 6.5: OLS/IV regression of recidivism
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
γˆ1, Prison eﬀect in month:
1 0.218** (0.004) -0.721* (0.373)
2 0.192** (0.004) -0.045 (0.288)
3 0.202** (0.004) -0.589* (0.326)
4 0.185** (0.004) -0.304 (0.283)
5 0.182** (0.003) 0.081 (0.265)
6 0.173** (0.003) 0.051 (0.251)
7 0.157** (0.003) 0.591** (0.259)
8 0.152** (0.003) 0.233 (0.233)
9 0.142** (0.003) 0.205 (0.226)
10 0.135** (0.003) 0.422* (0.226)
11 0.128** (0.003) 0.620** (0.236)
12 0.122** (0.003) 0.529** (0.221)
σˆ1, Initial prison eﬀect: 0.225** (0.003) -0.600** (0.289)
(speciﬁc deterrence)
σˆ2, Linear monthly evolution: -0.008** (0.000) 0.106** (0.032)
Speciﬁcation Flexible Flexible Linear Linear
N 330,340
Note: Controls include age, age squared, police force area, crime type, ethnicity, gender,
time and current employment. Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. **/* denotes
statistical signiﬁcance at the 5%/10% level.
Table 6.6: OLS/IV regression of employment
OLS OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
γˆ1x100, Prison eﬀect in month:
1 -1.99** (0.08) -9.73** (0.13) 1.15 (8.86)
2 -2.62** (0.10) -9.07** (0.13) -8.28 (13.28)
3 -3.17** (0.11) -8.90** (0.13) 1.17 (15.1)
4 -3.49** (0.11) -8.64** (0.13) 9.19 (16.5)
5 -3.86** (0.12) -8.55** (0.13) 21.73 (17.9)
6 -3.98** (0.12) -8.32** (0.13) 21.59 (18.2)
7 -3.99** (0.12) -8.04** (0.13) 17.51 (18.2)
8 -4.03** (0.12) -7.83** (0.13) 6.11 (18.0)
9 -4.08** (0.12) -7.63** (0.13) -0.86 (17.8)
10 -4.14** (0.12) -7.51** (0.13) -12.91 (18.8)
11 -4.01** (0.12) -7.17** (0.13) -24.51 (21.0)
12 -4.00** (0.13) -6.99** (0.13) -34.36 (29.6)
σˆ1, Initial prison eﬀect: -2.59** (0.11) 14.90 (14.51)
σˆ2, Linear monthly evolution: -0.16** (0.01) -2.19 (2.28)
Speciﬁcation Flexible Flexible Flexible Linear Linear
Include current employment? Yes No Yes Yes Yes
N 330,340
Note: controls include age, age squared, police force area, crime type, ethnicity, gender,
time. Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. **/* denotes statistical signiﬁcance
at the 5%/10% level.
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Table 6.7: Hausman test of IV vs OLS estimates
Recidivism eq. Employment eq.
χ2 9.53 1.28
p-value 0.049 0.865
Reject H0 of no endogeneity? Yes No
Note: Results are from implementing the rhausman package on STATA, a cluster-
robust version of the Hausman test based on the bootstrap and does not require the OLS
estimators to be fully eﬃcient under the null hypothesis.
Table 6.8: Speciﬁcation tests of the IV regressions
Estimated Recidivism Recidivism Recidivism Employment Employment Employment
prison eﬀect: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial -0.600** -0.799** -0.775 14.900 -21.461 -15.944
(0.289) (0.378) (0.484) (14.506) (0.162) (18.348)
Evolution -
Linear 0.106** 0.191** 0.172 -2.190 13.741* 9.426
(0.032) (0.092) (0.236) (2.282) (7.582) (15.481)
Quadratic -0.656 -0.306 -125.788** -44.863
(x100) (0.586) (3.873) (63.505) (282.404)
Cubic -17.940 -4217
(x10000) (188.950) (14907)
Degree of polynomial One Two Three One Two Three
N 330,340
Note: Employment regression estimates are multiplied by 100, as in previous tables.
Controls include age, age squared, police force area, crime type, ethnicity, gender, time.
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. **/* denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the
5%/10% level.
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Figure 6.1: Probabilities of criminal justice punishment (time 0 = August 2011)
(a)
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Figure 6.1: Probabilities of criminal justice punishment (time 0 = August 2011)
(b)
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Figure 6.1: Probabilities of criminal justice punishment (time 0 = August 2011)
(c)
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Figure 6.1: Probabilities of criminal justice punishment (time 0 = August 2011)
(d)
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Figure 6.2: Estimated incarceration eﬀect on the number of reoﬀences




The empirical literature on the economics of criminal justice is, while not totally lacking,
not as lively as other ﬁelds related to social policy, such as labour market, health, edu-
cation, etc. A lack of experiments that would be deemed ethical and the highly sensitive
nature of personal level crime data mean that in the past there are limits to what data
econometricians have access to and what research designs they can deploy to identify use-
ful policy parameters. We see that early research by social researchers or economists were
typically based on either aggregated data or reasonably small-sized longitudinal studies
that were of voluntary nature, which somewhat restricted their usefulness. However, this
is about to change. As the world moves towards one with more microdata and higher
recognition for the value of linked data encompassing more inter-related outcomes, empi-
ricists have a big role to play in taking advantage of the movement to inform the research
agenda and policy debate. In this thesis I have used a new UK microdata covering crime,
labour market and beneﬁts outcomes to make three important empirical contributions.
First, I ﬁnd that post-custody supervision, contrary to the recent oﬀender management
policy movement in the UK, makes little diﬀerence to both crime and non-crime outcomes.
It is not found to have any rehabilitative eﬀect, at least not in the way the supervision
programme was run. Second, I ﬁnd that criminal convictions only cause rather short-
lived damages to earnings and employment prospective, which is at odds with perhaps
the traditional wisdom. Finally, I ﬁnd that incarceration can induce short term speciﬁc
deterrence eﬀect on inmates upon release but it fades and gives way to more criminogenic
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factors after 6 months. They are part of the new wave of empirical evidence on criminal
justice that is starting to emerge due to better availability of microdata around the world,
but a lot more can and should be done in time. Below I list several future avenues for
research.
The interplay between crime and labour market outcomes are complex and intricate
and an immediate extension to my thesis will be to look at the role of occupation, which
is overlooked here due to unavailability of information of employer information in my
dataset. While, for example, I ﬁnd that the eﬀect of criminal conviction is not as adverse
as traditional wisdom dictates, it will be interesting to see if this is because ex-inmates
moving down the skills ladder and getting employment in industries requiring lower skills
to compensate for the presence of criminal record which theoretically dampens employer's
demand and wage oﬀer. Occupation analysis will shed light on the some of 'black boxes'
that I have identiﬁed here. A further step, therefore, is to develop better and more
hollistic modelling of criminal behaviour, using the multi-dimensions of microdata to
validate and identify structural paramters regarding preference for crime-labour market
trade-oﬀ and responses to punishment. As discussed in the literature review, crime is a
complex behaviour that has dependencies on many other factors and currently even the
most sophisticated dynamic models fail to capture the intricacies and this limits their
usefulness in policy predictions.
Another strand of work that will beneﬁt hugely from availability of better microdata
is criminal career analysis. The crime-age proﬁle (Hirschi & Gottfredson 1983) is well-
documented around the world but the determinants of the proﬁle are less well-understood.
For example, the causes of onset, continuation and termination are under-explored but
clearly they have very important policy implications. A running theme through this
thesis, echoed in some part of the literature, is that the criminal justice system, or a
conviction record, or even a spell in the prison is limited in aﬀecting outcomes, whether
positively or negatively. Fixed eﬀects formed at the point of entrance to the criminal
justice system appear very important, suggesting that policies may be more eﬀective if
they follow a hollistic approach such as by looking also at health, education, training,
childhood development, deprivation, community, family upbringing etc. Micro-datasets
that track multiple of these outcomes and allow identiﬁcation of clusters (such as family,
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community, or school) will go a very long way to demystify some of the ﬁxed eﬀects and
allow policymakers and researchers to understand better the determinants of the criminal
career proﬁle and the counter-measures.
Recently, Kleinberg et al. (2015) points out that a policy problem can be divided into
a prediction and a causal inference component, and both are equally important though
economists tend to focus more on the latter. For instance, judges have to decide whether
to detain or release arrestees as they await adjudication of their case. Knowing the
causal relationship of pre-trial detention on outcome improves the policy in general, but
so does an accurate prediction about the arrestee's probability of committing a crime in
the pre-trial period. Kleinberg et al. (2017) show that machine learning techniques can
dramatically improve upon judges' predictions and substantially reduce the amount of
crime without adjusting the policy itself. While better microdata support causal analyses
like I have presented in this thesis and those listed above as potential future research,
they also lend themselves naturally to the fast-booming ﬁeld of data science, which is
more concerned with pattern recognition and prediction. Machine learning techniques
are better suited than standard econometric analysis in predicting recidivism risk or
employment likelihood, or sub-categorising oﬀenders that may have heterogenous eﬀects
for optimal policy response, etc. Future criminal justice research should consider cross-
cutting methods that incorporate machine learning such as those proposed by Athey and
Imbens (2016), to take advantage of the richness in new microdata in order to enhance
their usefulness for policy use.
All these are very exciting, of course. Criminal justice policies in the past have more
often than not been based on belief and hypothesis, valid as they may be, rather than
hard evidence. Better data will result in better research, which means the evidence base
for policymaking is going to be broadened and become more robust than ever.
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